Stephen Kershnar

Thomas Hurka has put forth a powerful account of virtue. The account rests on a specification of intrinsically good mental states and then explains what unifies them. On his account, virtue and desert also share the same structure. His theory of virtue has some difficulties that threaten the structure that unifies it. First, Hurka's account cannot provide a principled account of virtue and vice when they are constituted by attitudes toward things are not intrinsically good (e.g., nonexistent state of affairs). Second, Hurka's account does not have room for an important factor in determining the degree to which an attitude is virtuous or vicious: agent-relative goods. Hurka is thus faced with a abandoning the basic structure that makes his theory attractive or adopting counterintuitive positions.

A punitive desert-claim should be understood as a claim about the intrinsic value of punishment, where this value is grounded in an act or feature of the person to be punished. The purpose of my project is to explore the structure and justification of such punitive desert-claims. ;I argue that a true punitive desert-claim takes the form and , and that belief in these principles is justified on the basis of our considered moral judgments. The Principle of Deserved Punishment. A person who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only because, she has performed a culpable wrongdoing. The Principle of the Proportionality of Deserved Punishment. A person receives the punishments she deserves if and only if the punishment she receives is proportional to her culpable wrongdoing. ;My analysis proceeds as follows. In chapter two, I argue in favor of the claim that a culpable wrongdoing is the sole basis for deserved punishment. ;In chapter three, I put forth an account of the structure of a punitive desert-claim and argue that deserved punishment is not justified via the consequences that result from punishment. Having clarified the basis and structure of deserved punishment, I then set out to provide the justification for it. ;In chapter four, I argue that deserved punishment cannot be justified by an appeal to more general moral principles. My argument here rests on the criticism of different types of theory that attempt to justify deserved punishment on the grounds of more general principles. Here I criticize those theories that attempt to justify and on the grounds of: the culpable wrongdoer's choice, the culpable wrongdoer's hypothetical consent, the state's promise to punish, the demands of a justified institution, and distributive justice. ;In the last chapter I argue that and best account for our considered moral judgments about specific cases. From this, I conclude that our belief in both principles is justified

This book is an analysis and evaluation of torture. My take on torture is unique for four reasons. First, it provides a distinct analysis of what torture is. Second, it argues that on non-consequentialist grounds, specifically rights-based ones, torture is sometimes permissible. Third, it argues that torturers are not always vicious. Fourth, it argues that it is plausible that these conclusions apply to some real world cases. In short, it fills the following gap: it evaluates torture from a rights-based perspective and finds that in some cases it is permissible. My book is a unique philosophical exploration of torture. It combines a philosophical analysis of torture with a moral evaluation of it. The philosophical analysis of torture has not received a lot of attention. My analysis defends a minimal view of torture and one that distinguishes the analysis of the concept of torture from the moral evaluation of it. The resulting theory, the minimalist theory, differs noticeably from other analyses. My moral evaluation of torture sharply differs from the rest of the literature. The evaluation focuses on the non-consequentialist approach to morality, that is, it assumes that what makes an action right is not solely whether it brings about the best results. Using the central feature of non-consequentialism, moral rights, I argue that torture is justified in a number of theoretical contexts, including defense, punishment, and when the person to be tortured consents. I then look at the actual world and argue that it is plausible to think that there are real-world cases where torture is justified. My analysis also looks at whether torture is virtuous in an attempt to get at what intuitively repels us about torture. My analysis is not only the first look at the issue, but it also ties in with recent developments in virtue theory. As in the analysis of the permissibility of torture, I try to show that my findings with regard to virtue are not merely of theoretical interest, but are plausible given some real-world cases.

The article claims that a person who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only because, she has performed a culpable wrongdoing . The article thus rejects the theory that the basis of deserved punishment is a bad moral character. The argument rejecting The Character Theory of Deserved Punishment is divided into two parts:1) that it is not necessarily the case that an intentional act reflects the agent's moral character, and2) that it is not necessarily the case that a culpable wrongdoing reflects the agent's moral character. The article then proceeds to isolate instances of culpable wrongdoing and of bad moral character to see which of these factors accompanies the considered moral judgment that the agent deserves punishment. It concludes that our intuitions suggest deserved punishment and the amount of punishment someone deserves, correlate with culpable wrongdoing rather than with a person's bad moral character. Der Beitrag geht davon aus, daß eine Person dann und nur dann Strafe verdient, wenn sie eine rechtswidrige Tat schuldhaft begangen hat. Er wendet sich damit gegen die Auffassung, Basis für eine verdiente Strafe sei der schlechte Charakter der bestraften Person. Das Argument, das die letztere Lehre verwirft, zerfällt in zwei Teile. 1) Es ist nicht notwendigerweise so, daß eine Vorsatztat den schlechten Charakter des Handelnden, und 2) es ist nicht notwendigerweise so, daß schuldhaft begangenes Unrecht überhaupt den Charakter des Handelnden widerspiegelt. Anschließend untersucht der Beitrag Beispiele schuldhaftes Unrechttuns und Beispiele schlechten moralischen Charakters, um festzustellen, welcher dieser Faktoren das moralische Urteil, daß der Handelnde Strafe verdient, begleitet. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß unsere Intuitionen den Gedanken, jemand verdiene Strafe, und die Höhe der Strafe, die der Betreffende verdient, mit der Annahme einer schuldhaft begangenen rechtswidrigen Tat korrelieren und nicht mit der Annahme der Betreffende habe einen schlechten Charakter

David Boonin’s book, The Problem of Punishment, combines an incredible command of the literature with an organized and careful discussion. With the possible exception of Michael Moore’s book, Placing Blame, this is the best book ever written on the philosophy of punishment. His overall thesis is that legal punishment is wrong. Boonin argues that the purported justifications of punishment fail the Foundational Test or the Entailment Test. (1) Foundational Test: A theory satisfies the foundation test if and only if it does not have implications that are so counterintuitive that there is sufficient reason to reject the theory. (2) Entailment Test: A theory satisfies the Entailment Test if and only if it entails that legal punishment is permissible. Despite the book’s brilliance, Boonin’s overall strategy is mistaken. He tries to show that no theory can justify punishing all and only people who violate the law and entail that all such offenders should receive proportionate punishments. He also argues that many of the theories fail on their own terms, but let us leave aside these specific criticisms. Consider the following question: Are the laws in question are perfectly just or not? If the laws are perfectly just, then we are talking about an ideal set of laws. The ideal laws might well perfectly track one of the factors such as desert, forfeiture, or fairness because doing so is what makes them perfectly just. In this case, the theory in question will pass the Entailment Test. If the laws are not perfectly just, then it is not clear why it is desirable for a theory to justify punishing all offenders. For example, if the state does not allow someone to engage in free speech, practice the religion of her choice, or deny intercourse to her husband, it is not clear why in such cases we should think that an adequate theory should justify state punishment. Boonin’s book is must reading for anyone who wants to explore the moral status of punishment. His overall strategy, however, is mistaken.

The retributive duty is both held by and owed to the victim of a culpable wrongdoing. This reflexive account fits nicely with a Kantian emphasis on autonomy because the Kantian account allows us to explain how a person can have a duty to oneself. The reflexive account also fits nicely with, and is in part supported by, the notion that a culpable wrongdoer forfeits some of his rights . The waivability of the retributive duty in part explains why it is intuitively permissible for the victim not to punish the wrongdoer, but why the same is not true with regard to the state. The reflexive duty also fits into a consent-based account of state authority and the notion that natural duties are mostly negative. Das Opfer einer schuldhaften Verletzung seiner Rechte hat nicht nur Recht, sondern auch die Pflicht Vergeltung zu üben. Diese reflexive Erwägung paßt sehr gut zu einer Betonung des Autonomiegedankens nach der Weise Kants, da die Auffassung Kants zu erklären vermag, wie eine Person eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst haben kann. Ebenso gut paßt die reflexive Erwägung zu - und sie wird zum Teil auch gestützt von - der Erkenntnis, daß jemand, der schuldhaft Unrecht tut, einige seiner Rechte verwirkt. Freilich kann auf die Vergeltung verzichtet werden, und das erklärt teilweise, warum es unseren Intuitionen entspricht, daß es dem Opfer erlaubt ist, den Täter nicht zu strafen, während das für den Staat gerade nicht gilt. Die reflexive Pflicht paßt schließlich auch zu einer auf Einverständnis gegründeten Sichtweise staatlicher Autorität, und sie läßt sich gut vereinbaren mit der Erkenntnis, daß natürliche Pflichten zumeist negativ formuliert sind

