Allan Hazlett

The idea that the imagination can help us acquire knowledge is relatively uncontroversial. For example, that you can imagine some state of affairs seems like evidence that that state of affairs is possible. But imagination sometimes plays a more central role in the acquisition of knowledge: imagination sometimes amounts to knowledge, rather than merely being among the causes of knowledge. In the same way that instances of belief amount to knowledge in paradigm cases of knowledge, instances of imagination can amount to knowledge. In the relevant cases, your imagination that p is partly constitutive of your knowledge that p. Such cases include some cases of knowledge from fiction, providing one way in which engagement with fiction can provide knowledge.

What is the relationship between the theory of knowledge and linguistics? Consider a familiar epistemological methodology, on which facts about how “knows” is ordinarily used provide evidence for and against particular views about the nature and scope of knowledge. Since “knows” is a word in English, which is one of many human languages, this methodology is problematic, akin to a species of cultural chauvinism. I suggest that we should reject the familiar linguistics-driven methodology, in favor of a picture on which theorizing about knowledge is driven by the stipulation of the value of knowledge, and is not beholden to linguistic intuitions.

“Anti-realism” about epistemic normativity is articulated and defended against objections. First, a socio-epistemological vindication of the practice of epistemic evaluation is advanced. Second, three accounts of the semantics of epistemic evaluation (error theory, expressivism, and “convention-relativism”) are sympathetically discussed. Epistemic evaluation is favorably compared to evaluation relative to the rules of a club and to rules of etiquette. Finally, a definition of “epistemic” is provided, and “pluralism about doxastic evaluation” is proposed.

“Kantian” approaches to epistemic normativity, on which truth is belief’s constitutive standard of correctness (regardless of the desires of the believer), are articulated and criticized. A “normative” conception of belief is considered. It is argued that Kantian approaches are in tension with philosophical naturalism. More importantly, it is argued, the main argument for the Kantian’s view is unsound: the reality of the phenomena suggestive of the Kantian’s view (e.g. doxastic involuntarism) is contingent, and not necessary. Other arguments for the Kantian’s view are also criticized.

“Darwinian” approaches to epistemic normativity, which is explain epistemic normativity in terms of the biological function of belief, are articulated and criticized. A “biological” conception of belief, on which the biological function of belief is to be true, is considered. It is argued that Darwinian approaches depend on the problematic assumption that biological functioning is valuable, and that the plausibility of these approaches depends on empirical knowledge about the natural history of human cognition that we presently do not possess. The possibility of non-epistemic biological functions of belief is considered.

It is argued that false belief is often better for a person than true belief, by appeal to the psychological literature on “self-enhancement bias” – bias in favor of a positive self-conception. Such bias was described by Hume, who called it pride or “greatness of mind.” Empirical research on self-enhancement bias – overly positive self-evaluation, unrealistic optimism, and illusion of control – is reviewed. It is argued that such bias is often valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer, and objections to this conclusion are presented and discussed.

Two ideas are introduced. The first idea, which is evaluative, is that that true belief is better than false belief – as suggested by Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living. The second idea, which is metaphysical, is that there is something in the nature or essence of human beings, or in the nature or essence of our beliefs, that makes us, or our beliefs, directed at truth – as suggested by Aristotle’s claim that everyone naturally wants knowledge. Although a few important conclusions are drawn, most big issues are introduced here and examined in detail in later chapters.

There seem to be repeatable artworks. Plays and musical works (like _Hamlet_ or ‘Pictures at an Exhibition’) can be performed again and again; installations (like Sol LeWitt’s _Wall Drawing #260)_ can be installed over and over; culinary dishes (like Jean-George Vongerichten’s tuna tartare) can be prepared many times. This chapter offers an argument against the existence of repeatable artworks. First, the chapter argues that an artwork is repeatable only if it is an abstract object. This jives with standard accounts of repeatable works, which take them to be abstracta. Second, it argues that abstract objects must have all their properties essentially. Finally, since repeatable artworks, if there are any, do not have all their properties essentially, the chapter concludes that there are no repeatable artworks.

