Wei Zhang

The use of comparative methods to study in China since reform and opening up and development of higher education faces challenges and opportunities. Pointed out: At present, China's higher education development to a new stage and critical period, opportunities and challenges, we must establish and implement the scientific concept of development, people-oriented, co-ordination of higher education and economic development of the coordinated development of the connotation and extension of the coordinated development of Road, correctly grasp the scale and quality of the dialectical relationship between the advance of different types, levels, ownership and coordination of higher education in the development of different regions. The development of higher education in China has reached a new and crucial stage currently, facing both opportunities and challenges. We must establish and implement a scientific concept of development, which is human-oriented. By both intensive form and extensive form, the increasing speed of the scale of higher education should be coordinated with that of economic development. The dialectical relationship between the scale and quality has to be mastered. The development of different types, levels, ownerships and regions of higher education should be coordinated and balanced.

The meanings of person in Scheler’s phenomenology are discussed on three levels: that of epistemology, of ontology and of ethics. One can find the possible unity among these three levels through the concept of “selffeeling”. There are also three different philosophical meanings of self-feeling: “self-feeling 1” on epistemological level, “self-feeling 2” on ontological level, and “self-feeling 3” on ethical level. The person is self-given and gains its selfidentity through “self-feeling 1”. The person is related to its own existence and its being, as well as to the absolute being in the negative and positive “selffeeling 2”. Therefore, the pattern of the being of the person is the becoming of the person, more exactly, is the to-be of the person toward the ideal ordo amoris and the ideal value-essence of person. According to Scheler, “self-feeling 3” builds the technique of personal salvation. One can completely understand Scheler’s phenomenological concept of person through the three meanings of self-feeling.

The symbiotic resonance of the planetary and psychosomatic bodies was one of the most ancient religious and philosophical assumptions in ancient China. A number of contemporary scholars have explored this assumption in various branches of Chinese thought. Here, I would like to investigate this ancient assumption further in relation to the classical medical traditions, arguing that it was the medical thinkers who first attempted a systematic treatment and modeling of the macrocosm and the somatic body as a microcosm. Specifically, I suggest that the mutual trust between cosmology and medicine yields a cosmological synthesis of..

The dissertation project is a study of the rhetoric of "enlightenment" and the philosophy of modernity. It addresses two seemingly unrelated questions: "what is enlightenment?" and "what is May Fourth?" The investigation of these two questions is located in the contexts of Kant-Foucault-Habermas's dialogue on "what is enlightenment?" and Western sinology's re-presentation of Chinese modernity. One of the objectives of the present study is to critique modern sinology's re-presentation of Chinese modernity, which has reduced the latter into a latent statement of the Enlightenment and a derivative language of Reason, and hence, to seek to determine the conditions of possibility to address the question of "what is May Fourth?" ;The study attempts to identify the problematics in the Kant-Foucault-Habermas context, in which enlightenment was treated as an enterprise to bridge the gap between theoretical reason and practical intelligence, reason and unreason, and expert knowledge and everyday praxis. The study suggests that mediation of hermeneutic understanding of text/tradition with political commitment to organize an enlightened society was treated differently in Confucian and modern Chinese political philosophy and historiographical discourse. Examination of that treatment, the study points out, may help provide a framework to further reflect upon some unresolved problems and anticipate some pratical difficulties in the Western genealogy of enlightenment

Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value.

The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory.

Scheler called “material ethics of value” his own phenomenological ethics. Therefore, to clarify the concept of “value” is the most important step for a good understanding of his phenomenological material ethics of value. In the whole framework of the phenomenological movement, many phenomeno-ogists such as Husserl, Scheler, and N. Hartmann and so on developed their own ethics of value. But we can see the fundamental difference between Husserl’s or Hartmann’s ethics of value and Scheler’s one. The reason for this is that they prescribed “value” differently. In Scheler’s phenomenological material ethics of value, there are two basic formulations of value: the former is the value a priori as material a priori , and the latter, the value being as a ultimately basic form of being . On the one hand, in contrast with Husserl, Scheler regarded value a priori as primal-phenomenon; On the other hand, unlike N. Hartmann, Scheler prescribed value-being as “the relative being of act”. In this sense, Scheler’s phenomenological material ethics of value is founded neither merely on the value a priori in the sense of thing-phenomenology, nor merely on emotional a priori in the sense of the act-phenomenology, but on a “material apriorism”. There are three kinds of a priori in such a “material apriorism”: value a priori, emotional a priori and the relevant a priori between fact and act