A private property right is a collection of particular rights that relate to the control of an object. The ground for such moral rights rests on the value of project pursuit. It does so because the individual ownership of particular objects is intimately related to the formation and application of a coherent set of projects that are the major parts of a self-shaped life. Problems arise in explaining how unowned property is appropriated. Unilateral acts with regard to an object, e.g., mixing in one’s labor into it, probably don’t ground particular rights to private property. Nor do bilateral contracts since a stable pre-institutional contract with regard to appropriation is not likely to form. However, a conventional method of appropriation can allow for such appropriation while at the same time preserving the pre-institutional nature of such rights. This theory can also account for a person’s property rights in her own body. However, the value of project formation requires that persons have at least some private property that is to serve as the object of their projects. These positive rights to property undermine the libertarian claim that all non-commitment-based rights are negative. However, a further empirical argument is needed in order to justify protecting these positive moral rights to private property by positive legal rights.

In this paper, I provide an analysis of equal opportunity. I argue that equal opportunity occurs where two or more persons with equal natural abilities and willingness to work hard have chances at various jobs that are in the aggregate of equal value. I then argue that equal opportunity is neither valuable nor something that the government ought to pursue. First, it is not clear why we should value opportunities rather than outcomes. Second, the value of equal opportunity rests on the value of interest satisfaction. However, if interest satisfaction is relatively constant across different jobs and different job opportunities, then the concern for interest satisfaction will not ground the value of equal opportunity. Third, equalizing opportunities is not in itself valuable because persons are not equally valuable. Fourth, even if equal opportunity were valuable, the government can pursue it only by trespassing on individual rights.

The moral theory justifying punishment will shape the debate over numerous controversial issues such as the moral permissibility of the death penalty, probation, parole, and plea bargaining, as well as issues about conditions in prison and access to educational opportunities in prison. In this essay I argue that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. If I am correct, the answer to issues involving the criminal justice system should be answered in large part by considering whether the practice in question furthers the infliction of suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it.

Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to hose persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, in the case of slavery, past injustice – where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead – cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person’s existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed.

This paper argues that an instance of trash-talking is permissible if and only if the relevant sports organization’s system of rules permits the expression. The argument for this position rests on the notion that if there is no relevant side-constraint on trash-talking, then if the player commits to a moral boundary on trash-talking then that is the moral boundary on trash-talking. I then argued that there is no relevant side-constraint on trash-talking and that the players commit to the ownership theory as the moral boundary on trash-talking. Hence, the ownership theory is the moral boundary for trash-talking. I then considered a number of objections, the most important of which are that there is a side-constraint against trash-talking because it is degrading, disrespectful, exploitative, or objectifying and that the ownership theory is false because it confuses what is wrong with what is penalized.

Americans are very grateful to veterans. Veterans are celebrated via speeches, statues, memorials, holidays, and affirmative action. They are lavishly praised in public gatherings and private conversations. Contrary to this widespread attitude, I argue that U.S. citizens should not be very grateful to veterans. In evaluating whether the significant gratitude toward veterans is justified, I begin by exploring the nature of gratitude. On my account, one person should be very grateful to a second person just in case the second person reasonably attempted to provide a significant benefit to the first and was primarily motivated by concern for the first’s well-being. I then look at whether veterans typically satisfy these conditions and argue that they do not.

In Grutter, preferential treatment was held to be Constitutional on the basis of the contribution of “diverse” students to the education of their classmates. An implicit assumption in this argument, at least given how schools such as Michigan have interpreted it, is that the contribution involves making it more likely that the other students adopt the beliefs (or perspective) of the minorities. Three beliefs seem relevant here: justice is concerned with equality, racial and ethnic minorities are currently treated unequally, and the state has a mandate to combat this type of injustice. I argued that the first two beliefs are likely false and that in any case they are already well represented on campuses. If my arguments succeed, then this narrow experiential diversity argument is incapable of establishing the moral permissibility, let alone Constitutionality, of these programs. A broader consequentialist argument may avoid this objection but only at the extent of introducing Constitutionally irrelevant considerations.

