Kai Horsthemke

In 2005 and 2008, respectively, two books by well-established and -respected analytical philosophers caused some controversy, not only because of their provocative and eye-catching titles but also because of the sheer brevity of the essays they contained. Harry Frankfurt’s book, which analysed the prevalence of ‘bullshit’ in contemporary society, was generally lauded for elevating a slang term to a new epistemological category, despite some people’s understandable unease with the author’s opportunist focus on a popular obscenity. Critics were generally less kind with regard to Colin McGinn’s book, pointing out that his analysis adds little, if anything, to the general understanding of mental manipulation, and that he has little to say about the factors that influence the frequency with which mindfucking occurs in contemporary society. After arguing that mindfucking is a special kind of psychological manipulation , the present paper investigates the possible educational significance and application of these two notions. It pays special attention to the factors affecting the frequency and magnitude with which bullshit and mindfucking occur in contemporary society, not only in our culture but in other cultures too

The question of elephant “management”, presented here as epitomizing the conflicts of interests between human beings and free-ranging animals, is widely regarded as one of the more intractable problems on the African continent. Generally valued as magnificent and among the most intelligent members of the continent’s population of free-roaming animals, admired by Africans and foreign tourists alike, elephants are also considered to be among the most problematic in that they have a substantial impact on their environment. What makes the issue of “culling”—or “legal” killing for purposes of population management—different from cases of abuse and cruelty is that killing is characteristically seen to require justification, whether in terms of resources, health, welfare or interests. Such a defence, which is characteristically not forthcoming in instances of abuse and cruelty, may assume several forms, or combinations of the following considerations: cultural, scientific, economic, and/or moral. Confronting advocates of killing on their home territory, this chapter argues that—just as it is morally reprehensible as a means towards curbing human overpopulation and human environmental degradation—killing is impermissible in the case of non-human animals, especially in cases where these animals are relevantly similar to human beings.

The section New Areas and Developments presents essays on relatively new topics and concerns that have attracted the interest of philosophers of education in recent years, as well as novel approaches to philosophy of education. To date, emerging issues that have garnered considerable media attention, such as cyberbullying, school shootings, or radicalization, have been addressed predominantly from psychological and sociological perspectives. By contrast, the essays in this section focus on the philosophical questions that emerge from a study of these phenomena. Other topics, such as academic freedom or the question of non-human animals, are not exactly new but appear to be generating new work within philosophy of education. Finally, the increasing interdisciplinarity of academic departments and institutions, and of academic work generally, arguably requires that philosophers of education examine the boundaries of their field. A few of the essays in this section are concerned, explicitly or implicitly, with the need to address these boundaries and the connections with contiguous fields.

Questions about the cognitive and conative life, as well as the status and treatment of other-than-human animals have been receiving systematic consideration by philosophers for close to 50 years. Courses on comparative psychology, animal ethics and animal rights have been introduced in the undergraduate and postgraduate curricula of a substantial number of universities worldwide. It is all the more puzzling, then, that fairly little has been produced on the subject within philosophy of education, apart from the odd reference to humane education. By contrast, environmental education has received wide coverage, not only by philosophers but also by other social scientists, natural scientists and politicians.The present chapter attempts, at least in part, to fill this gap. It reviews empirical evidence for the purported links between animal abuse and human violence.The chapter’s chief normative focus is both on the moral implications of a psychophysical continuum between humans and non-humans and on the promise of theriocentric education. Does anti-racist and antisexist education logically entail anti-speciesist education? Similarly, is there a necessary link between human rights education and animal rights education?In attempting to answer these questions, the chapter presents an account of moral education as both education in matters of social justice and education in ‘moral feeling’, cultivation of moral sentiments. Given most children’s natural interest in, and feeling for, animals, this should arguably be easier than is commonly assumed.However, it does require some effort and commitment on the part of educators, parents and teachers alike.

‘Critical animal historiography’ arguably emanates from ‘critical animal studies’, which evolved from ‘animal studies’. After briefly tracing these connections and developments, this chapter considers the question to what extent, if any, it is meaningful to regard other-than-human animals as subjects of and as both agents and recipients in history, as individual subjects of experience who impact and who are impacted by historical processes. The notion, especially, of animals being considered subjects of history gives rise to two additional issues. The first concerns the possible conflict between experiential perspectives (or subjective experiences) and history. The second concerns animals’ standpoints. Do animals have standpoints at all? If they do, is it possible to represent these in non-anthropocentric ways and without erroneously anthropomorphising other-than-human animals? This chapter constitutes a critical contribution to the work done by Steven Best, Richard Kahn, Anthony Nocella II, and others. Rejecting relativism, it is critical of some of the epistemological commitments of critical animal studies while endorsing the normative conclusions drawn by these authors.