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3III*—Intentionality and the Language of ThoughtProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 35-56. 1987.Stephen Schiffer; III*—Intentionality and the Language of Thought, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 35–56, https
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25Précis of The Things We MeanPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 208-210. 2006.In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the …Read more
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15Précis of The Things We MeanPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 208-210. 2007.In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the …Read more
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Fodor's characterIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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29There are two things we must know in order to know what vagueness is. We must know what kinds of things can be vague. Evidently, predicate and sentence types can be vague, but what about tokens of those types? What about statements and other speech acts? What about abstract entities such as properties and propositions? And what about names and the boundaries of physical objects? Then, of course, for each kind of thing that can be vague, we must know in what vagueness for that kind consists. Need…Read more
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114Boghossian on externalism and inferencePhilosophical Issues 2 29-38. 1992.Suppose we think in a language of thought. Then Paul Boghossian' is prepared to argue, first, that there may be ambiguous Mentalese expression types that have unambiguous tokens, and, second, that the way in which this is possible allows for otherwise valid theoretical or practical reasoning to be rendered invalid owing to equivocation of a sort that may be undetectable to the reasoner. Paul sees this as a possible basis from which to launch an argument for what some might call "narrow content",…Read more
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83Précis of the things we mean (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1). 2006.In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the …Read more
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5Two-dimensional semantics and propositional attitude contentIn The things we mean, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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47A Normative Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 186-192. 2002.One has some idea of what to expect from the theory of meaning offered in The Grammar of Meaning even before opening the book, since Bob Brandom, who should know, says on the book’s jacket that, according to the authors
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1Knowledge of meaningIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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32Stalnaker's problem of intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's inquiryPacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April): 87-97. 1986.
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58Moral realism and indeterminacyPhilosophical Issues 12 (1): 286-304. 2002.I’m going to argue for something that some of you will find repugnant but which I can’t help thinking may be true—namely, that there are no determinate moral truths. As will become apparent, my interest in moral discourse as manifested in this paper derives more than a little from my interest in the theory of meaning. Moral discourse has always presented a puzzle for the theory of meaning and philosophical logic, and I take myself to be following the advice of Bertrand Russell when he recommende…Read more
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26Replies (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 233-243. 2007.There are important differences among those philosophers who would call themselves nominalists and thus claim to disbelieve in the existence of numbers, properties, propositions, and their ilk. Some are non-concessive, and would deny that sentences such as following can be true