Laszlo E. Szabo

Greenberger. Horne. Shimony, and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the branching space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible with a deterministic world nor with a world that permits correlated space-related events without a common cause.

It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects.

“In an earlier era of ‘natural philosophy’, physics and philosophy of physics were quite inseparably intertwined, but in the modern age of proliferating specialization, fruitful communication across the disciplines has become the exception rather than rule. We would like to think that the workshop1 and this volume are symptomatic of an ongoing process of reunification, one which can pave the way toward exceptional progress in this fundamental and highly challenging area, and others as well” — the editors Richard A. Healey and Geoffrey Hellman write in the Preface. The main topic of the ten articles in this volume, Quantum Measurement, indeed, requires both physical and philosophical considerations