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3III*—Intentionality and the Language of ThoughtProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 35-56. 1987.Stephen Schiffer; III*—Intentionality and the Language of Thought, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 35–56, https
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24Précis of The Things We MeanPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 208-210. 2006.In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the …Read more
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15Précis of The Things We MeanPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 208-210. 2007.In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the …Read more
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116The language-of-thought relation and its implicationsPhilosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 263-85. 1994.
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1Propositional attitudes in direct-reference semanticsIn K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports, Elsevier. pp. 14--30. 2000.
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2567Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative GrammarErkenntnis 80 (1): 61-87. 2015.A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis , is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to…Read more
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583MeaningClarendon Press. 1972.What is it for marks or sounds to have meaning, and what is it for someone to mean something in producing them? Answering these and related questions, Schiffer explores communication, speech acts, convention, and the meaning of linguistic items in this reissue of a seminal work on the foundations of meaning. A new introduction takes account of recent developments and places his theory in a broader context.
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236Russell's theory of definite descriptionsMind 114 (456): 1135-1183. 2005.The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions m…Read more
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1Functionalism and beliefIn Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, University of Arizona Press. 1986.
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9What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
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4The Relational Theory of Belief [a Reply to Mark Richard]Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3): 240-245. 1990.
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184Philosophical & Jurisprudential Issues of VaguenessIn Ralf Geert Keil & Poscher (ed.), Vagueness and the Law: Philosophical and Legal Approaches, Not Yet Known. forthcoming.
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64A normative theory of meaning (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1). 2002.One has some idea of what to expect from the theory of meaning offered in The Grammar of Meaning even before opening the book, since Bob Brandom, who should know, says on the book’s jacket that, according to the authors
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272Meaning In Speech and In ThoughtPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 141-159. 2013.If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional-attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p-meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t-meaning). Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of…Read more
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149Interest-Relative Invariantism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist