Tom Rockmore

There is an obvious distinction between the philosophical meditation on politics and relevance to politics, on the one hand, and the political engagement of philosophers and even philosophy, on the other. At this late date, there can be few people interested in philosophy, and even many uninterested in this ancient discipline, unaware that Martin Heidegger turned to Nazism in the 1930s. Heidegger, who all his life subscribed to the Platonic view of the priority of philosophy over politics, later described his own political turning as “die grösste Dummheit,” in short as an error. This paper will consider recent discussion of this instance of “stupidity,” with special attention to three books: Julian Young, Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism; Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias; and Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time.

The recent concern with hermeneutics, which stems above all from Truth and Method, should not be allowed to obscure the fact, to which Gadamer certainly is sensitive, that this topic has a long philosophical lineage, extending back into the tradition at least to Aristotle. In particular, it seems rarely to have been noticed that although their thought is notoriously difficult, the major members of the German idealist tradition provided not only the positions themselves, but a theory of their interpretation. The latter point is important since, if evaluation is to be fair, positions must be measured against standards which are their own and not against extrinsic criteria. Yet for idealism this has rarely been done, in part because little attention has so far been directed to the idealist view of how theory is to be interpreted. Accordingly, my task in this paper will be twofold: to discuss the idealist theory of hermeneutics, and to test that theory in the interpretation of one of the major idealist positions. In consequence, the paper will come full circle, since the idealist theory of hermeneutics will be both expounded and put to the test provided by the hermeneutics of idealism.

It is hardly surprising, since for Hegel philosophers are children of their times, that French Hegelianism differs from Hegelianism in other languages and literatures. At least the following aspects typify the French approach to Hegel's theory. To begin with, Hegel, like a few others, is a master thinker in the French discussion, one of the few intellectual figures around whom the discussion tends to take shape. Second, in the wake of the major impetus provided to French Hegel studies by Kojève's work, there has long been a tendency to conflate the views of Hegel, the great philosopher, and Kojève, one of his most brilliant expositors. Third, since the 1940s when Hyppolite emerged as a major Hegel interpreter, French Hegelianism has been the theater of an ongoing struggle between the two, Hegelian unorthodoxy, represented by Kojève, and Hegelian orthodoxy, represented by Hyppolite, that now seems to have been resolved in favor of the latter. The French Hegel discussion, which was once highly unorthodox by virtue of Kojève's influence, seems now to have become more orthodox but perhaps less interesting. Fourth, as a result of Kojève's influence, there is a link, peculiar to the French discussion, between Hegel and Heidegger that has further led to the tendency, also peculiar to the French debate, to see Husserl and Hegel as sharing the same method.

For some time now I have been arguing that Fichte's theory can be read as circular, antifoundationalist, and systematic, and further arguing that it is the source of an epistemological revolution in philosophy. Fichte and most of his interpreters mainly see him as carrying forward the critical philosophy. But I see him as breaking with it in crucial ways in a profoundly innovative theory. The aim of this paper is to pull together aspects of this argument in a single place in order to describe Fichte's theory as I see it, using a wider range of texts than I have so far employed, drawing consequences that follow from my interpretation and responding to recent criticism of it. In so doing, I intend to reaffirm my conviction that the interest of Fichte's theory is not merely archival, something historians of philosophy are interested in because they cannot do philosophy, or something that philosophers might concern themselves with when they are not concerned with philosophy, but directly relevant to the contemporary discussion. But as I see it, the contemporary relevance of the Fichtean view largely depends on an unorthodox, anti-foundationalist reading of it. For if it is read in an orthodox, Cartesian, foundationalist manner, favored by most writers on Fichte, it has nothing or almost nothing to contribute to our increasingly anti-foundationalist debate on knowledge.

9/11 represents less a tear in the fabric of history, or a break with the past, than an inflection in ongoing historical processes, such as the continued expansion of capitalism that at some recent time has supposedly attained a level of globalization. This paper considers the relation of war and politics with respect to three instances arising in the wake of 9/11, including the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, and finally the global war on terror. I argue that these wars are superficially dissimilar, but that on a deeper level they all relate to a single ideological position that is an important motivation in current US foreign policy, and that this position is further related to capitalism.

Recent discussion has seen an increase in the interest in hermeneutics. The increased interest in hermeneutics goes back at least until the appearance of Being and Time in 1927, more than sixty years ago. Thisbookis characterized by the unresolved tension between two clearly incompatible theses: the Husserlian form of absolute truth, and a post-Husserlian view of truth arising from the hermeneutical circle. More recently, the interest in hermeneutics has been strengthened by the appearance of Truth and Method in 1960, in which Gadamer, Heidegger’s most important student, developed the hermeneutical thesis of the latter’s Fundamentalontologie in a way which has influenced numerous other thinkers, notably Ricoeur and Habermas, in a wide-ranging and often confused discussion. The latter’s theory of communicative action can be seen as carrying further the Gadamerian view that knowledge results from interpretation. In Habermas’s version of the linguistic turn, which is further influenced by Kant’s view of Vernunftinteresse and Habermas’s own, peculiar reading of Peirce, speech is intrinsically aimed at potential agreement through the development of consensus.

With few exceptions, philosophers typically have contended that knowledge worthy of the name is beyond time and place. This venerable idea was turned on its head in the emergence of a rival view of knowledge as historical in the wake of the French Revolution. A claim that knowledge is not ahistorical but historical resolves some of these difficulties while creating others. This paper will briefly consider several of these difficulties, including how to argue for this position, the differences between contextualism, or a view of knowledge as cultural, and historicism, as well as issues concerning relativism and cognitive objectivity. It will argue that after the decline of foundationalism, a conception of knowledge as historical is our most promising approach.