This book is about how the systematic application of some basic principles of applied ethics yields some surprising and very unpopular results. In particular, Kershnar investigate three areas: sex, discrimination, and violence. The book argues that the following are some permissible in theory and practice. (1) Adult-child sex (2) Watching rape-pornography (3) State universities discriminating against women (4) The U.S. denying welfare to immigrants (5) Interrogational torture (6) Assassination In addition, the book argues that different races likely have different per capita moral value and that equal opportunity is not valuable. These controversial conclusions will no doubt spur animated and thoughtful discussion amongst readers

The compensatory‐justice justification of affirmative action requires a comparison of the actual world in which the injured person lives with a relevantly similar possible world in which this person lives but where the unjust injuring act never occurred, in order to identify the degree of harm brought about by the unjust injurious act. The problem is that some unjust injuring acts, particularly acts of slavery, led to intercourse and the later creation of the ancestors of many members of minority groups. Hence, there is no possible world in which these individuals exist and in which the injustice, e.g., slavery, did not occur. As a result, the counterfactual test does not allow us to measure or even understand the existence of a compensatable injury to these persons. I provide an inheritance‐based account of compensation that escapes this.

In this paper, I explore whether harsh treatment fails to respect the criminal as a person. I focus on the most extreme treatment because if such treatment can satisfy the duty to respect a criminal as a person then less extreme cases (e.g., incarceration, fines, shaming practices) can also do so. I begin by filling out the notion of a duty to respect a person. Here I set out an account of autonomy and then show that it grounds the duty to respect a person. Next, I use this account of the duty to lay out a three-part test for whether harsh treatment respects a criminal as a person. I then apply this test and conclude that it does where the treatment does not infringe on the criminal’s rights, exploit him, or express contempt for him.

If God is essentially all-good, then he is not morally responsible. If God is maximally great, then he is essentially both omnipotent and omniscient and these latter properties ensure that he is essentially all-good. From essential all-goodness, it follows that he does not have the power to choose evil. This in turn results in his lacking the power to do evil and thus his not being responsible for avoiding it. This conclusion is not defeated by objections that differ based on whether they deny, assert, or are independent of the claim that God is essentially all-good. I conclude that a maximally great being is not possible. Theism might remain true, however, if God is not a maximally great being. However, I claim, without defense here, that the best arguments for theism assume or entail that God is a maximally great being.

The issue of the time of intrinsic value focuses on the time during which a state has a level of intrinsic value. This is distinct from the time that desert makes a state of affairs good or bad (time of desert) and the time that statements about desert are true or false (time of the desert statement). To arrive at this conclusion, I assumed that intrinsic value is a function of desert-adjusted well-being. Both desert and well-being should be understood as contemporaneous properties that occur at a particular moment in time. Hence, the time of intrinsic value is a point in time since the relevant property occurs at a point, albeit one that refers to the past. This result is significant because it relates to the dual-ledger account of intrinsic value. On one version of this account, desert is treated as similar to credits and well-being as similar to debits. It thus presents a tidy and intuitively appealing account of intrinsic value at a time and across times and persons.

In the middle of the twentieth century, many philosophers came to believe that the problem of morally justifying punishment had finally been solved. Defended most famously by Hart and Rawls, the so-called “Mixed Theory” of punishment claimed that justifying punishment required recognizing that the utilitarian and retributive theories were in fact answers to two different questions: utilitarianism answered the question of why we have punishment as an institution, while retribution answered the question of how to punish individual wrongdoers. We could thus reconcile the two great competing theories of punishment, and show how they were both right and not in conflict at all. Unfortunately, it gradually became apparent that the solution would not work. This essay attempts to set out thereasons why the Mixed Theory was bound to fail, and why the problem of reconciling the utilitarian and retributive goals remains with us. In this paper, Stephen Kershnar argues that character alone grounds desert. He begins by arguing that desert is grounded by a person’s character, action, or both. In the second section, He defends the claim that character grounds desert. His argument rests on intuitions that other things being equal, it would be intrinsically better for virtuous persons to flourish and vicious persons suffer than vice versa. In the third section, he argues that actions do not ground desert. He gives three arguments in support of this claim. First, there is little intuitive support for this supposed ground and to the extent that there is support, it is undermined when we consider what causes character and acts to diverge. Second, this type of desert doesn’t fit with a unifying account of the different aspects of intrinsic value. Third, the most plausible version of act-based desert leaves it unclear why acts should ground desert.

A contract in which the potential immigrants to the U.S. waive their right to non-emergency welfare benefits in return for their being allowed to come to the U.S. is not unjust. This is because the right to allow persons to immigrate in return for their waiving any future claim on non-emergency welfare benefits is included in other moral rights that the U.S. has. Nor is the transaction exploitative since it is beneficial to the average immigrant and since he gains a fair share of the transactional surplus. Thus, if such a transaction is permissible for the U.S. citizens and they favor it, then the U.S. government as their agent is other-things-equal obligated to implement it.

In some cases, the U.S. should adopt a policy of assassinating national leaders. On just war theory, national leaders are sometimes combatants. This is because some leaders are both causal and logical agents of an unjust military campaign. Such leaders occupy this logical role because in some cases their position has an essential link to their nation’s military projects. In addition, such a policy aligns with some of the policies that motivate just war theory in that assassination does not target innocent persons, is connected to self-defense, and does not violate any international agreements. Just war theory should probably be rejected, however, since it rests on dubious claims about the non-contractual essentialist conditions of combatant. On a self-defense theory, some national leaders may be killed because they are threats. They are threats because they originate a causal process that will likely bring about large amounts of unjust harm. In so doing, they forfeit those moral rights that protect them against injurious action and thus remove one of the major constraints against violence and killing. On a consequentialist theory, such a policy would likely bring about the best consequences since it would be a vital tool in the protection against genocide, unjust military aggression, and other horrendous state actions that have characterized the twentieth century. It is unlikely that the harm that would result from such a policy (e.g., its misuse) would outweigh the expected gain from it.

In general, capitalists deserve profits and losses for their contribution to the general welfare. Market imperfections and the range of permissible prices (at least within the boundaries of exploitation) prevent the alignment from being a direct one, but the connection generally holds. In the context of the market, this thesis preserves the central place of moral responsibility in moral desert. It also satisfies the fittingness and proportionality conditions of moral desert and provides a backward-looking and pre-institutional ground of it. In addition, the focus on contribution unifies several different types of act-based desert, specifically deserved profits and losses, deserved punishment, and deserved wages. Hence, to the extent that desert-satisfaction is relevant in the selection of an economic system, this result strengthens the case for capitalism.

George Schedler raises interesting issues with regard to the amount of reparations owed for slavery, the parties who are owed reparations, and the standard for these reparations. His arguments, however, do not hold up upon analysis. His analysis of the case for the descendants of slaves being owed compensation seriously overestimates the case for such reparations. He does not identify the grounds for such compensation, i.e., either stolen inheritance or the descendants’ trustee-like control over the slave’s estate, and this results in his not identifying the metaphysical and epistemic problems that accompany the descendants’ claim to reparations. In analyzing whether the U.S. government owes compensation, Schedler provides arguments based on its small role in bringing about slavery and the break in national identity that followed the Civil War. Such arguments fail but his conclusion can be supported by other arguments, specifically the nature of the federal government’s relation to slavery and the limited nature of its powers. Thus, the case against reparations is overwhelming but not for the reasons Schedler provides.

Retributivism is the notion that punishment is justified because, and only because, the wrongdoer deserves it. Proportionality is central to retributivism. A proportional punishment is one in which the severity of a punishment is proportional to the seriousness of the offense (for example, its wrongness or harmfulness). Michael Tonry’s collection is must reading for punishments theorists. The articles are well-chosen and the reflections of theorists such as Andreas von Hirsch, R. A. Duff, and Douglas Husak who have shaped punishment theory and who now consider the future of the principles that have governed their work, makes for interesting reading. The tie-in between retributivism and the practice of punishment is enlightening and sometime too often absent in the philosophical literature.

A particular amount of punishment is justified if and only if that amount of punishment is deserved and the desert claim is not overridden. In the case of some multiple murderers or people who perform serious violent acts in addition to murder, the deserved punishment must involve torture. I argue that this legitimate desert claim is not overridden by objections based on notions of brutality and inhumanity, the Kantian concern that persons be treated as ends, the intuitive distaste that many persons have for torture, the negative consequences of institutionalized torture, the concern for bias in the imposition of punishment, and the need for accuracy in measuring harms.