In this paper, I argue that the fact that truth is the correctness condition for belief and assertion does not entail that truth is a value—it does not entail that true beliefs and true assertions are good. The way I will put this point is by saying that correctness does not entail goodness. It follows from this that correctness is not a species or kind of goodness and that being correct is not a way of being good. I consider an objection to this, to the effect that correctness amounts to goodness qua representation, and discuss some the consequences of my thesis in the realm of reasons.

There is a philosophical puzzle about blaming people for their attitudes that arises because we lack direct voluntary control over our attitudes. The fact that we lack direct voluntary control over our attitudes suggests that we are not responsible for them. Defenders of blaming people for their beliefs have appealed to various senses in which we are responsible for our beliefs, despite our lacking direct voluntary control over them. In this paper, I pursue a different strategy. I argue that it is something fitting to be ashamed of your beliefs, or, to put this another way, that it is sometimes fitting to feel shame for believing something. I articulate an account of shamefulness, on which the shameful is a species of legitimate expectation violation. By contrast with blameworthiness, shamefulness does not entail responsibility. For this reason, the fittingness of shame for beliefs (i.e. doxastic shame), unlike the fittingness of blame for beliefs (i.e. doxastic blame), is orthogonal to questions of responsibility. Independent of whether we are responsible for our beliefs, doxastic shame can be fitting.

What do we ordinarily mean when we describe people as authentic or inauthentic? We describe friends, enemies, acquaintances, and colleagues as authentic and inauthentic, as well as politicians, celebrities, and other public figures. What are we saying about someone, when we say that they are authentic or inauthentic? I argue that authenticity is transparency: that you are authentic to the extent that you are transparent and inauthentic to the extent that you are opaque. I contrast my account with three alternative accounts of authenticity: the view that authenticity is fidelity to your true self, the view that authenticity is a species of selfknowledge, and the view that authenticity is a species of non-conformity. I will argue that my proposed account, unlike its rivals, can explain a basic intuition about personal authenticity: that people who are fakes – i.e. phonies or poseurs – are inauthentic people.

Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community

One function of knowledge attributions is to make social comparisons: to imply that one person, but not some salient other person or people, knows something. When we attribute an item of common knowledge to S, however, it is false that S, but not some salient other person or people, knows. For this reason, attributions of common knowledge sometimes seem false. In this chapter, I will argue that the anti-skeptical philosopher’s utterance of “I know that I’m not deceived by a demon” seems false because it is an assertion of common knowledge. This provides a tool for theorists of anti-skeptical entitlement theorists to use in diagnosing skeptical intuitions.

In this paper I examine unjust deficits of criticism, or what I call cases of “critical injustice.” In paradigm cases of testimonial injustice, prejudice leads one person to give insufficient credibility to another. In paradigm cases critical injustice, prejudice leads one person to offer insufficient criticism of another. Here I articulate the concept of critical injustice and give an explanation of why it is a species of injustice. I also describe a non-prejudicial species of critical injustice and discuss a possible tension between the goal of preventing testimonial injustice and the goal of preventing critical injustice.

Intellectual pride is pride about intellectual matters – for example, knowledge about what you know, about your intellectual virtues, or about your intellectual achievements. It is the opposite of intellectual humility (e.g. knowledge about what you don’t know, about your intellectual vices, or about your intellectual failures). In this paper I will advocate for intellectual pride by explaining its importance in the contexts of education (where a lack of pride threatens to undermine motivation), intellectual marginalization (where a lack of pride threatens to facilitate oppression), and collective inquiry (where a lack of pride threatens to undermine public discourse). In these contexts, intellectual humility is problematic and intellectual pride is valuable. I’ll go on to offer a sketch of intellectual pride as a virtue. Just as the virtue of intellectual humility comprises excellence in negative intellectual self-evaluation, the virtue of intellectual pride comprises excellence in positive intellectual self-evaluation.