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Dieter Henrich

Humboldt University, Berlin
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    144
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 More details
  • Humboldt University, Berlin
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Continental Philosophy
  • All publications (144)
  • G. Schneeberger, Kants Konzeption der Modalbegriffe (review)
    Philosophische Rundschau 4 (1/2): 118. 1956.
  • Eine Republik Deutschland. Reflexionen auf dem Weg aus der deutschen Teilung
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 55 (1): 174-174. 1993.
  • O Que É Metafísica? – O Que É Modernidade? Doze Teses Contra Jürgen Habermas
    Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã 14 83-117. 2009.
  •  1
    Die Philosophie im Prozeß der Kultur
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (3): 591-593. 2007.
  • Kant oder Hegel?
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 39 (2): 317-321. 1985.
  •  253
    Zwei Theorien zur Verteidigung von Selbstbewußtsein
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 7 (1): 77-99. 1979.
    Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first t…Read more
    Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first theory suffers furthermore from a hidden circularity whereas the second needs an extension that leads into an infinite regress.
    Self-Consciousness in ExperienceFirst-Person ContentsNonconceptual/Prereflective Self-Consciousness
  •  1
    Die Formationsbedingungen der Dialektik
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 36 (139/140): 139. 1982.
  • Hegel y Hölderlin
    Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 7 (20): 49. 1970.
  •  528
    The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction
    Review of Metaphysics 22 (4): 640-659. 1969.
    Hence, there is still controversy over which of the two versions of the deduction deserves priority and whether indeed any distinction between them can be maintained that would go beyond questions of presentation and involve the structure of the proof itself. Schopenhauer and Heidegger held that the first edition alone fully expresses Kant's unique philosophy, while Kant himself, as well as many other Kantians, have only seen a difference in the method of presentation.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologySelf-Consciousness, Misc
  •  1
    Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte
    Philosophische Rundschau 13 252. 1965.
  •  1
    H. Herring, Das Problem der Affektion bei Kant
    Philosophische Rundschau 2 (3/4): 233. 1954.
  •  167
    Subjectivity as philosophical principle
    Critical Horizons 4 (1): 7-27. 2003.
    This paper wishes to establish some connections with the intentions that have informed the project of the philosophy of the subject. This project has especially been represented by the work of Fichte, although today it is important to make it relevant to contemporary philosophical problems and issues. A renewed philosophy of the subject must not risk being exposed to the fundamental critique, so eloquently formulated by Heidegger, that, like Fichte's work, it can begin once again from the convic…Read more
    This paper wishes to establish some connections with the intentions that have informed the project of the philosophy of the subject. This project has especially been represented by the work of Fichte, although today it is important to make it relevant to contemporary philosophical problems and issues. A renewed philosophy of the subject must not risk being exposed to the fundamental critique, so eloquently formulated by Heidegger, that, like Fichte's work, it can begin once again from the conviction that we can lead a human life only on the basis of acts of the universal objectification of everything there is and on the basis of an act of self-empowerment. This paper proposes that a renewed philosophy of the subject has to try to bring itself into harmony with our experience and awareness of human limitations and ambivalence.
    Subjectivity and ConsciousnessMartin HeideggerJohann Gottlieb Fichte
  • A. de Coninck, L'Analytique Transcendentale de Kant
    Philosophische Rundschau 6 (3/4): 303. 1958.
  •  47
    Fragen und Quellen zur Geschichte von Hegels Nachlaß
    with Willi Ferdinand Becker
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 35 (3/4). 1981.
  •  34
    Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität
    Suhrkamp. 2007.
    Self-Consciousness, Misc
  • Logical form and real totality: The authentic conceptual form of Hegel's concept of the state
    In Robert B. Pippin, Otfried Höffe & Nicholas Walker (eds.), Hegel on Ethics and Politics, Cambridge University Press. 2004.
    G. W. F. Hegel
  •  29
    Die Krise der Universität im vereinigten Deutschland
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 40 (11): 1239-1258. 1992.
  • J. Vuillemin, L'Héritage Kantien et la Révolution Copernicienne
    Philosophische Rundschau 2 (3/4): 234. 1954.
  • Versuch über Kunst und Leben. Subjektivität — Weltverstehen — Kunst
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 65 (1): 167-168. 2003.
  • Carl Immanuel Diez
    with Johann Ludwig Döderlein
    Hegel-Studien 3 276-287. 1965.
  • Hegels philosophische Psychologie
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3): 571-572. 1981.
  •  1
    Subjektivität Und Metaphysik Festschrift Für Wolfgang Cramer
    with Wolfgang Cramer and Hans Wagner
    Klostermann. 1966.
  •  89
    Über die Einheit der Subjektivität (review)
    Philosophische Rundschau 3 (1/2): 28-69. 1955.
  •  230
    Hegel and Hoelderlin
    Idealistic Studies 2 (2): 151-173. 1972.
    Hegel’s friendship with Hoelderlin ended in silence. In all of Hegel’s work the name Hoelderlin does not once occur. Wherever he is mentioned in letters, Hegel gives only a scant reply. The period of their association, dominated by the “ideals of adolescence,” seemed as far removed to Hegel—who had developed the Idea into a philosophical system of knowledge —as Hoelderlin himself, silenced by madness. Were it not for scholarly research, we would know nothing about what they had in common.
    G. W. F. Hegel
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