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Stephen Schiffer

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    162
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    3
  •  News and Updates
    62

 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Distinguished Professor
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1970
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Action
Metaphysics
Metaphilosophy
General Philosophy of Science
5 more
  • All publications (162)
  •  309
    A paradox of meaning
    Noûs 28 (3): 279-324. 1994.
    Meaning
  •  154
    Meaning and Value
    Journal of Philosophy 87 (11): 602-614. 1990.
    Meaning
  •  282
    The 'fido'-fido theory of belief
    Philosophical Perspectives 1 455-480. 1987.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions
  •  218
    Skepticism and the vagaries of justified belief
    Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 161-184. 2004.
    DefeatVarieties of Skepticism, MiscJustification
  •  213
    Interest-Relative Invariantism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.
    In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist
    Epistemic Contextualism and Invariantism
  • Fodor's character
    In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
    Narrow Content
  •  209
    Review: Horwich on Meaning (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201). 1972.
    Minimalism about TruthUse Theories of Meaning
  •  156
    Intention-Based Semantics
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (2): 119--156. 1982.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicRelevance Logic
  •  107
    Compositional Supervenience Theories and Compositional Meaning Theories
    Analysis 53 (1). 1993.
    SemanticsCompositionality
  •  159
    Pleonastic Propositions
    In Bradley P. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court Press. pp. 353--81. 2005.
    Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence is secured by something-from-nothing transformations, these being conceptually valid inferences that take one from a statement in which no reference is made to a thing of a certain kind to a statement—often a pleonastic equivalent of the first statement—in which there is a reference to a thing of that kind. The possibility of pleonastic entities is further explained in terms of the notion of one theory being a conservative extension of another. Pr…Read more
    Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence is secured by something-from-nothing transformations, these being conceptually valid inferences that take one from a statement in which no reference is made to a thing of a certain kind to a statement—often a pleonastic equivalent of the first statement—in which there is a reference to a thing of that kind. The possibility of pleonastic entities is further explained in terms of the notion of one theory being a conservative extension of another. Propositions are pleonastic entities, and the way in which they are individuated shows how pleonastic propositions are both fine-grained and unstructured.
    Ontology
  •  101
    The Varieties of Reference by Gareth Evans (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 85 (1): 33-42. 1988.
    Philosophy of Linguistics
  •  220
    Belief ascription and a paradox of meaning
    Philosophical Issues 3 89-121. 1993.
    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions
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