Thomas Mormann

Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap's mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap's non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap's persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris's and Kaplan's pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy.

In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation berween empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way

The aim of this paper is to show that global scientific promises aka “scientific world-conceptions” have an interesting history that should be taken into account also for contemporary debates. I argue that the prototypes of many contemporary philosophical positions concerning the role of science in society can already be found in the philosophy of science of the 1920s and 1930s. First to be mentioned in this respect is the Scientific World-Conception of the Vienna Circle (The Manifesto) that promised to contribute to the realization of an enlightened, rational and science-oriented society and culture. The Manifesto was not the only „scientific world-conception“ that philosophers and scientists put forward in the 1920s. Also the scientific world-conception of the philosopher and physicist Moritz Schlick, and the Weltanschauung of Sigmund Freud deserve to be mentioned. Still other examples of are Carnap’s Scientific Humanism and the project of The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science which was related to American pragmatism as well, as is shown by Charles W. Morris and others. Forgotten for a long time, since the beginning of the 21rst century, at least some of the Viennese projects are reconsidered in a new wave of „socially engaged philosophy of science”.

The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori of Physical Theory (Pap 1946, henceforth FAP) and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (Cassirer 1937, henceforth DI) may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to show that the topological interpretation of knowledge as an interior kernel operator K of a topological space (X, OX) comes along with a partially ordered family of belief modalities B that fit K in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all axioms of Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief with the exception of the contentious axiom of negative introspection (NI). The new belief modalities B introduced in this paper are defined with the help of the (dense) nuclei of the Heyting algebra OX of open subsets on the topological space (X, OX). In this way, the natural context for the belief operators B related to topological knowledge operator K is shown to be the Heyting algebra NUC(OX) of the nuclei of the Heyting algebra OX.1 More precisely, the dense nuclei of NUC(OX) can be used to define a variety of bimodal logics of knowledge operators K and belief operators B. The operators K and B are compatible with each other in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all axioms of Stalnaker’s KB system with the exception of the axiom (NI). Therefore, for (X, OX), one obtains a bounded, partially ordered family of belief operators B defined by the elements of NUC(OX).

The aim of this paper is to present a topological method for constructing discretizations of topological conceptual spaces. The method works for a class of topological spaces that the Russian mathematician Pavel Alexandroff defined more than 80 years ago. The aim of this paper is to show that Alexandroff spaces, as they are called today, have many interesting properties that can be used to explicate and clarify a variety of problems in philosophy, cognitive science, and related disciplines. For instance, recently, Ian Rumfitt used a special type of Alexandroff spaces to elucidate the logic of vague concepts in a new way. Moreover, Rumfitt’s class of Alexandroff spaces can be shown to provide a natural topological semantics for Susanne Bobzien’s “logic of clearness”. Mainly due to the work of Peter Gärdenfors and his collaborators, conceptual spaces have become an increasingly popular tool of dealing with a variety of problems in the fields of cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics and philosophy. For Gärdenfors’s conceptual spaces, geometrically defined discretizations play an essential role. These tessellations can be shown to be extensionally equivalent to topological tessellations that can be constructed for Alexandroff spaces in general. Thereby, Rumfitt’s and Gärdenfors’s constructions turn out to be special cases of an approach that works for a more general class of spaces, namely, for weakly scattered Alexandroff spaces. The main aim of this paper is to show that this class of spaces provides a convenient framework for conceptual spaces as used in epistemology and related disciplines in general. Weakly scattered Alexandroff spaces are useful for elucidating problems related to the logic of vague concepts, in particular they offer a solution of the Sorites paradox. Further, they provide a semantics for the logic of clearness that overcomes certain problems of the concept of higher-order vagueness. Moreover, these spaces help find a natural place for classical syllogistics in the framework of conceptual spaces. The specialization order of Alexandroff spaces can be used to refine the all-or-nothing distinction between prototypical and non-prototypical stimuli in favor of a gradual distinction between more or less prototypical elements of conceptual spaces. The greater conceptual flexibility of the topological approach helps avoid some inherent inadequacies of the geometrical approach, for instance, the so-called “thickness problem”. Finally, it is shown that the Alexandroff spaces offer an appropriate framework to deal with digital conceptual spaces that are gaining more and more importance in the areas of artificial intelligence, computer science and related disciplines.