On the one hand, Scheler's critique of Kant's concept of a priori benefits from Husserl to a large extent, and it complements and deepens Husserl's. On the other hand, Scheler also critiques Husserl's definition of a priori. Husserl's material a priori as ideal object primarily thanks to his so-called "Bolzano- turn". In this connection, Scheler grabs hold of the relation of Husserl to Bolzano from the very beginning. For Scheler, Husserl thinks in a "platonic" way, and still falls in a new type of "Platonism", or rather, logical Platonism, although he correctly refuses the ordinary Platonism. In Scheler's view, Husserl's phenomenological reduction is "not purely" executed, and therefore his phenomenological experience is problematic, or more precisely, the relation between categorial intuition and sensuous intuition is problematic. The final aim of Scheler's critique of Husserl's phenomenological understanding of "objective a priori" is to win the primary position of categorial intuition and its content , ethical insight and its correlate , and ultimately of phenomenological ethics of material value.Einerseits nimmt Schelers Kritik an Kant bezüglich des Begriffs des Apriori die Einsichten Husserls in großem Umfang auf. Schelers Kritik an Kant ergänzt und vertieft die Husserlsche Kant-Kritik. Andererseits kritisiert er aber auch Husserls Bestimmung des Apriori. Vor allem verdankt sich das materiale Apriori als idealer Gegenstand bei Husserl der sogenannten “Bolzano’schen Wendung”. Von Anfang an kritisiert Scheler Husserl in diesem Punkt, indem er dem Verhältnis zwischen Bolzano und Husserl immer präziser nachging. Für Scheler unterliegt Husserl mit Recht keinem platten Platonismus. Aber dennoch verfahre Husserl immerhin “platonistisch”, er unterliege einem “Neoplatonismus”, bzw. einem logischen Platonismus. Weil die phänomenologische Reduktion bei Husserl nach Schelers Meinung “nicht reinlich” durchgeführt wird, ist die phänomenologische Erfahrung bei Husserl problematisch, genauer gesagt ist das Verhältnis zwischen der kategorialen Anschauung und der sinnlichen Anschauung problematisch. Der Endzweck von Schelers Kritik an der phänomenologischen Auffassung des gegenständlichen Apriori bei Husserl besteht darin, die primäre Stelle der kategorialen Anschauung und ihrer Gehalte , sowie der sittlichen Einsicht und ihrer Korrelate und zuletzt der phänomenologisch materialen Wertethik zu gewinnen.S jedne strane, Schelerova kritika Kantova pojma a priori u velikoj mjeri duguje Husserlu, te dopunjuje i produbljuje Husserlovu. S druge strane, Scheler kritizira i Husserlovu definiciju apriorija. Husserlov materijalni a priori kao idealni predmet prvenstveno proizlazi iz njegova takozvanog bolzanovskog obrata. Prema Scheleru, Husserl razmišlja na "platonski" način te upada u novi tip "platonizma" ili, točnije, logičkog platonizma, iako s pravom odbacuje obični platonizam. Scheler smatra da Husserlova fenomenološka redukcija nije izvedena "čisto" te da je stoga njegovo fenomenološko iskustvo proble- matično ili, točnije, problematičan je odnos između kategorijalnog zora i osjetilnog zora. Krajnji cilj Schelerove kritike Husserlova fenomenološkog shvaćanja "objektivnog a priori" jest zadobivanje primarne pozicije kategorijalnog zora i njegova sadržaja , etičkog uvida i njegova korelata te, na koncu, fenomenološke etike materijalne vrijednosti

