Matthew Soteriou

In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view-the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general

A variety of different proposals have been made about the nature of sounds. Although these proposals differ in a number of significant respects, some common assumptions appear to be made by their advocates: (1) the assumption that sounds possess audible, acoustic features, such as timbre, pitch, and loudness (and so the assumption that a sound is not a property that is identical to any one of those audible features); and (2) the assumption that sounds are one kind of thing. The second assumption is rarely defended in debates about sound and auditory perception. This chapter explores ways in which such debates are affected if the relevant assumption is rejected.

This chapter introduces some of the main issues and themes addressed by the contributors to this book. It provides an overview of debates concerning the scope of our mental agency — i.e. which aspects of our mental lives should be regarded as mental actions. There is a discussion of some of the different structures mental agency may take, and whether any such structures are distinctive of mental, as opposed to bodily, action. The chapter also highlights some of the connections that have been forged between accounts of mental agency and debates about self-knowledge, and the ontology and phenomenology of mind.

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one's attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time-travel—a case of re-visiting, or re-acquaintance with, some past episode.