Thomas Mormann

Abstract. In Dynamics of Reason Michael Friedman proposes a kind of synthesis between the neokantianism of Ernst Cassirer, the logical empiricism of Rudolf Carnap, and the historicism of Thomas Kuhn. Cassirer and Carnap are to take care of the Kantian legacy of modern philosophy of science, encapsulated in the concept of a relativized a priori and the globally rational or continuous evolution of scientific knowledge,while Kuhn´s role is to ensure that the historicist character of scientific knowledge is taken seriously. More precisely, Carnapian linguistic frameworks, guarantee that the evolution of science procedes in a rational manner locally,while Cassirer’s concept of an internally defined conceptual convergence of empirical theories provides the means to maintain the global continuity of scientific reason. In this paper it is argued that Friedman’s neokantian account of scientific reason based on the concept of the relativized a priori underestimates the pragmatic aspects of the dynamics of scientific reason. To overcome this short-coming, I propose to reconsider C.I. Lewis’s account of a pragmatic the priori, recently modernized and elaborated by Hasok Chang. This may be<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>Keywords: Dynamics of reason, Paradigms, Logical Empiricism,Neokantianism, Pragmatism, Mathematics, Communicative Rationality.

Geometry was a main source of inspiration for Carnap's conventionalism. Taking Poincaré as his witness, Carnap asserted in his dissertation Der Raum that the metrical structure of space is conventional while the underlying topological structure describes ‘objective’ facts. With only minor modifications he stuck to this account throughout his life. The aim of this paper is to disprove Carnap's contention by invoking some classical theorems of differential topology. It is shown that his metrical conventionalism is indefensible for mathematical reasons. This implies that the relation between topology and geometry cannot be conceptualized as analogous to the relation between the meaning of a proposition and its expression in some language as the logical empiricists used to say.

Carnap’s quasi-analysis is usually considered as an ingenious but definitively flawed approach in epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper it is argued that this assessment is mistaken. Quasi-analysis can be reconstructed as a representational theory of constitution of structures that has applications in many realms of epistemology and philosophy of science. First, existence and uniqueness theorems for quasi-analytical representations are proved. These theorems defuse the classical objections against the quasi-analytical approach launched forward by Goodman and others. Secondly, the constitution of various kinds of structures is treated in detail: order structures, comparative similarity structures, mereological, mereotopological, and topological structures are considered. In particular, it is pointed out that there exist interesting relations between quasi-analysis and modern theories of pointless topology.

In seiner "Intellektuellen Autobiographie" stellt Carnap die These auf, eine der dringendsten Aufgaben der Philosophie sei es, die verschiedenen möglichen Sprachformen zu untersuchen und ihre charakteristischen Eigenschaften aufzudecken. Diese Charakterisierung kann als ein Schlüssel für das Verständnis seines gesamten Denkens betrachtet werden. Carnap konzipiert Philosophie als Möglichkeitswissenschaft, d.h. als eine allgemeine Theorie, konzeptuelle Möglichkeiten zu formulieren und auszuloten. Aufgabe der Philosophie ist es nach Carnap, Vorschläge zu machen, nicht aber Thesen aufzustellen. Vorschläge zu machen aber heißt, Möglichkeiten aufzuzeigen. Diese Möglichkeitsorientierung ist eine Invariante, die sich in allen Phasen seines Denkens durchhält, von der Konstitutionstheorie des Logischen Aufbau der Welt bis hin zu seinen Arbeiten zur induktiven Logik. Anhand der Interpretation einiger zentraler Werke Carnaps soll diese Interpretation seiner Philosophie als einer Möglichkeitswissenschaft im Einzelnen belegt werden

In the first third of this century Cassirer was one of the leading, most influential philosophers of the German-speaking world. He was the respected opponent of such giants as Husserl, Russell, Schlick, Heidegger or Carnap who left their mark on the philosophical landscape until this very day. One might recall his discussion with Schlick on the philosophical relevance of Einstein’s relativity theory in the first decade of this century. Carnap reported to have received essential ideas for the Logical Construction of the World from Cassirer and other neo-Kantians; or, to recall a more spectacular event concerning Cassirer’s philosophy, one might mention the famous “Davos disputation” with Heidegger in 1929 which seems to have been a major philosophical event for the audience

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a peculiar debate between Ernst Cassirer and the Swedish philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau on Begriffstheorie that took place in the late thirties of the 20th century. This debate may be conceived as sort of ersatz of the discussion between Cas sirer's Neokantian Begriffstheorie on the one hand, and logical empiricist accounts on the other, in particular Schlick's Begriffstheorie as presented in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Although Schlick did not participate in personam in the discussion that took place between Cassirer and Marc-Wogau, one may consider him as a “virtual” participant of the debate, since his Begriffstheorie played an important role in the background, in particular for Cassirer. More precisely, I'd like to show that the debate can be read as a dispute on the feasibility of a “rich” account of Begriffstheorie, favored by Cassirer, and the necessity of restricting Begriffstheorie to an “austere” approach whose protagonists were Marc-Wogau and Schlick, although in a quite different ways. More generally, the debate on Begriffstheorie exemplifies the complex interactions — and non-interactions — between three important currents of scientific philosophy, namely, the Marburg Neokantianism of Cassirer, the scientifically minded philosophers of the Uppsala School, and, indirectly, the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle

The Vienna Circle’s relations to Polish Semantics comprise a rather large spectrum that reaches from Camap’s whole-hearted reception, Gödel’s partial anticipation that Neurath would completely reject semantics. According to Neurath, semantics was of no help for the empiricist program of the Vienna Circle. Quite the contrary, Neurath seems to have regarded Tarski as a sort of evil genius who led astray his closest philosophical friend Carnap, seducing him to leave the path of empiricist virtue and to become addicted to the vice of Aristotelian metaphysics

Contents: Preface. Introduction. J. ECHEVERRIA, A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: The Long and Winding Road to the Philosophy of Science in Spain. REPRESENTATION AND MEASUREMENT. A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: Theories as Representations. J. GARRIDO GARRIDO: The Justification of Measurement. O. FERNÁNDEZ PRAT and D. QUESADA: Spatial Representations and Their Physical Content. J.A. DIEZ CALZADA: The Theory-Net of Interval Measurement Theory. TRUTH, RATIONALITY, AND METHOD. J.C. GARCÍA-BERMEJO OCHOA: Realism and Truth Approximation in Economic Theory. W.J. GONZALEZ: Rationality in Economics and Scientific Predictions: A Critical Reconstruction of Bounded Rationality and Its Role in Economic Predictions. J.P. ZAMORA BONILLA: An Invitation to Methodonomics. LOGICS, SEMANTICS, AND THEORETICAL STRUCTURES. J.L. FALGUERA: A Basis for a Formal Semantics of Linguistic Formulations of Science. A. SOBRINO and E. TRILLAS: Can Fuzzy Logic Help to Pose Some Problems in the Philosophy of Science? J. de LORENZO: Demonstrative Ways in Mathematical Doing. M. CASANUEVA: Genetics and Fertilization: A Good Marriage. C.U. MOULINES: The Concept of Universe from a Metatheoretical Point of View. List of Contributors. Index of Names