Les questions les plus fondamentales de la phénoménologie du sentir de Max Scheler concernent la place de l’intentionnalité dans la phénoménologie du sentir et la structuration de la sphère émotionnelle. Dans la première section, nous nous focaliserons avant tout sur la différence entre les sentiments non intentionnels et le sentir intentionnel, en comparant sur ce point les positions de Scheler et de Husserl. En effet, Scheler critique ces deux thèses fondamentales de Husserl: 1) les actes affectifs et leurs corrélats (« valeurs ») doivent être associés aux représentations et à leurs corrélats (« choses », Sachen ); 2) les actes affectifs, en tant qu’actes non objectivants, sont fondés dans les actes objectivants. D’une part, pour Scheler, la valeur est un objet unique en son genre du sentir des valeurs, et le sentir intentionnel est donc un acte indépendant. D’autre part, Scheler a d’abord entrepris de dépasser la séparation entre acte objectivant et acte non objectivant. Dans ce contexte, la recherche actuelle consacrée à Scheler se heurte à de nombreuses difficultés relatives à la structuration de la sphère émotionnelle en rapport avec la hiérarchie des modalités axiologiques et avec l’a priori corrélationnel. Dans la deuxième section, nous expliquerons d’abord les idées de Scheler, puis en discuterons les difficultés. C’est par le « commerce vivant » avec le monde dans le sentir intentionnel et dans les actes émotionnels intentionnels, par les corrélats intentionnels (valeurs matérielles), que Scheler se sépare du formalisme en éthique. A travers un « apriorisme matériel » qui présente trois espèce d’a priori (a priori axiologique, a priori émotionnel et a priori corrélationnel), l’éthique matérielle phénoménologique des valeurs de Sche­ler est guidée par l’esprit d’un « objectivisme et absolutisme éthique rigoureux »

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.

Dreaming: a process of self-organizationKahn and Hobson (1993) proposed that dreams are a product of self-organization of brain during sleep. As a complex system far from equilibrium state, the dreaming brain may form a new pattern by the interaction between components within this system. At REM sleep stage, signals from neuronal clusters self-organize and form image fragments, then the image fragments interact and produce images, and finally these materials are associated into a relatively continuous narrative (i.e., dreams). This process above happens under a weak control of brain, and the conditions of this state mainly include: (a) the inhibition of external stimuli or feedback; (b) the changes of neuromodulatory systems (e.g., the governance of aminergic neurochemicals and the weakness of cholinergic neurochemicals); (c) the bombardment of PGO wave to the visual cortex; and (d) the changes of neural activity in brain (e.g., the activation of limbic system and the reduction of prefrontal regions). In this situation, the brain could focus on the internal world and integrate various psychological and physiological changes into dream content (Kahn et al., 2002, 2000). However, self-organization mechanism could not determine which memories will be activated and incorporated into dream content (Kahn, 2013), although it provides an approach how an ordered structure, behavior or pattern spontaneously emerges from the interaction between components or subsystems without an e...

Scheler’s critique of Kant and his concept of a priori does, on the one hand, show a notable debt to Husserl, although Scheler adds to and deepens Husserl’s critique. On the other hand, however, Scheler also criticises Husserl’s own understanding of the concept of a priori. The material a priori as an ideal object in Husserl is, above all, connected with the so-called “Bolzanian turn”. Scheler’s critique of Husserl is rendered more profound as he increasingly penetrates the depth of the relation between Bolzano and Husserl. According to Scheler Husserl does not subscribe to soulless Platonism, allow he always conducts himself in a Platonist way. He subscribes instead to neo-Platonism, or rather to logical Platonism. Because the phenomenological reduction in Husserl is not, according to Scheler, conducted in a “pure” way, Husserl’s phenomenological experience (categorical intuition) is problematic. More exactly the relation between categorical and sensory intuition is problematic. Scheler’s ultimate goal is to ensure a primary status for categorical intuition and its contents (material a priori), as well as for the moral view and its correlates (material values), and last, but not least, for the phenomenologically material value ethics.

The concept of a priori plays an important role in Kant’s entiree philosophy. However, Husserl often claimed that a genuine concept of a priori in the phenomenological sense was absent in Kant. Scheler criticized this concept of Kant just as Husserl did. All of Scheler’s ethical critiques of Kant, who is the major opponent to Scheler, are based on his critiques of Kant’s concept of a priori because, for Scheler, it is the largest absurdity of Kant’s theory that a priori is equated to the formal. Scheler thus clearly delineated Kant’s transcendentalism, which seeks a priori in form. It seems that Scheler‘s comprehension and interpretation of a priori reversed Kant’s “Copernican revolution”, in contrast with which, Scheler carried ou a „Ptolemiac counter-revolution“. In fact, Scheler questioned Kant‘s transcendental-rational theory of the function of synthetic categories, which derived from the “Copernican revolution”. Nevertheless, Scheler did not want to defend the pre-Kant position, or Kant’s pre-critique period. He also did not mean simply to stress one side in Kant’s dualism, which was ignored by Kant. In fact, he wanted to question Kant’s metaphysical dualism itself. The eventual goal of his phenomenological philosophy is to reveal the uncritical presuppositions in Kant’s critical philosophy.