Wei Zhang

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.

The dissertation project is a study of the rhetoric of "enlightenment" and the philosophy of modernity. It addresses two seemingly unrelated questions: "what is enlightenment?" and "what is May Fourth?" The investigation of these two questions is located in the contexts of Kant-Foucault-Habermas's dialogue on "what is enlightenment?" and Western sinology's re-presentation of Chinese modernity. One of the objectives of the present study is to critique modern sinology's re-presentation of Chinese modernity, which has reduced the latter into a latent statement of the Enlightenment and a derivative language of Reason, and hence, to seek to determine the conditions of possibility to address the question of "what is May Fourth?" ;The study attempts to identify the problematics in the Kant-Foucault-Habermas context, in which enlightenment was treated as an enterprise to bridge the gap between theoretical reason and practical intelligence, reason and unreason, and expert knowledge and everyday praxis. The study suggests that mediation of hermeneutic understanding of text/tradition with political commitment to organize an enlightened society was treated differently in Confucian and modern Chinese political philosophy and historiographical discourse. Examination of that treatment, the study points out, may help provide a framework to further reflect upon some unresolved problems and anticipate some pratical difficulties in the Western genealogy of enlightenment

Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value.