Jacqueline A. Laing

An analysis of moral theology, the study of how man must live in order to achieve his highest end, which, according to many theistic outlooks, is union with his maker. A species of theology, it involves the study of things divine, and is distinct from dogmatic theology by virtue of its focus. Whereas dogmatic theology concentrates upon doctrines and articles of faith, moral theology relates, more specifically to the actions of human beings and their relations to God. Moral theology naturally involves a discussion of ethics and the natural law, since this law is recognized also by divine revelation. It is not, however, co-extensive with moral philosophy, since its subject matter derives generally from revelation and theological sources.

An analysis of the concept of law, its source and connection with human positive law. The article begins by noting that “law” relates not only to prescriptions governing the behavior of human individuals. The term has a far wider sense. It can also refer to a standard or rule that binds things or events. This sense of the term covers the laws of the physical as well as the moral sciences. There is a distinction to be drawn between scientific laws of nature and moral laws. Regularities in natural occurrences are often regarded as laws of nature even though what we ordinarily think of as laws are those rules that govern human behavior. We speak, for example, of the “law” of gravity and of Newton's, Einstein's, and Kepler's laws. In so doing we emphasize the regularity and binding nature implicit in each of their formulas. The thought that there are laws of the natural sciences as well as moral laws has traditionally been seen as implying a creator and regulator of all things, and an eternal source of these laws. Equally it raises the disputed question of the place of miracles, or those suspensions of regularities, in the natural scheme of things. In the same way, sacred scripture speaks of Divine Wisdom as directing all actions and movements. This article considers the physical and moral laws more generally and considers human law and its connection with the natural law.

The Groningen Protocol and contemporary defences of the legalisation of infanticide are predicated on actualism and personism. According to these related ideas, human beings achieve their moral status in virtue of the degree to which they are capable of laying value upon their lives or exhibiting certain qualities, like not being in pain or being desirable to third party family members. This article challenges these notions suggesting that both ideas depend on arbitrary and discriminatory notions of human moral status. Our propensity to sleep, fall unconscious, pass out and so on, demonstrates that we very often exhibit our status as “potential persons.” Our abilities can and do fluctuate. The equal dignity principle, distinguished in turn from both the excesses of vitalism and consequentialism, is analyzed in the context of human rights logic and law. The normalization of non-voluntary euthanasia, via such ad hoc practices as the Groningen Protocol is considered. Substituted ‘consent’ to the euthanasia of infants or others, is scrutinized and the implications of institutionalizing non-voluntary euthanasia in the context of financial, research and political interests are considered. The impact on the medical and legal professions, carers, families and coroners, as well as public attitudes more generally, is discussed. It is suggested that eroding the value of human life carries with it significant destructive and hazardous long-term implications for societies. To elevate some long-term implications whilst ignoring others demonstrates the irrational nature of the effort to institutionalize euthanasia.

This article challenges the view most recently expounded by Emily Jackson that ‘decisional privacy’ ought to be respected in the realm of artificial reproduction (AR). On this view, it is considered an unjust infringement of individual liberty for the state to interfere with individual or group freedom artificially to produce a child. It is our contention that a proper evaluation of AR and of the relevance of welfare will be sensitive not only to the rights of ‘commissioning parties’ to AR but also to public policy considerations. We argue that AR has implications for the common good, by involving matters of human reproduction, kinship, race, parenthood and identity. In this paper we challenge presuppositions concerning decisional privacy. We examine the essential commodification of human life implicit in AR and the systematicity that makes this possible. We address the objection that it is an ethically neutral way of having children and consider the problem of ‘existential debt’. After examining objections to the thesis that AR is illegitimate for reasons of public policy and the common good, we return to the issue of decisional privacy in the light of considerations concerning the legitimate role of the state in matters affecting human reproduction.

