Stephen Kershnar

If God is essentially all-good, then he is not morally responsible. If God is maximally great, then he is essentially both omnipotent and omniscient and these latter properties ensure that he is essentially all-good. From essential all-goodness, it follows that he does not have the power to choose evil. This in turn results in his lacking the power to do evil and thus his not being responsible for avoiding it. This conclusion is not defeated by objections that differ based on whether they deny, assert, or are independent of the claim that God is essentially all-good. I conclude that a maximally great being is not possible. Theism might remain true, however, if God is not a maximally great being. However, I claim, without defense here, that the best arguments for theism assume or entail that God is a maximally great being.

There are three attractive principles that are held by many desert theorists. (1) Character-Desert Principle: A person’s character is a ground of moral desert. (2) Limited Responsibility for Character Principle: Persons are not fully morally responsible for their character. (3) Moral Responsibility Principle: If something grounds moral desert in a person, then she is fully morally responsible for it. Each of these principles is backed by some strong intuitions or arguments. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the Moral Responsibility Principle. This principle is not supported by an analysis of act-based desert. This rejection is in line with the observation that desert is affected by a number of factors that are outside of an individual’s control, e.g., degree of autonomy and desire content. It also fits with an explanation of desert in terms of fittingness.

A contract in which the potential immigrants to the U.S. waive their right to non-emergency welfare benefits in return for their being allowed to come to the U.S. is not unjust. This is because the right to allow persons to immigrate in return for their waiving any future claim on non-emergency welfare benefits is included in other moral rights that the U.S. has. Nor is the transaction exploitative since it is beneficial to the average immigrant and since he gains a fair share of the transactional surplus. Thus, if such a transaction is permissible for the U.S. citizens and they favor it, then the U.S. government as their agent is other-things-equal obligated to implement it.