Csaba Varga

A jogváltozás a jog létrejöttével egyidős jelenség. Összetettsége áttekintésére vállalkozik a jelen tanulmánykötet, a Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Jogtudományi Intézetében záruló kutatási programja elvi alapjainak, történeti dimenzióinak és elméleti-jogi hátterének a feltárását tűzve célul. Hangsúlyosan tárgyalja a jogváltozás formális és informális csatornáit, egyes további tanulmányaiban pedig a kodiikációnak, a történelmi és jelenkori jogátvételeknek, az alkot- mányossági ellenőrzésnek a jogváltozásban játszott szerepét csakúgy, mint a jog átalakulása lehetőségeinek eddig kialakult modelljeit és a tudományos-technikai továbbfejlődés során a jog lényegi jegyeiben várható hangsúlyeltolódások és módosulások elgondolható irányait. Előszó / 1. Jogváltozás a jogban és a jogi folyamatokban 2. Kodifikáció az ezredforduló perspektívájában 3. Jogátvételek: a jogátvitel gyakorlata és dilemmái ma 4. A jog táguló terei, versengéssel a jog meghatározásáért 5. A tudományos-technikai fejlődés és várható kérdőjelei 6. Átalakulóban a jog? / Irodalom

Legal doctrine, doctrine juridique, or as termed in its specialised German cultivation, Rechtsdogmatik, by transforming the given texture of the law into a logically organised conceptual system, will result in changes not of law itself but in the law’s understanding. Thereby it duplicates the legal phenomenon, giving mere wordings conceptuality and systematization. The law’s doctrinal study is practically coeval with law, situated at a meta-level to the law. Considering that law itself is neither theoretical in nature, nor a directly scientific product but is practical a category, the doctrinal study of law does not “cognitively recognize”: nothing from its results can be verified or falsified. As a reflection on what is positivated as valid law, it is just a function of the law. Albeit analogon to theology and theoretical economics, it is no science at all.

Classical texts of continental legal theorising in Hungarian translation: RUDOLF VON JHERING: Kampf ums Recht [1872] / EUGEN EHRLICH: Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft [1903] / HERMANN KANTOROWICZ: Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft [1906] / RUDOLF STAMMLER: Richtiges Recht [1908] & excerpts from his Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft [1911/1923] & Richtiges Recht [1921] / FRANÇOIS GÉNY: Science et technique en droit privé positif [1924: excerpts] / GUSTAV RADBRUCH: Rechtsphilosophie [1932: excerpts] / HANS KELSEN ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’ [1941] & ‘The Law as a Specific Social Technique’ [1941] & ‘Value Judgments in the Science of Law’ [1942] / GUSTAV RADBRUCH ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ [1946] / ALEXANDRE PASSERIN D’ENTRÈVES ‘Le droit naturel’ [1959] / HANS KELSEN ‘What is Justice?’ [1960] & ‘Positivisme juridique et doctrine du droit naturel’ [1963].

La 4e de couverture indique : "The author introduces the reader to reasoning in law through the possilities, boundaries and traps of assuming personal responsibility and impersonal pattern adoption that have arisen in the history of human thought and in the various legal cultures. He discloses actual processes hidden by the veil of patterns followed in thinking, processes that we encounter both in our conceptual-logical quests for certainties and in the undertaking of fertilising ambiguity. When trying to identify definitions lurking behind the human construct of facts, nitons, norms, logic, and thinking, or behind the practice of giving meanings, he discovers tradition in our presuppositions, and our world-view and moral stance in our tacit agreements. Recognising the importance of the role communication plays in shaping society, he describes our existence and institutions as self-regulating processes. Since law is a wholly social venture, we not only take part in its oeuvre with our entire personality, but are also collectively responsible for its destiny. In the final analysis, anything can be qualified as 'legal' or 'non-legal' in one or another recognised sense in which law can originate, but, as a relative totality, it can only be qualified as 'more legal' or 'less legal' in any combination of the above senses. Being formed in an uninterrupted process, neither the totality nor particular pieces of law can be taken as complete or unchangeably identical with itself. Therefore law can only be identified through its motions and computable states of 'transforming into' or 'withdrawing from' the distinctive domain of the law. Thereby both society at large and its legal professionals actually contribute to -by shaping incessantly- what presents itself as ready-to-take, according to the law's official ideology. For our initation, play, role-undertaking and human responsibility lurk behind the law's formal mask in the backstage. Or, this equals to realise that all we have become subjects from mere objects, actors from mere addressees. And despite the variety of civilisational overcoasts, the entire culture of law is still exclusively inherent in us who experience it day to day. We bear it and shape it. Everything coventional in it is convenctionalised by us. It has no further existence or effect bexond this. And with its existence inherent in us, we cannot convey the responsibility to be born for it on somebody else either. It is ours in its totality so much that it cannot be torn out of our days or acts. It will thus turn into what we guard it to become. Therefore we must take care of it at all times since we are, in many ways, taking care of our own"

The ‘Hart-miracle’, then the ‘Hart-phenomenon’ are analysed through surveying (1) the state of legal philosophising in England preceding Hart, (2) his professional career and (3) the early British reception of his work, including (4) the kinds of criticism as to its methodology and presuppositions as well as (5) its becoming a master type of jurisprudence with Oxford as a centre. Taking it as a mainstream, the continental tradition of encouragement to productive thinking characteristic even of Kelsenism is contrasted with its worldwide reception, by the effect of channelling thinking. Its reception in Hungary with an overview of which trends of legal philosophising of the 20 th century has exerted or failed to exert an impact upon - as echoed by - theorising on law in Hungary is also considered. As concluded, the places in the imaginary Pantheon of 20 th -century legal philosophising occupied by Max Weber and Hans Kelsen (as accompanied by Eugen Ehrlich and Gustav Radbruch who are deemed to have been decisively significant minor masters), representing the first half of the century, are complemented indeed by the places occupied by H. L. A. Hart and Ronald M. Dworkin in representation of the second half of 20 th century.

[Papers from modern western legal theory] Translation of HANS KELSEN ‘The Law as a Specific Social Technique’ [1941] [trans. Csaba Varga] 1–22, excerpts from RUDOLF STAMMLER Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft [1923: 4–11, 24–28 & 76–82] 23–43, from FELIX [BÓDOG] SOMLÓ Juristische Grundlehre [1927: §§ 17, 29–30, 32–35 & III] 45–61, from EUGEN EHRLICH Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts [1913: XXI/II] 63–79, from JEROME FRANK Law and the Modern Mind [1930: 3–21, 29–34, 37–38, 108–125] 81–94, from AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM On Fundamental Problems of Law [1930: 348–366] 95–111, from A. VILHELM LUNDSTEDT Legal Thinking Revised [1956: I–II] 113–128, as well as GUSTAV RADBRUCH ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ [1946] 129–139; w/ Indexes of names & of subjects. The series of translation had been prepared for the forthcoming collection of Jog és filozófia (1981). In the meantime the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Legal Studies director Imre Szabó rejected their involvement for ideological reasons but, at the same time, approved their publication in own non-official volume.

Photomechanical reprint of papers from 1970 to 1992 mostly in English, some in German or French: Foreword 1–4; LAW AS PRACTICE ‘La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques’ 7–33, ‘Geltung des Rechts – Wirksamkeit des Rechts’ 35–42, ‘Macrosociological Theories of Law’ 43–76, ‘Law & its Inner Morality’ 77–89, ‘The Law & its Limits’ 91–96; LAW AS TECHNIQUE ‘Domaine »externe« & domaine »interne« en droit’ 99–117, ‘Die ministerielle Begründung’ 119–139, ‘The Preamble’ 141–167, ‘Presumption & Fiction’ 169–185, ‘Legal Technique’187–198; LAW AS LOGIC ‘Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Recht’ 201–207, ‘Heterogeneity & Validity of Law’ 209–218, ‘Leibniz & die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung’ 219–232, ‘Law & its Approach as a System’ 233–255, ‘Logic of Law & Judicial Activity’ 258–288, ‘Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’ 289–293, ‘The Nature of the Judicial Application of Norms’ 295–314; LAW AS EXPERIENCE ‘The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning’317–374, ‘The Ontological Foundation of Law’ 375–390, ‘Is Law a System of Enactments?’ 391–398, ‘The Uniqueness of National Legal Cultures’ 399–411, ‘Institutions as Systems’ 413–424; LAW AS HISTORY ‘From Legal Customs to Legal Folkways’ 427–436, ‘Anthropological Jurisprudence?’ 437–457, ‘Law as a Social Issue’ 459–475, ‘Law as History?’477–484, ‘Rechtskultur – Denkkultur’ 485–489; w/ Curriculum Vitae & Bibliography, as well as Index & Indexes of normative materials & of names.

Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1986 to 2009 /// Historical background -- An imposed legacy -- Twentieth century contemporaneity -- Appendix: The philosophy of teaching legal philosophy in Hungary /// HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / István Losonczy 29 // ON THE SURVIVAL OF ILMAR TAMMELO’S LETTER AND MANUSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR MOÓR [2009] 41–44 // PROFESSIONAL DISTRESS AND SCARCITY: ALEXANDER HORVÁTH AND THE LEGACY OF NATURAL LAW IN HUNGARY [2005] 45–50 // HUNGARIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY [2011] 51–72: I. The Pre-war Period [1. Bódog (Felix) Somló (1871–1920) 52] / II. The Inter-war Period [2. Gyula (Julius) Moór (1888–1950) 54 / 3. Barna Horváth (1896–1973) 55 / 4. József Szabó (1909–1992) 57 / 5. István Bibó (1911–1979) 58 / 6. Tibor Vas (1911–1983) 59 / 7. István Losonczy (1918–1980) 60] III. The Post-war Period (Communism) 61 [8. Imre Szabó (1912–1991) 62 / 9. Vilmos Peschka (1929–2006) 63 / 10. Kálmán Kulcsár (1928–2010) 65] IV. Contemporary Trends and Perspectives 66 [11. Csaba Varga (b. 1941) 66 / 12. András Sajó (b. 1949) 69 / 13. Béla Pokol (b. 1950) 70] V. Our Understanding of the Law Today 71 --- AN IMPOSED LEGACY -- LOOKING BACK [1999] 75–94: 1. On Ideologies and Marxism in general 75 / 2. Life of an Intellectual in Communism 79 / 3. On Marxism and its Socialist Cultivation in Particular 82 / 4. Legal Philosophising [4.1. Approaches to Law 87 / 4.2. Arriving at a Legal Ontology 91] 5. Conclusion 94 // LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARXISM OF SOCIALISM: HUNGARIAN OVERVIEW IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [2003] 95–151: I. Development and Balance of Marxist Philosophising on Law in Hungary [1. Preliminaries (until 1948) 96 / 2. Stalinism (from the Soviet Occupation on) {a) Liquidation of the »Residues« 98 / b) Soviet-type Uniformisation [Gleichschaltung] 99 / c) Denial of the Past, with a Dual Effect 99 / d) »Socialist Legality«, Drawn from the Progressive Past of Western Europe 103 / e) Search for the Germs of Scholarly Evolution 103} 3. Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation (from the 1960s) [a) Epigonism Becoming the Scholarly Ideal 104 / b) Stalinism in a Critical Self-perspective 105 / c) Disciples Diversified Launching their own Trends 107 / d) Comparatism 110 / e) (Re)discovery of the Western Legal Philosophy as a Competitor 112 / f) A Leading Mediatory Role within the »Socialist World Order« 114} 4. Disintegration (in the 1980s) {a) Attempt at Laying New Foundations for Marxism with Epigonism Exhausted 115 / b) Competitive Trends Becoming Exclusive 115 / c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged as a Fellow-traveller within the Socialist Orbit Proper 116 / d) Hungarian Legal Theory Transforming into a National Corpus 118 / e) The Practical Promotion of Some Balance 119} 5. End-game for a Substitute State Religion (in the 1990s) 120] II. Marxist Legal Philosophising in an International Perspective [Ad 1: To the Preliminaries 122 / Ad 2: To Stalinism 124 / Ad 3: To Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation {a) Late Separation from Vishinskiy’s Theory 125 / b) From Ideological Self-closure to an Apparently Scholarly Openness 127 / c) From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 130 / d) International Recognition of Socialist Jurisprudence as an Independent Trend 135 / e) Together with Western Trends 137} Ad 4: To Disintegration {a) Loss of Attraction as Mere Epigonism 139 / b) Exclusivity of Competing Trends 139 / c) Fellowship with »Bourgeois« Trends 140 / d) An own Trend, Internationally Recognised 141 / e) A yet Progressive Role 142} Ad 5: To the Present state 143] III. A Temporary Balance 145 // AUTONOMY AND INSTRUMENTALITY OF LAW IN A SUPERSTRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE [1986] 151–175: 1. The Strange Fate of Concepts 151 / I. A Relational Category 2. Basis and Superstructure: The Genuine Meaning 154 / 3. Exerting Social Influence as a Conceptual Minimum 156 / 4. Relationships within the Prevailing Totality 158 / 5. Attempts at Interpretation in Hungary 159 / 6. The Lukácsian Stand 162 / 7. Lukács’s Recognitions 168 / 8. Some Criticism 169 / II. The Law’s Understanding 171 / 9. Law Interpreted as Superstructure 171 / 10. Conclusions Drawn for the Law’s Understanding 173 // LEGAL THEORY IN TRANSITION (A PREFACE FROM HUNGARY) [2000] 177–186 // DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM [2006] 187–215: 1. International Environment 188 / 2. The Situation in Hungary 190 / 3. Outlook I: The Historical-comparative Study of Legal Cultures and of the Lawyerly Way of Thinking 203 / 4. Outlook II: The Paradigmatic Enigma of the Transition to Rule of Law 207 / 5. Incongruity in Practice 213 / 6. Perspectives 214 --- TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEMPORANEITY -- CHANGE OF PARADIGMS IN LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION: CARL SCHMITT AND THE TEMPTATION TO FINALLY REACH A SYNTHESIS [2002] 219–234: 1. Dangers of Intellectualism 219 / 2. Schmitt in Facts 221 / 3. Schmitt and Kelsen 222 / 4. On Bordering Conditions 226 / 5. With Kelsen in Transubstantiation 230 / 6. Polarisation as the Path of Theoretical Development 232 // KELSENIAN DOCUMENTS IN HUNGARY: CHAPTERS ON CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE GENESIS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY [2006] 235–243: 1. Preludes 235 / 2. The Search for Moór’s Bequeath 235 / 3. Moór’s Collegiality 238 / 4. Bibó as a Disciple Translating 241 // THE »HART-PHENOMENON« [2002] 245–267: I. The Hart-miracle 246 [1. The Scene of Britain at the Time 247 / 2. The Personal Career 250 / 3. The Opus’ Career 252 / 4. Verbal Sociologism 255 / 5. Growing into the British Pattern 259] II. The Hart-phenomenon 260 [6. Origination of a Strange Orthodoxy 261 / 7. Mastering Periods of the 20th Century 263 / 8. Raising the Issue of Reception in Hungary 365] // LITERATURE? A SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? [2007] 269–287: 1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 269 / 2. “Law and Literature” 271 / 3. Varieties of “Law and Literature” 274 / 4. The German Study of Artistic Representations 280 / 5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 285 / 6. Conclusion 287 --- APPENDIX -- THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY [2007] 291–320: I. Why and How to Philosophise in Law? 291 / II. The State of Teaching Legal Philosophy 294 / III. The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy 296 / IV. Programme at the Catholic University of Hungary 300 [1. Graduate Studies 300 {a) Basic Subjects 301 / b) Facultative Seminars 305 / c) Closing Subjects 309 / d) Written Memoranda and the Thesis 312} 2. Postgraduate Studies 313 / 3. Conclusion 317] V. Perspectives 318 /// Index of Subjects 321 / Index of Normative Materials 328 / Index of Names 329