The Natural Law Reader features a selection of readings in metaphysics, jurisprudence, politics, and ethics that are all related to the classical Natural Law tradition in the modern world. Features a concise presentation of the natural law position that offers the reader a focal point for discussion of ancient and contemporary ideas in the natural law tradition Draws upon the metaphysical and ethical categories put forth and developed by Aristotle and Aquinas Points to the historical significance and contemporary relevance of the Natural Law tradition Reflects on a revival of interest in the tradition of virtue ethics and human rights

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland establishes three principles among which is the controversial idea that people in a PVS, though not dying, have no best interests and no meaningful life. Accordingly, it is argued, they may have their food and fluids, whether delivered by tube or manually, removed, with the result that they die. Laing challenges this view arguing that not only is this bad medical science, it is unjustly discriminatory and at odds with our duties to the severely disabled. Laing highlights research by Keith Andrews et al and points out that Andrew Devine, in the same Hillsborough disaster, woke up some years after Tony Bland was decided.(Post script) Laing argues elsewhere that after the Mental Capacity Act 2005 the case has become a dangerous springboard for new third parties' to require the removal of food and fluids from the vulnerable incapacitated.

By the mid-1960s the sexual revolution was in full swing. The persuasive rhythms of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones urged new personal freedoms, Carl Djerassi’s Pill was introduced to widespread acclaim, and feminists were setting their underwear ablaze. Most Christian denominations had long ago overturned their previous teaching on contraception. John Calvin, had at one time, called the act "condemned" and "doubly monstrous", while John Wesley had said contraception was "very displeasing to God", and the "evidence of vile affections." Those who used them he regarded as "logs", "stock" and "swine". But most Protestants had by now abandoned this instruction. Indeed, the Church of England had as far back as 1930 up-ended its once entrenched rejection of contraception as “demoralizing to character and hostile to national welfare.” Into this unlikely and tempting climate came the explosive Humanae Vitae. The Roman Catholic Church, alone among religions, publicly reaffirmed its traditional teaching prohibiting contraception. The encyclical warned of the need to maintain the connection between sex and babies – and this, despite the Rockefeller offer of cash for favourable encyclicals in the summer of ’65. Pope Paul VI warned that contraception would lead to promiscuity, loss of respect for life, marriage and the family, and breakdown of essential social structures. Laing suggests that there is reason to think this fear for the likely effects of separating sex from babies well founded.

The word monogamy derives from the Greek words μóνoδ meaning one and γάμoδ meaning marriage. When Christianity was founded, polygamy (the marriage of a man to many women) was, at that point in Judaic history, regarded as acceptable practice. The Gospel according to Matthew reports that Christ restored marriage to its original unity and indissolubility (Matt. 19:6). Monogamy is still deeply entrenched in the Christian tradition. It has long been held that polygamy and polyandry undermine the dignity due to man and woman as parties to the marriage contract. The command “What God has joined together let no man put asunder” (Mark 10:9) is still a central part of the marriage ceremony of many denominations notwithstanding widespread changes of attitude and practice.

Introduction to the book Human Lives: Critical Essays on Conseequentialist Bioethics. This book aims to redress the imbalance in moral philosophy created by the dominance of consequentialism and utilitarianism, the view that criterion of morality is the maximisation of good effects over bad without regard to intrinsic rightness or wrongness. this approach has become the orthodoxy over the last few decades partticularly in bioethics, where moral theory is applied to bioethics. Human Lives critically examines the assumptions and arguemnts of consequentialism reviviing in the process such concepts as rights, justice, innocence, natural integrity, flourishing, the virtues and the fundamental value of human life.

The modern language of rights provides a contemporary idiom for certain ancient and perennial questions about the nature of morality. These include debates about the objectivity and universality of ethics and the nature of human obligation, freedom and action. Jeremy Bentham famously denounced natural rights, arguing that if morality was founded upon pain and pleasure, then there could be no such thing as natural rights: ‘Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts’ (Bentham 1970: 30–1). This article considers the concept of rights more generally and considers its relation to law.