This paper deals with Natorp’s version of the Marburg mathematical philosophy of science characterized by the following three features: The core of Natorp’s mathematical philosophy of science is contained in his “knowledge equation” that may be considered as a mathematical model of the “transcendental method” conceived by Natorp as the essence of the Marburg Neo-Kantianism. For Natorp, the object of knowledge was an infinite task. This can be elucidated in two different ways: Carnap, in the Aufbau, contended that this endeavor can be divided into two distinct parts, namely, a finite “constitution” of the object of knowledge and an infinite incompletable empirical description. In contrast, and more in the original spirit of Cohen and Natorp, the physicist and philosopher Margenau in The Nature of Physical Reality (Margenau. 1950) conceived the infinity of this “Aufgabe” as an infinite dialectical process, in which relative “data” and “conceptual constructs” determine each other. This dialectical process eliminates the dichotomy between Anschauung and Begriff that distinguished the Marburg Neo-Kantianism from Kantian orthodoxy, namely, the abandonment of the difference between intuition and concept. Finally, the paper deals with the non-Archimedean geometrical systems that played a central role in Natorp’s defence of Cohen’s “infinitesimal” metaphysics.

Bis heute wird Russells Philosophie nicht selten der Vorwurf gemacht, es fehle ihr an Kohärenz und Zusammenhang. Russell wird als ein Autor charakterisiert, der alle paar Jahre eine neue alternative Philosophie vorgeschlagen habe. In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll dagegen argumentiert werden, daß diese These auf einer zu oberflächlichen Ein–schätzung von Russells Denken beruht. Seine Philosophie verfügte sehr wohl über eine Einheit, die durch ihre charakteristische einheitsstiftende Methode vermittelt wurde. Dies war die Methode der logischen Analyse, die sich als Invariante in allen Phasen seines Denkens durchhielt. Die logische Analyse erlaubte es, die in gegebenen Sach–verhalten enthaltenen Möglichkeiten zu explizieren. Philosophie wurde damit für Russell zu einer “Möglichkeitswissenschaft”.

The global relation between logical empiricism and American pragmatism is one of the more difficult problems in history of philosophy. In this paper I’d like to take a local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern the vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter of logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, Ernest Nagel. In this paper, I want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the then „new“ logical-empiricist philosophy. In the beginning Nagel welcomed logical empiricism whole-heartedly. This early enthusiasm did not last. At the end of his philosophical career Nagel’s early positive attitude towards logical empiricism shown in the 1930s had been replaced by a much more reserved one. Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with the Carnapian version of logical empiricist philosophy was clearly expressed in Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic and more generally in his last book Teleology Revisited and Other Essays on History and Philosophy of Science. There he critized harshly Carnap’s philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and non-pragmatist. One of the distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science is the emphasis that he put on the role of history of science for philosophy of science. A compelling evidence for this attitude are his works on the history and philosophy of geometry and algebra One may say that Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities of how the profession of a philosopher of science could be understood: Carnap as a „conceptual engineer“ was engaged in the task of inventing the conceptual tools for a better theoretical understanding of science, while Nagel was to be considered more as a „public intellectual“ engaged in the project of realizing a more rational and enlightened society.

