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64A normative theory of meaning (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1). 2002.One has some idea of what to expect from the theory of meaning offered in The Grammar of Meaning even before opening the book, since Bob Brandom, who should know, says on the book’s jacket that, according to the authors
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272Meaning In Speech and In ThoughtPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 141-159. 2013.If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional-attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p-meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t-meaning). Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of…Read more
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149Interest-Relative Invariantism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist
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2Does mentalese have a compositional semantics?In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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228Propositions, What Are They Good For?In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning (Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 3), Walter De Gruyter. 2012.Although there is a vast literature on whether propositional attitudes are relations to propositions, a crucial question that ought to lie at the heart of this debate is not often enough seriously addressed. This is the question of the contribution propositions make to the ways in which we benefit from having our propositional-attitude concepts, if those concepts are concepts of relations to propositions. Unless propositions can be shown to confer a benefit that no non-propositions could provide…Read more
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38Paradox and the A PrioriIn Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--273. 2005.
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Fodor's characterIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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29There are two things we must know in order to know what vagueness is. We must know what kinds of things can be vague. Evidently, predicate and sentence types can be vague, but what about tokens of those types? What about statements and other speech acts? What about abstract entities such as properties and propositions? And what about names and the boundaries of physical objects? Then, of course, for each kind of thing that can be vague, we must know in what vagueness for that kind consists. Need…Read more
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82Précis of the things we mean (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1). 2006.In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the …Read more
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5Two-dimensional semantics and propositional attitude contentIn The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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114Boghossian on externalism and inferencePhilosophical Issues 2 29-38. 1992.Suppose we think in a language of thought. Then Paul Boghossian' is prepared to argue, first, that there may be ambiguous Mentalese expression types that have unambiguous tokens, and, second, that the way in which this is possible allows for otherwise valid theoretical or practical reasoning to be rendered invalid owing to equivocation of a sort that may be undetectable to the reasoner. Paul sees this as a possible basis from which to launch an argument for what some might call "narrow content",…Read more
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47A Normative Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 186-192. 2002.One has some idea of what to expect from the theory of meaning offered in The Grammar of Meaning even before opening the book, since Bob Brandom, who should know, says on the book’s jacket that, according to the authors