-
26Replies (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 233-243. 2007.There are important differences among those philosophers who would call themselves nominalists and thus claim to disbelieve in the existence of numbers, properties, propositions, and their ilk. Some are non-concessive, and would deny that sentences such as following can be true
-
30Correspondence & Disquotation (review)International Studies in Philosophy 28 (4): 112-113. 1996.
-
90SI is a paradox because it presents four appearances that cannot all be veridical: first, it appears to be valid—after all, it’s both classically and intuitionistically valid; second, its sorites premiss, (2), seems merely to state the obvious fact that in the sorites march from 2¢ to 5,000,000,000¢ there is no precise point that marks the cutoff between not being rich and being rich; third, premiss (1), which asserts that a person with only 2¢ isn’t rich, is surely true; and fourth, the conclus…Read more
-
92The Mode-of-Presentation ProblemIn C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, Csli. pp. 249-268. 1990.
-
255Propositional contentIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.To a first approximation, _propositional content_ is whatever _that-clauses_ contribute to what is ascribed in utterances of sentences such as Ralph believes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph said _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph hopes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph desires _that Tony Curtis is alive_.
-
13.1 the face-value theory of belief reportsIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 267. 2006.
-
48Intentionality and the language of thoughtProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 35-55. 1987.Stephen Schiffer; III*—Intentionality and the Language of Thought, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 35–56, https
-
38Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline CasesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4). 1997.
-
78A central claim of Paul Horwich’s 1998 book Meaning was that meaning properties reduce to acceptance properties, where a meaning property is a property of the form e means m for x, e being “a word or phrase—whether it be spoken, written, signed, or merely thought (i.e. an item of ‘mentalese’)” (44); an acceptance property for an expression e relative to a person x is a relation of the form x is disposed to accept an e-containing sentence of kind … in circumstances of kind …
-
70Pleonastic PropositionsIn J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court. pp. 353--81. 2005.Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence is secured by something-from-nothing transformations, these being conceptually valid inferences that take one from a statement in which no reference is made to a thing of a certain kind to a statement—often a pleonastic equivalent of the first statement—in which there is a reference to a thing of that kind. The possibility of pleonastic entities is further explained in terms of the notion of one theory being a conservative extension of another. Pr…Read more
-
94Two Issues of VaguenessThe Monist 81 (2): 193--214. 1998.Two issues of vagueness, which may together exhaust its philosophical interest, are, first, to solve the sorites paradox and, second, to explain the notion of a borderline case. I’ll try to make a little headway on both issues.
-
322A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reportsNoûs 40 (2): 361-368. 2006.(1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms