Tom Rockmore

Recent discussion has seen an increase in the interest in hermeneutics. The increased interest in hermeneutics goes back at least until the appearance of Being and Time in 1927, more than sixty years ago. Thisbookis characterized by the unresolved tension between two clearly incompatible theses: the Husserlian form of absolute truth, and a post-Husserlian view of truth arising from the hermeneutical circle. More recently, the interest in hermeneutics has been strengthened by the appearance of Truth and Method in 1960, in which Gadamer, Heidegger’s most important student, developed the hermeneutical thesis of the latter’s Fundamentalontologie in a way which has influenced numerous other thinkers, notably Ricoeur and Habermas, in a wide-ranging and often confused discussion. The latter’s theory of communicative action can be seen as carrying further the Gadamerian view that knowledge results from interpretation. In Habermas’s version of the linguistic turn, which is further influenced by Kant’s view of Vernunftinteresse and Habermas’s own, peculiar reading of Peirce, speech is intrinsically aimed at potential agreement through the development of consensus.

This is a paper about Hegelian constructivism in relation to theory of knowledge. Constructivism, which is known at least since Greek antiquity, is understood in different ways. In philosophy, epistemological constructivism is often rejected, and only occasionally studied. Kantian constructivism is examined from time to time under the heading of the Copernican revolution. Hegelian constructivism, which is best understood as a reaction to and revision of Kantian epistemology, seems never to have been discussed in detail. This paper will sketch the outlines of Hegelian constructivism in relation to the critical philosophy. Hegelian constructivism amounts to an intrinsically historical view of epistemology as a trial and error process situated in the social context. Knowledge emerges from a trial and error process in which we construct a cognitive framework to grasp objects constructed in and through this process. I suggest that the considerable interest of a historical, constructivist, phenomenological approach to knowledge, such as Hegel’s, lies in its largely unexplored possibilities for advancing the epistemological debate.

These original essays, never published before, suggest the breadth and richness of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's philosophy and are signs of the contemporary effort to explore the relationship between his system of thought and current philosophical debates. Some of the issues discussed included the relationship between "theoretical" and "practical" reason; the philosophy of language; antifoundationalism; the juridical status of women; duties toward natural beings; and the political implications of the Wissenschaftslehre. In addition, the volume includes an introduciton that surveys the history of Fichte interpretation in the English-speaking world and assesses the current state of Fichte studies.

A great deal of attention has been devoted to Marxian man in recent years as a result of the increased interest in the early Marx. A complete list of all those who have considered this problem cannot be given here, but Lukács, Fromm, Popitz, Petrovic, and Schaff, and among more recent contributors Avineri, Mészáros, Sève and Hartmann should be mentioned. The result of all this attention has been, as could be expected, somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, progress has been made in several areas. For one thing, it has become increasingly apparent that there are at least strong indications of a view of the human individual in Marx’s thought, especially in the early writings, although the intrinsic significance of that view, for Marx’s position and in general, is a matter of debate. On the other hand, a controversy has arisen in the literature. This controversy is basically three-cornered. It roughly divides those who consider Marx’s early so-called humanism as a phase that was definitely superseded in his mature work. The principal representatives of this view are Althusser and his school. Against this, Sartre has argued that Marx in fact has no theory of the individual and his position is hence in danger of collapse because of this lack. Schaff has countered that there is a view of man implicit in Marx’s position, a view which needs to be reconstructed and further developed.