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48A Normative Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 186-192. 2002.One has some idea of what to expect from the theory of meaning offered in The Grammar of Meaning even before opening the book, since Bob Brandom, who should know, says on the book’s jacket that, according to the authors
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33Stalnaker's problem of intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's inquiryPacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April): 87-97. 1986.
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1Knowledge of meaningIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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26Replies (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 233-243. 2007.There are important differences among those philosophers who would call themselves nominalists and thus claim to disbelieve in the existence of numbers, properties, propositions, and their ilk. Some are non-concessive, and would deny that sentences such as following can be true
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58Moral realism and indeterminacyPhilosophical Issues 12 (1): 286-304. 2002.I’m going to argue for something that some of you will find repugnant but which I can’t help thinking may be true—namely, that there are no determinate moral truths. As will become apparent, my interest in moral discourse as manifested in this paper derives more than a little from my interest in the theory of meaning. Moral discourse has always presented a puzzle for the theory of meaning and philosophical logic, and I take myself to be following the advice of Bertrand Russell when he recommende…Read more
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90SI is a paradox because it presents four appearances that cannot all be veridical: first, it appears to be valid—after all, it’s both classically and intuitionistically valid; second, its sorites premiss, (2), seems merely to state the obvious fact that in the sorites march from 2¢ to 5,000,000,000¢ there is no precise point that marks the cutoff between not being rich and being rich; third, premiss (1), which asserts that a person with only 2¢ isn’t rich, is surely true; and fourth, the conclus…Read more
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30Correspondence & Disquotation (review)International Studies in Philosophy 28 (4): 112-113. 1996.
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255Propositional contentIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.To a first approximation, _propositional content_ is whatever _that-clauses_ contribute to what is ascribed in utterances of sentences such as Ralph believes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph said _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph hopes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph desires _that Tony Curtis is alive_.
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92The Mode-of-Presentation ProblemIn C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, Csli. pp. 249-268. 1990.
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13.1 the face-value theory of belief reportsIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 267. 2006.
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48Intentionality and the language of thoughtProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 35-55. 1987.Stephen Schiffer; III*—Intentionality and the Language of Thought, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 35–56, https
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38Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline CasesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4). 1997.
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70Pleonastic PropositionsIn J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court. pp. 353--81. 2005.Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence is secured by something-from-nothing transformations, these being conceptually valid inferences that take one from a statement in which no reference is made to a thing of a certain kind to a statement—often a pleonastic equivalent of the first statement—in which there is a reference to a thing of that kind. The possibility of pleonastic entities is further explained in terms of the notion of one theory being a conservative extension of another. Pr…Read more
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78A central claim of Paul Horwich’s 1998 book Meaning was that meaning properties reduce to acceptance properties, where a meaning property is a property of the form e means m for x, e being “a word or phrase—whether it be spoken, written, signed, or merely thought (i.e. an item of ‘mentalese’)” (44); an acceptance property for an expression e relative to a person x is a relation of the form x is disposed to accept an e-containing sentence of kind … in circumstances of kind …
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94Two Issues of VaguenessThe Monist 81 (2): 193--214. 1998.Two issues of vagueness, which may together exhaust its philosophical interest, are, first, to solve the sorites paradox and, second, to explain the notion of a borderline case. I’ll try to make a little headway on both issues.
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322A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reportsNoûs 40 (2): 361-368. 2006.(1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms