Tom Rockmore

In this engaging and accessible introduction to Hegel's theory of knowledge, Tom Rockmore presents the philosopher's ideas the way Hegel himself saw them: as coming to grips with, even competing with, prior philosophical positions. Carefully laying out the philosophical tradition of German idealism, he concisely explicates the theories of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, essential to an understanding of Hegel's thought. Rockmore shows how Hegel first formulates his own position in relation to the philosophical discussion of his own historical moment, before extending the discussion, in a second phase, to the entire historical tradition. The Hegelian system, according to Rockmore, remains an essentially modern conception of knowledge, surprisingly relevant to our contemporary intellectual situation. Rockmore's remarkably lucid book will interest general readers as well as students of philosophy, intellectual history, politics, culture, and society.

This paper will sketch the outlines of a constructivist approach to human nature. Constructivism is an epistemic approach that emerges in ancient geometry, that comes into modern philosophy and that resembles certain scientific practices. The paper begins with brief remarks on epistemic constructivism before turning to three important illustrations: Kant’s Copernican revolution, Bas van Fraassen’s constructivist empiricism, and Noam Chomsky’s generative linguistics. I argue that the human sciences routinely and successfully construct representations of human nature, not as it is, but as it appears and is known on the basis of available empirical data.

This paper concerns the nature and a significance of metaphilosophy with special attention to German idealism. Metaphilosophy, or the philosophy of philosophy, is understood differently from different perspectives, for instance, if philosophy concerns the consciousness of the object, as the self-consciousness of the knowing process. If we assume that the Western philosophical tradition consists in a long series of efforts to demonstrate claims to know, then metaphilosophy is not present in the ancient Greek tradition. It only arises in the modern tradition through the turn from a theory of knowledge that depends on consciousness, more precisely consciousness of the independent object, to a theory of knowledge that depends on self-consciousness, more precisely consciousness of the independent object as well as consciousness of consciousness of the independent object.

This intellectually discomfiting, disturbingly provocative, yet still thoroughly scholarly Handbook reproduces the intellectual ferment that accompanied the Russian Revolution including the wholly polarising effect at that time of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The Palgrave Handbook of Leninist Political Philosophy does not settle for one safe interpretation of the thought of this world-historic figure but rather revels in a clash of viewpoints. Most interestingly it presents a contrast between the Western editors who emphasise pure democracy and Marxian humanism with many of the contributing scholars who take a more sanguine view of the Leninist political project. Perhaps reflecting the current Western political crisis, some of the volume’s other European and North American scholars more closely align with their colleagues from the Global South. Key Features: · Places particular emphasis on the key elements of Lenin’s thought – the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nature of the dialectic and the New Economic Policy · Additional comprehensive coverage includes the theory of the party, Bolshevism, imperialism, and the class struggle in the countryside · Examines the relation of Lenin’s thought to the ideas of his most influential contemporaries as well as the most eminent thinker to interpret Lenin since his death – György Lukács This Handbook is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in political philosophy, political theory, the history of political ideas, economics, international relations and world history. It is also ideal for the general reader who wishes to understand some of the most powerful ideas that have shaped the modern world and that may yet shake the world again.

Two centuries after his birth, Karl Marx is read almost solely through the lens of Marxism, his works examined for how they fit into the doctrine that was developed from them after his death. With Marx’s Dream, Tom Rockmore offers a much-needed alternative view, distinguishing rigorously between Marx and Marxism. Rockmore breaks with the Marxist view of Marx in three key ways. First, he shows that the concern with the relation of theory to practice—reflected in Marx’s famous claim that philosophers only interpret the world, while the point is to change it—arose as early as Socrates, and has been central to philosophy in its best moments. Second, he seeks to free Marx from his unsolicited Marxist embrace in order to consider his theory on its own merits. And, crucially, Rockmore relies on the normal standards of philosophical debate, without the special pleading to which Marxist accounts too often resort. Marx’s failures as a thinker, Rockmore shows, lie less in his diagnosis of industrial capitalism’s problems than in the suggested remedies, which are often unsound. ​ Only a philosopher of Rockmore’s stature could tackle a project this substantial, and the results are remarkable: a fresh Marx, unencumbered by doctrine and full of insights that remain salient today.

