Tom Rockmore

The Pittsburgh School, aka the Pittsburgh Hegelians or as the Pittsburgh neo-Hegelians, is often associated with Sellars, McDowell and Brandom. The views of the Pittsburgh School arise on the heels of Sellars’ rejection of the given, but differ in important ways. The difficulty, if one turns away from the given, lies in justifying objective claims to know. I argue that neither Sellars, nor Brandom, nor McDowell successfully justifies claims to know. I further question their supposed Hegelianism. Hegel is a constructivist in that he follows Kant’s claim, which is central to the Copernican revolution, that we know only what we in some sense “construct.” Unlike Hegel, the Pittsburgh “Hegelians” are not constructivists in terms of the letter or even the spirit of their views.

These original essays, never published before, suggest the breadth and richness of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's philosophy and are signs of the contemporary effort to explore the relationship between his system of thought and current philosophical debates. Some of the issues discussed included the relationship between "theoretical" and "practical" reason; the philosophy of language; antifoundationalism; the juridical status of women; duties toward natural beings; and the political implications of the Wissenschaftslehre. In addition, the volume includes an introduciton that surveys the history of Fichte interpretation in the English-speaking world and assesses the current state of Fichte studies.

A great deal of attention has been devoted to Marxian man in recent years as a result of the increased interest in the early Marx. A complete list of all those who have considered this problem cannot be given here, but Lukács, Fromm, Popitz, Petrovic, and Schaff, and among more recent contributors Avineri, Mészáros, Sève and Hartmann should be mentioned. The result of all this attention has been, as could be expected, somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, progress has been made in several areas. For one thing, it has become increasingly apparent that there are at least strong indications of a view of the human individual in Marx’s thought, especially in the early writings, although the intrinsic significance of that view, for Marx’s position and in general, is a matter of debate. On the other hand, a controversy has arisen in the literature. This controversy is basically three-cornered. It roughly divides those who consider Marx’s early so-called humanism as a phase that was definitely superseded in his mature work. The principal representatives of this view are Althusser and his school. Against this, Sartre has argued that Marx in fact has no theory of the individual and his position is hence in danger of collapse because of this lack. Schaff has countered that there is a view of man implicit in Marx’s position, a view which needs to be reconstructed and further developed.

This article examines two views about the capitalism that lies at the heart of modern industrial society. We owe to Marx and Piketty two large-scale, hugely important, but very different studies of the nature of modern industrial capitalism. In Capital, Marx provides a complex analysis of the anatomy of modern industrial capitalism, which he regards not as stable but rather as over time unstable and tending toward internal collapse on several grounds, of which the most important is apparently the so-called tendency of the falling rate of profit. The falling rate of profit supposedly threatens its continued existence. Piketty criticizes the latter view in the context of his theory of contemporary capitalism. The article suggests, first, that Marx's view of the falling rate of interest is empirically implausible but Piketty's rival claim is empirically plausible. Second, a successful transition from capitalism to communism on Marxian grounds is unlikely in practice. And finally, despite Marx's intentions, it is unlikely to realize itself in practice, and is in this respect a traditional theory.

Gerald Bruns has written a fine study of the relation of language and poetry in the later Heidegger, whose final phase lies beyond the reach of philosophical comprehension, according to Bruns. Bruns offers a clear, comprehensive, sensitive account of a number of main themes in Heidegger's final view in a discussion patient to a fault and always attentive to the nuances of expression, an application if one will of Heidegger's idea of Gelassenheit to Heidegger's own texts. As Bruns sees it, it is folly even to try to follow this stage of Heidegger's thinking, although it must be said that he himself does an outstanding job of doing just what he says it would be foolish even to attempt. According to Bruns, Heidegger is finally a comic thinker, an outsider who supposedly resists integration on behalf of scandal and freedom, even in Bruns's view a philosopher of freedom. In short, Heidegger was someone who strove for authentic thought and stubbornly followed the argument wherever it might lead.

Plato both created the Western aesthetic tradition and rejected the artistic claim to truth. I suggest that Plato’s rejection of the view that non-philosophical art is true gave rise to a debate later traversing the entire Western aesthetic tradition. I further suggest that the post-Platonic Western aesthetic tradition can be reconstructed as an effort by many hands to come to grips with and if possible overturn the Platonic judgment. I finally suggest that Hegel, in disagreeing with both Kant and Plato, presents an interesting anti-Platonic argument for “reforging” as it were the ancient link between art and truth. For in the final analysis, art, or at least some kinds of art, is not only beautiful but also in a deep sense true.