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32Stalnaker's problem of intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's inquiryPacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April): 87-97. 1986.
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1Knowledge of meaningIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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26Replies (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 233-243. 2007.There are important differences among those philosophers who would call themselves nominalists and thus claim to disbelieve in the existence of numbers, properties, propositions, and their ilk. Some are non-concessive, and would deny that sentences such as following can be true
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57Moral realism and indeterminacyPhilosophical Issues 12 (1): 286-304. 2002.I’m going to argue for something that some of you will find repugnant but which I can’t help thinking may be true—namely, that there are no determinate moral truths. As will become apparent, my interest in moral discourse as manifested in this paper derives more than a little from my interest in the theory of meaning. Moral discourse has always presented a puzzle for the theory of meaning and philosophical logic, and I take myself to be following the advice of Bertrand Russell when he recommende…Read more
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87SI is a paradox because it presents four appearances that cannot all be veridical: first, it appears to be valid—after all, it’s both classically and intuitionistically valid; second, its sorites premiss, (2), seems merely to state the obvious fact that in the sorites march from 2¢ to 5,000,000,000¢ there is no precise point that marks the cutoff between not being rich and being rich; third, premiss (1), which asserts that a person with only 2¢ isn’t rich, is surely true; and fourth, the conclus…Read more
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28Correspondence & Disquotation (review)International Studies in Philosophy 28 (4): 112-113. 1996.
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92The Mode-of-Presentation ProblemIn C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, Csli. pp. 249-268. 1990.
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251Propositional contentIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.To a first approximation, _propositional content_ is whatever _that-clauses_ contribute to what is ascribed in utterances of sentences such as Ralph believes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph said _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph hopes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph desires _that Tony Curtis is alive_.
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13.1 the face-value theory of belief reportsIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 267. 2006.