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2Why Pleonastic Propositions? Content in Information and ExplanationIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.Pleonastic propositions play two important roles: first, we use them both to exploit the beliefs of others as a source of information about the world and to exploit the world as a source of information about the beliefs and desires of others; second, we use them to explain the behaviour of ourselves and others. Both roles are clarified and accounts are offered of how pleonastic propositions are able to play those roles. It is argued that no other things—neither non-pleonastic propositions nor li…Read more
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2Vagueness and IndeterminacyIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.A theory of vagueness must lie at the heart of any complete theory of meaning. This chapter offers a theory of vagueness, and of indeterminacy generally, since the indeterminacy of vague borderline proposition is only one source of indeterminacy. The theory distinguishes two kinds of partial belief: standard partial belief, which is normatively governed by the axioms of probability theory, and what I call vagueness-related partial belief, which is not normatively governed by those axioms. Thanks…Read more
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2The Face-Value TheoryIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both…Read more
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2Moral Realism and IndeterminacyIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no substantive moral propositions have determinate truth values.
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2Meanings and Knowledge of MeaningIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.Knowing what an expression means is neither knowing that it means such and such nor knowing how to do things with the expression; it is being in, or being apt to be in, a certain kind of language-processing state. The account of knowledge of meaning is seen to suggest that, strictly speaking, there are no such things as expression meanings. Whether or not that is so, there are things to which an expression must be related if it is to have meaning, and with an eye to David Kaplan’s characters, th…Read more
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2Having MeaningIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.To have meaning is to stand in the meaning relation to a meaning, meanings taken to be characters*. This chapter is about the nature of the meaning relation. A theory of this relation requires saying what relation a person must bear to a language in order for that language to be her public language, and also what relation a person must bear to a language in order for that language to be her language of thought. The answers bear on questions about compositional semantics and about the supervenien…Read more
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1Conditionals and IndeterminacyIn Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on conditionals, both indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals. The existence of conditional propositions is easily secured on the theory of pleonastic propositions, and conditions are specified under which a conditional proposition is determinately true, determinately false, or indeterminate. These truth conditions generate a puzzle, in that the way we form partial beliefs in indeterminate conditional propositions is not what their …Read more
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Philosophical and jurisprudential issues of vaguenessIn Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher (eds.), Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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1Direct Reference: From Language to Thought (review)Linguistics and Philosophy 19 (1): 91-102. 1996.
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2Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.This collection of recent articles by leading scholars is designed to illuminate one of the greatest and most influential philosophical books of all time. It includes incisive commentary on every major theme and argument in the Meditations, and will be valuable not only to philosophers but to historians, theologians, literary scholars, and interested general readers
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16Intention and Convention in the Theory of MeaningIn Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 1997.This chapter focuses on a question: how does the intentionality of language 'derive' from the original intentionality of thought. Hardly any philosopher of language would deny that if something is an expression which has meaning in a population, then that is by virtue of facts about the linguistic behavior and psychological states of members of that population. The chapter starts with a reconstruction of Lewis's account of the relation in Convention because a problem that immediately arises for …Read more
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8Deflationist Theories of Truth, Meaning, and ContentIn Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 1997.Every deflationist semantic theory has its inflationist correlate: this is the semantic theory the deflationist theory is designed to deflate. This chapter presents Radical Inflationism and Radical Deflationism as stipulatively defined theories, without regard to who might subscribe to them, or to one or another of their parts. Radical Deflationism is based on a view worked out over a number of important publications by Hartry Field. In other words, radical inflationist is on board with the view…Read more
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5VaguenessIn Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: The Sorites Paradox Some Attempts at a Solution Happy‐and Unhappy‐Face Solutions Vagueness, Indeterminacy, and Partial Belief.
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1Propositions, What Are They Good For?In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 531-552. 2012.
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12Truth and the Theory of ContentIn Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding, W. De Gruyter. pp. 204-222. 1981.
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120Cognitive propositionsPhilosophical Studies 173 (9): 2551-2563. 2016.Soames's new theory of "cognitive propositions" is presented and several prima facie objections are presented to it.
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The Relativity Feature: Response to Ray BuchananIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Vagueness and Indeterminacy: Responses to Dorothy Edgington, Hartry Field and Crispin WrightIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Gricean Semantics and Reference: Responses to Anita Avramides, Stephen Neale, and Kent BachIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Pleonastic Entities: Responses to Amie Thomasson, Thomas Hofweber, Ian Rumfitt, and Michael SmithIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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A Source of Paradox: Response to Paul HorwichIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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De Re Subtleties: Response to Nathan SalmonIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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De Re Belief Reports: Response to Gary OstertagIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.