1. Law and morals as two systems of norms, and the inner morality of law 2. Law as a value bearer and as a mere external indicator 3. The inner and external moral credit of legislator 4. The inner morality of law. As to the last paragraph, the most striking feature of the inner morality of law is that it is such a possible characteristic, surplus quality which is not a sine qua non, which law is conceivable without. However, it is a question whether law can long do without it? In principle, the legislator is free in deciding on what legal consequence he attaches to what course of conduct14 and it is also desirable that legal concepts be freed from moral overtones. Nevertheless, the legal complex cannot be torn out of its social context, nor can it steadily conflict with other complexes (religions, moral, or political values, norms and ideologies) law is to develop in living interrelationship with. Otherwise, it is subject to danger that (I) law-observance in average cases is weakened; (2) the reified functioning of and approach to law are strengthened and make law alienated; and (3) it blurs the social objectives the law intends to serve and, especially in hard cases, makes its application rootless and floating. A pathological situation only becomes more pathological, if the pathology of contents is accompanied by the pathology of means. Or, it brings the promise of real solution closer, if the adequateness of means also provides, by the strength of publicity, for the direct mobilization of society. That explains why it is a topical question what I have proposed to term the inner morality of law. [For the text, see my L&Ph, 77–89]

I. Playing a Game II. The Precondition to Mete out a Legal Sanction III. A Non-cognitively Homogeneous Activity IV. The Reproduction of the Law as a System 1. The Claim for Normative Closedness 2. The Openness of the Communication about Facts Rule of law proclaims the ethos of legal distinctiveness through institutionalizing normative closure, while the rule of facts proclaims a legal functioning embedded in facts as rooted in common sense evidence, backed by practical openness in its functioning. All in all, while rule of law argues for the law’s self-differentiation, the rule of facts ascertains why legal enterprise is (notwithstanding the same) what the heterogeneity of everyday practice and experience suggest it is. In the final analysis, I guess that these two aspects are able only in supplementation of one another to serve the common interest in making the law operate in a socially meaningful way. That is, they are to guarantee distinctively legal operation actually taking place, on the one hand, at a time when and under the conditions in which all its normative preconditions are fully met, on the other.