This is a compact, nicely written book that provides a rejuvenating alternative to the utilitarian orthodoxy that dominates contemporary bioethics. There is currently a dearth of bioethical literature presenting what might be called a more traditional approach to medicine and health care. This contribution is a short and useful introduction to such an approach. The book announces itself as being written with “both the general reader and students and professionals in medicine, nursing, law, philosophy and related areas in mind”. Accordingly, it assumes no prior knowledge of ethics. It gives a neat introductory overview of some ethical concerns raised by reproduction, death, and dying. The issues considered include euthanasia and withdrawal of treatment, the persistent vegetative state, abortion, cloning, and in vitro fertilisation. By beginning the early chapters with a real-life case, Watt captures the interest of the reader. The case is introduced and discussed dispassionately. It is then employed as a springboard for a general discussion of principles often thought dry and difficult. Newcomers to the study of ethics will …

John Harris criticises the European Parliament’s ‘waft in the direction of human rights and human dignity’ and rejects its suggestion that ‘human cloning violates the principle of equality since “it permits a eugenic and racist selection of the human race”’. He argues that, by parity of reasoning, so too do ‘pre-natal and pre-implantation screening, not to mention egg donation, sperm donation, surrogacy, abortion and human preference in choice of partner’. Conflating the techniques mentioned (ie, human cloning, egg donation, etc) with human preference in choice of a partner, he holds that reproductive liberty must be the operative principle in determining what ought to be prohibited by law in the realm of human reproduction. This article challenges his two problematic assumptions.

A useful case against voluntary euthanasia. This short article summarises at least ten reasons why voluntary euthanasia should not be legalised.On the subject of voluntary euthanasia she argues that institutionalizing medically assisted death - erodes respect for human life, underestimates human capacity for error and vice and is intrinsically discriminatory. She argues that it plays into the hands of illicit interests and trades on an improper understanding of human autonomy. She warns against dismissing “the army of corporate, financial, medical and political interests that there are in controlling death, euthanasia’s corrosive effects on public and professional attitudes, and the discrimination implicit in its implementation.”

This is a compact, nicely written book that provides a rejuvenating alternative to the utilitarian orthodoxy that dominates contemporary bioethics. There is currently a dearth of bioethical literature presenting what might be called a more traditional approach to medicine and health care. This contribution is a short and useful introduction to such an approach. The book announces itself as being written with “both the general reader and students and professionals in medicine, nursing, law, philosophy and related areas in mind”. Accordingly, it assumes no prior knowledge of ethics. It gives a neat introductory overview of some ethical concerns raised by reproduction, death, and dying. The issues considered include euthanasia and withdrawal of treatment, the persistent vegetative state, abortion, cloning, and in vitro fertilisation. By beginning the early chapters with a real-life case, Watt captures the interest of the reader. The case is introduced and discussed dispassionately. It is then employed as a springboard for a general discussion of principles often thought dry and difficult. Newcomers to the study of ethics will …

The recent revelation that the rolling out of the Liverpool Care Pathway as the NHS National End of Life Care strategy in 2008 had been financially incentivised and implemented with astonishing compliance emerged as a thought-provoking development. Many of us have been warning for years of the financial, political and research interests that there are in institutionalising sedation-and-dehydration regimes, and then, inevitably, medical homicide. Freedom of Information Act requests exposed the millions of pounds that have been paid for the implementation of this national end-of-life care strategy. Much more interestingly, it showed that some hospital trusts had been paid these funds for ensuring that up to two thirds of all deaths were Pathway deaths. Given that the very livelihood of health professionals was being judged against the new Commissioning for Quality Innovation (CQUIN) ’Gold Standards Framework’, professional observance of the pathway was predictable. The revelation of management targets, despite the best efforts of the regime’s proponents to play them down, radically alters the debate. Unlike education or housing targets, these ones are potentially homicidal.