•  902
    Testing Sripada's Deep Self model
    Philosophical Psychology 25 (5). 2012.
    Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the ?Deep Self model,? according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, then we present cases that …Read more
  •  894
    Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?
    Philosophical Explorations 19 (3): 290-305. 2016.
    “Frankfurt-style cases” are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners are inconsistent, and this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the locatio…Read more
  •  57
    Review: The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron (review)
    Philosophical Psychology 25 (2). 2012.
  •  332
    A Dispositional Theory of Love
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3): 342-357. 2013.
    On a naive reading of the major accounts of love, love is a kind of mental event. A recent trend in the philosophical literature on love is to reject these accounts on the basis that they do not do justice to the historical dimension of love, as love essentially involves a distinctive kind of temporally extended pattern. Although the historicist account has advantages over the positions that it opposes, its appeal to the notion of a pattern is problematic. I will argue that an account of love as…Read more