-
Review of Brown and Cappelen, Assertion (Oxford University Press) (review)Mind 121 (483): 784-788. 2012.
-
160The maturation of the Gettier problemPhilosophical Studies 172 (1): 1-6. 2015.Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis , dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true belief …Read more
-
16Realism and RelativismIn John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Springer. pp. 33--53. 2013.
-
29New Waves in Metaphysics (edited book)Palgrave-Macmillan. 2010.Introduction; A.Hazlett Quantification, Naturalness, and Ontology; R.P.Cameron Two Problems of Composition in Collective Action; S.R.Chant Another Look at the Reality of Race, By Which I Mean Racef; J.Glasgow Bringing Things About; N.Judisch Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits; U.Kriegel Empirical Analyses of Causation; D.Kutach Brutal Individuation; A.Hazlett Ghosts in the World Machine? Humility and Its Alternatives; R.Langton& C.Robichaud Is Everything Relative? Anti-Realism, Truth, and Femi…Read more
-
111How to defend response moralismBritish Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3): 241-255. 2009.Here I defend response moralism, the view that some emotional responses to fi ctions are morally right, and others morally wrong, from the objection that responses to merely fi ctional characters and events cannot be morally evaluated. I defend the view that emotional responses to fi ctions can be morally evaluated only to the extent that said responses are responses to real people and events.
-
159The Social Value of Non-Deferential BeliefAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1): 131-151. 2016.We often prefer non-deferential belief to deferential belief. In the last twenty years, epistemology has seen a surge of sympathetic interest in testimony as a source of knowledge. We are urged to abandon ‘epistemic individualism’ and the ideal of the ‘autonomous knower’ in favour of ‘social epistemology’. In this connection, you might think that a preference for non-deferential belief is a manifestation of vicious individualism, egotism, or egoism. I shall call this the selfishness challenge to…Read more
-
564A Problem For Relational Theories of ColorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 140-145. 2010.We argue that relationalism entails an unacceptable claim about the content of visual experience: that ordinary ‘red’ objects look like they look like they look like they’re red, etc.
-
5427Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on KnowledgeActa Analytica 27 (4): 461-478. 2012.In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true even if p isn’t true. The fourth (Ibid.) – w…Read more
-
31Review of Pylyshyn, Things and Places (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4): 544-546. 2008.
-
15Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of AnalysisInternational Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 131-136. 2010.
-
143Knowledge and ConversationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3). 2009.You are clever, Thrasymachus, I said, for you know very well that if you asked anyone how much is twelve, and as you asked him you warned him: "Do not, my man, say that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for I will not accept such nonsense," it would be quite clear to you that no one can answer a question asked in those terms. (Republic 337b).
-
746David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condi…Read more
-
66Epistemic conceptions of begging the questionErkenntnis 65 (3): 343-363. 2006.A number of epistemologists have recently concluded that a piece of reasoning may be epistemically permissible even when it is impossible for the reasoning subject to present her reasoning as an argument without begging the question. I agree with these epistemologists, but argue that none has sufficiently divorced the notion of begging the question from epistemic notions. I present a proposal for a characterization of begging the question in purely pragmatic terms.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Aesthetics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Social Epistemology |