In this article, I argue that as a theoretical matter, a population's health-level is best quantified via averagism. Averagism asserts that the health of a population is the average of members’ health-levels. This model is better because it does not fall prey to a number of objections, including the repugnant conclusion, and because it is not arbitrary. I also argue that as a practical matter, population health-levels are best quantified via totalism. Totalism asserts that the health of a population is the sum of members’ health-levels. Totalism is better here because it fits better with cost-benefit analysis and such an analysis is the best practical way to value healthcare outcomes. The two results are compatible because the theoretical and practical need not always align, whether in general or in the context of population health.

The slavery contract is not a rights violation since the right not to be enslaved and the right not to give out a benefit are waivable and the conjunction of their voluntary waiver is not itself a rights violation. The case for the contract being pejoratively exploitative is not clear. Hence given the general presumption in favor of liberty of contract, such a transaction ought to be permitted. The contract is also not invalid on the grounds that the wrongdoer’s consent to it necessarily reflects involuntariness or irrationality or on the grounds that it is logically impossible for the wrongdoer to satisfy the contract. Allowing such contracts may not have desirable consequences, but for the liberal this by itself is not a sufficient reason against allowing them. One case where the slavery contract might be relevant is where a victim’s agent or the state agrees to waive its claim to harsh punishment in return for the offender agreeing to be enslaved.

In "Kant on Freedom and the Appropriate Punishment," the author begins by noting that in The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant asserts that a wrongdoer should be given a punishment that is similar to his wrongdoing. He then makes two interpretive claims with regard to this assertion.First, he claims that the best way to understand this assertion in the context of other things Kant says is that the state is obligated to punish a wrongdoer in a way that imposes on the wrongdoer an amount of suffering equal to what he caused and through an action that is similar in type to the wrongdoer's offense. The argument in support of this claim occurs in section II and rests on two more specific interpretive claims about Kant's theory: that state punishment should resemble the wrongdoer's acts and should involve the same level of suffering as was involved in the original wrongdoing and that punishment in accordance with these constraints is an obligatory duty.Second, the author claims that on Kant's theory this principle of appropriate punishment is justified because it restores equality in the distribution of freedom for members of the state. The argument in support of this claim occurs in section III. The argument rests in part on Kant's justification of the state and coercion in terms of the value of equalized freedom. By applying this same justification to Kant's principle of appropriate punishment, the author claims to be able to account for the principle as well as to relate the principle to Kant's political theory. Der vorliegende Beitrag beginnt mit der Feststellung, daß Kant in der Metaphysik der Sitten geltend macht, ein Übeltäter solle eine Bestrafung erleiden, die mit seiner Tat vergleichbar ist. Im Hinblick auf diese Forderung Kants werden zwei Thesen aufgestellt.Erstens wird behauptet, die genannte Forderung sei vor dem Hintergrund sonstiger Äußerungen Kants am besten dahingehend zu verstehen, daß der Staat verpflichtet sei, einen Übeltäter in einer Weise zu bestrafen, die diesem ein Maß von Leid zufügt, das dem von ihm selbst verursachten gleichkommt. Geschehen müsse dies durch eine Handlung, die in ihrer Art dem vom Übeltäter begangenen Verbrechen entspricht. Die Begründung dieser These erfolgt in Abschnitt II und stützt sich wiederum auf zwei mehr in die Einzelheiten gehende Thesen zu Kants Theorie: Staatliche Bestrafung sollte den Handlungen des Übeltäters ähneln und Leid in einer Größenordnung mit sich bringen, wie es auch die ursprüngliche Tat zur Folge hatte. Bestrafung in Übereinstimmung mit diesen Bedingungen ist eine Pflicht.Zweitens wird die Auffassung vertreten, dieses Prinzip angemessenen Strafens sei im Rahmen der Theorie Kants gerechtfertigt, weil es für die Mitglieder des Staates die Gleicheit in bezug auf die Verteilung der Freiheit wiederherstelle. Die Begründung dieser These findet sich in Abschnitt III und beruht zum Teil auf Kants Rechtfertigung von Staat und Zwang durch den Verweis auf den Wert gleichmäßig verteilter Freiheit. Die Übernahme eben dieser Rechtfertigung auch für Kants Theorie angemessenen Strafens soll sowohl dazu dienen, das Prinzip selbst zu begründen, als auch dazu, es in Kants politische Theorie einzuordnen