Dieter Henrich

Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first theory suffers furthermore from a hidden circularity whereas the second needs an extension that leads into an infinite regress.

This paper wishes to establish some connections with the intentions that have informed the project of the philosophy of the subject. This project has especially been represented by the work of Fichte, although today it is important to make it relevant to contemporary philosophical problems and issues. A renewed philosophy of the subject must not risk being exposed to the fundamental critique, so eloquently formulated by Heidegger, that, like Fichte's work, it can begin once again from the conviction that we can lead a human life only on the basis of acts of the universal objectification of everything there is and on the basis of an act of self-empowerment. This paper proposes that a renewed philosophy of the subject has to try to bring itself into harmony with our experience and awareness of human limitations and ambivalence.

On considere communement que la philosophie de la subjectivite a ete definitivement depassee par les differents courants de pensee du XXe siecle. Alors que l'approche naturaliste des neurosciences vise a une reduction complete de la conscience individuelle aux activites neuronales du cerveau, la phenomenologie de l'intersubjectivite et la philosophie de la communication contemporaines presupposent comme acquis que la relation a autrui jouit d'une primaute ultime sur toute egoite du moi. Sans proner un simple retour a la metaphysique du sujet au sens classique, le present ouvrage entend montrer que la philosophie ne peut ni ne doit renoncer a la pensee de la subjectivite dans la mesure ou tout rapport au monde naturel et toute relation a autrui decoulent de la dynamique de la relation a soi primordiale dans laquelle chaque sujet se constitue a la fois comme libre et fini.