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9What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
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185Philosophical & Jurisprudential Issues of VaguenessIn Ralf Geert Keil & Poscher (ed.), Vagueness and the Law: Philosophical and Legal Approaches, Not Yet Known. forthcoming.
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4The Relational Theory of Belief [a Reply to Mark Richard]Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3): 240-245. 1990.
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273Meaning In Speech and In ThoughtPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 141-159. 2013.If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional-attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p-meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t-meaning). Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of…Read more
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64A normative theory of meaning (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1). 2002.One has some idea of what to expect from the theory of meaning offered in The Grammar of Meaning even before opening the book, since Bob Brandom, who should know, says on the book’s jacket that, according to the authors
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149Interest-Relative Invariantism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist
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2Does mentalese have a compositional semantics?In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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228Propositions, What Are They Good For?In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning (Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 3), Walter De Gruyter. 2012.Although there is a vast literature on whether propositional attitudes are relations to propositions, a crucial question that ought to lie at the heart of this debate is not often enough seriously addressed. This is the question of the contribution propositions make to the ways in which we benefit from having our propositional-attitude concepts, if those concepts are concepts of relations to propositions. Unless propositions can be shown to confer a benefit that no non-propositions could provide…Read more
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38Paradox and the A PrioriIn Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--273. 2005.
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Fodor's characterIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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29There are two things we must know in order to know what vagueness is. We must know what kinds of things can be vague. Evidently, predicate and sentence types can be vague, but what about tokens of those types? What about statements and other speech acts? What about abstract entities such as properties and propositions? And what about names and the boundaries of physical objects? Then, of course, for each kind of thing that can be vague, we must know in what vagueness for that kind consists. Need…Read more