Tom Rockmore

Despite the attacks on metaphysics in the 20th century, the field remains surprising alive, not less robust, less interesting, nor ready to be consigned to the dustbin of history. The essays assembled in this volume, which come from all areas of the metaphysical tradition, are all by authors who are committed to the kind of metaphysics which Hume and later Kant recommended, although naturally they regard what good metaphysics is in very different ways. Contributors include D. P. Chattoppadhyaya, Fred Dretske, Ludger Honnefelder, Peter van Inwagen, Jay F. Rosenberg, David-Hillel Rubin, and Loretta Torrago. Author abstracts are provided for each paper and a complete name index is provided.

This is a paper about Hegelian constructivism in relation to theory of knowledge. Constructivism, which is known at least since Greek antiquity, is understood in different ways. In philosophy, epistemological constructivism is often rejected, and only occasionally studied. Kantian constructivism is examined from time to time under the heading of the Copernican revolution. Hegelian constructivism, which is best understood as a reaction to and revision of Kantian epistemology, seems never to have been discussed in detail. This paper will sketch the outlines of Hegelian constructivism in relation to the critical philosophy. Hegelian constructivism amounts to an intrinsically historical view of epistemology as a trial and error process situated in the social context. Knowledge emerges from a trial and error process in which we construct a cognitive framework to grasp objects constructed in and through this process. I suggest that the considerable interest of a historical, constructivist, phenomenological approach to knowledge, such as Hegel’s, lies in its largely unexplored possibilities for advancing the epistemological debate.