The aim of this paper is to show that (elementary) topology may be useful for dealing with problems of epistemology and metaphysics. More precisely, I want to show that the introduction of topological structures may elucidate the role of the spatial structures (in a broad sense) that underly logic and cognition. In some detail I’ll deal with “Cassirer’s problem” that may be characterized as an early forrunner of Goodman’s “grue-bleen” problem. On a larger scale, topology turns out to be useful in elaborating the approach of conceptual spaces that in the last twenty years or so has found quite a few applications in cognitive science, psychology, and linguistics. In particular, topology may help distinguish “natural” from “not-so-natural” concepts. This classical problem that up to now has withstood all efforts to solve (or dissolve) it by purely logical methods. Finally, in order to show that a topological perspective may also offer a fresh look on classical metaphysical problems, it is shown that Leibniz’s famous principle of the identity of indiscernibles is closely related to some well-known topological separation axioms. More precisely, the topological perspective gives rise in a natural way to some novel variations of Leibniz’s principle.

Quine’s classic interpretation succinctly characterized Carnap’s Aufbau as an attempt “to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data ….” Consequently, “Russell” was characterized as the most important influence on the Aufbau. Those times have passed. Formulating a comprehensive and balanced interpretation of the Aufbau has turned out to be a difficult task and one that must take into account several disjointed sources.My thesis is that the core of the Aufbau rested on a problem that had haunted German philosophy since the end of the nineteenth century. In terms fashionable at the time, this problem may be expressed as the polarity between Leben and Geist that characterized German philosophy during the years of the Weimar Republic. At that time, many philosophers, including Cassirer, Rickert and Vaihinger, were engaged in overcoming this polarity. As I will show, Carnap’s Aufbau joined the ranks of these projects. This suggests that Lebensphilosophie and Rickert’s System der Philosophie (1921) (henceforth System) exerted a strong influence on Carnap’s projects, an influence that is particularly conspicuous in his unpublished manuscript Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit (1922). Carnap himself asserted that this manuscript could be considered “the germ of the constitution theory” of the Aufbau. Reading Chaos also reveals another strong but neglected influence on the Aufbau, namely a specific version of neutral monism put forward by the philosopher and psychologist Theodor Ziehen before World War I. Ziehen’s work contributed much to the invention of the constitutional method of quasi-analysis.

© The Authors [2017]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] book Space, Number, and Geometry from Helmholtz to Cassirer is a reworked version of Francesca Biagioli’s PhD thesis. It aims ‘[to offer] a reconstruction of the debate on non-Euclidean geometry in neo-Kantianism between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century’. More precisely, Biagioli concentrates on how the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism dealt with what may be called ‘Helmholtz’s challenge’ to the classical Kantian thesis that the geometry of space is necessarily Euclidean. To be precise, besides the Marburg current, SNG also deals with some other neo-Kantians, among them the realist neo-Kantian Alois Riehl and the South-West German neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch.According to SNG, the Marburg revision of the Kantian theory of space opened the door to a new way...

En esta réplica a la crítica que Sergio Martínez hace de nuestro artículo "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" sostenemos que su posición está basada en una aceptación acrítica de algunas dicotomías tradicionales y en una interpretación algo distorsionada de la historia de la filosofía. Indicamos que el enfoque expuesto en UTC no puede calificarse de formalista. En filosofía de la ciencia la distinción entre el enfoque "formalista" y el "historicista" es ya obsoleta. Por ello, tanto las herramientas formales como las informales son de utilidad en la elucidación del concepto de representación, concepto clave de UTC. Además, sostenemos que los argumentos que Martínez recaba de la historia de la filosofía contra nuestro enfoque no son atinados. \\\ In this reply to Martínez's discussion of our paper "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" we argue that his criticism is informed by the uncritical acceptance of some traditional dichotomies and a rather distorted interpretation of the history of philosophy. We point out that UTC should not be characterized as a formalist approach. The distinction between "formalist" and "historicist" accounts in philosophy of science is obsolete. Henee, formal and informal means are useful for the explication of the concept of representation to be considered as a key concept of UTC. Moreover, we argue that the arguments from history of philosophy Martínez launches against our account are ill-founded.