German Idealism as Constructivism is the culmination of many years of research by distinguished philosopher Tom Rockmore—it is his definitive statement on the debate about German idealism between proponents of representationalism and those of constructivism that still plagues our grasp of the history of German idealism and the whole epistemological project today. Rockmore argues that German idealism—which includes iconic thinkers such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—can best be understood as a constructivist project, one that asserts that we cannot know the mind-independent world as it is but only our own mental construction of it. Since ancient Greece philosophers have tried to know the world in itself, an effort that Kant believed had failed. His alternative strategy—which came to be known as the Copernican revolution—was that the world as we experience and know it depends on the mind. Rockmore shows that this project was central to Kant’s critical philosophy and the later German idealists who would follow him. He traces the different ways philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel formulated their own versions of constructivism. Offering a sweeping but deeply attuned analysis of a crucial part of the legacy of German idealism, Rockmore reinvigorates this school of philosophy and opens up promising new avenues for its study.

L’ontologie fichtéenne sociale est peu connue, mais certainement très originale. Elle est le résultat direct de la mise à jour fichtéenne du concept de sujet kantien. Kant comprend le sujet comme principe transcendantal, ce que Fichte réinterprète en sujet humain. À partir de Fichte, la connaissance se comprend donc comme connaissance humaine. S’inscrivant dans la mouvance kantienne, Fichte définit la connaissance comme limitée à ce qui nous arrive au niveau de la conscience, ou plus précisément aux représentations accompagnées d’un sentiment de nécessité. Ainsi Fichte limite l’ontologie au niveau des phénomènes, niveau indépassable, mais souvent dépassé, p. e. dans l’école de Pittsburgh actuelle.

“Materialism,” which is central for Marxism, is apparently less important for Marx, who, after the “Theses on Feuerbach,” only rarely mentions it. In Capital, Marx mentions “materialism” only two times: in a passage on Giambattista Vico, an important eighteenth Italian philosopher, and in the Afterword to the second German edition in the famous comment on Hegelian dialectic. This paper concerns the reference to Vico. This reference is important in two ways: in calling attention to a basic similarity between Marx’s position and Vico’s constructivist approach to knowledge, and in suggesting Marx’s position is not science but rather a particular kind of philosophy.

This excellent study of the theme of polemos shows a detailed grasp of the entire range of Heidegger’s writings and relevant parts of the huge and rapidly growing secondary literature. This work is based on recent efforts to understand the link between Heidegger’s philosophical theories and his politics. In Fried’s opinion, efforts by Heidegger or his more uncritical fans to deny his Nazi proclivities are not only fallacious but also obscure his theories. Fried is concerned to grasp Heidegger’s theories within his times and as they relate to our times without reducing one to the other. In following polemos throughout Heidegger’s writings, he casts genuine light on the position as a whole. Fried focuses mainly on the middle period, when Heidegger is explicitly concerned with polemos. He shows that this concept links together Heidegger’s writings, early and late.

It is appropriate to ask about the prospects for metaphysics at the present time as we near the end of a century in which, perhaps more than at any other moment in its long history, metaphysics has been under persistent, unrelenting attack. The traditional concern with metaphysics is very old, depending on the definition, as old as philosophy, even its main theme. Depending on the point of view, much is at stake in the continued viability of metaphysics, including the viability of a central philosophical theme or even the very viability of philosophy itself as a meaningful enterprise.

The German philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, has long been recognized as an important and original figure in the history of philosophy and Western thought and as a seminal influence upon the Romantic tradition. This book focuses on Fichte's contributions in political theory as set out in his Foundations of Natural Right. The essays, which examine such issues as Fichte as a social contract theorist, his theory of gender relations and his theories on punishment and the criminal law among many other topics, remedy what has been a striking lacuna in the existing scholarly literature.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte is a widely known transcendental philosopher and obviously a thinker of the first rank. Yet contemporary interest in and evaluation of "transcendental philosophy" as well as the precise meaning of the terms and its relation to "transcendental method" remains unclear. With renewed attention to German idealism in general and to Fichte in particular, this timely collection of new papers will be of interest to anyone concerned with transcendental philosophy, German idealism, modern German philosophy, and transcendental arguments.

This paper examines the distinction between materialism (or realism) and idealism, which to the best of my knowledge all forms of Marxism regard as central to Marx as well as to Marxism. Materialism comes into ancient philosophy as a philosophical approach to philosophy of nature, which later becomes a philosophical alternative to idealism, and still later becomes a Marxist view of an extra-philosophical, scientific approach supposedly illustrated by Marx. The paper will review Marxist approaches to materialism in Marxism-Leninism and then in classical Marxism before turning to Marx, with special attention to the Paris Manuscripts. I will suggest that if “materialism” is understood in a standard manner as referring to the priority of matter as the main or even the sole explanatory element, then Marx’s alleged materialism is no more than a Marxist myth. I will further suggest that Marx is a materialist in another, non-standard sense of the term as concerns the focus on concrete, social problems.