Andrew Altman

Modern liberalism developed out of the strife of post-Reformation religious warfare. Among liberalism's central ideas were those of the individual's right of religious liberty and the separate jurisdictions of secular and religious authority. In societies that accepted these ideas and put them into institutional practice, levels of systemic religious violence were dramatically diminished. Moreover, the liberal principles that helped to build and sustain civil peace could make a strong claim to providing a just framework for addressing religious differences. Yet important normative questions have remained about the policies a liberal state should adopt toward religion.

Democracy is regularly heralded as the only form of government that treats political subjects as free and equal citizens. On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that democracy unavoidably restricts individual freedom, and it is not the only way to treat all citizens equally. In light of these observations, we argue that the non‐instrumental reasons to support democratic governance stem, not from considerations of individual freedom or equality, but instead from the importance of respecting group self‐determination. If this is correct, it implies that a state may choose democracy, but its right to self‐determination means that it is also free, in principle, to decide in favor of some nondemocratic alternative.

For several decades, Ronald Dworkinhas been one of the most prominent voicesdefending the legality and justifiability ofrace-conscious programs aimed at undoing thecontinuing effects of prejudice. Writingwithin the framework of a liberal legalphilosophy, he has formulated powerfularguments against the view that color-blindpolicies are the only defensible ones. Nonetheless, I argue that a more completeliberal defense of race-conscious policieswould need to develop and modify Dworkin's lineof argument. Such a defense would go beyondhis policy-based arguments and incorporatearguments of principle. Race-conscious policiesdo not only promote the general good; they arealso required in order to help realize theconstitutional right of equal citizenship.

This chapter critically examines the jurisprudence of free expression under human rights law and American constitutional doctrine, focusing on the issue of Holocaust denial. It is argued that legal prohibitions aimed at Holocaust denial are unjustifiable in any existing liberal state. The argument hinges on a revised form of a doctrine at the heart of a key American free speech case, _Brandenburg v. Ohio_. The revised _Brandenburg_ doctrine holds that speech ought not to be prohibited, regardless of the viewpoint it advocates, unless the speech is a) intended and likely to bring about immediate lawless conduct, or b) reasonably expected to contribute substantially to widespread violence. This doctrine is defended, and it is shown to tell against prohibitions on Holocaust denial in existing liberal states.