Daniel Heider

The paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez’s metaphysics. They are as follows: “Univocalization” of the concept of being and transcendental properties, “reification” of the act-potency doctrine, “ontologization” of individuality, “conceptualization” of the Scotist perspective, “existential” character of the concept of being, “epistemologization” and “methodologization” of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the last two are taken as portending the methodological priority of the subjective states of affairs of early modern “main-stream” philosophy.

This article deals with the question of Suárez’s conception of being, which prima facie seems to oscillate between a Scotistic univocal conception anda conception of being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez’s doctrine can in no way be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the Uncommon Doctor’s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts of being. In the second part, the paper asks how the concept of being can, without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the third parts, this question receives an answer against the backgroundof Suárez’s critique of Scotus’s conception, and with the help of his theory of the radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section, there follows anexposition of Suárez’s doctrine on the explication of the concept of being. The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of esse for ratio entis. Inthe last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the Metaphysical Disputation.

Suárez’s conception of the principle of individuation of accidents and its relationship to the Thomistic solution is the main theme of the paper. In the fi rst part, the author briefl y recapitulates Suárez solution to the individuality and individuation of substances. In the second part he presents two main conceptions of the principle of individuation of accidents: substance and entitative theory of individuation. He presents four reasons for the entitative theory which are given by Suárez. In the third, the most ample part, he shows that Suárez argues that the Thesis of simultaneous co-existence of two mere numerically diff erent accidents in the same subject can be valid, at least, in the case of respective accidents. If it is not valid in the case of absolute accidents, then it is, according to Suárez, not because of the incompatible principle of individuation of accidents, but because of the fact that "nature abhors futility". Besides, he shows that God’s absolute potence towards numerical multiplication of qualities cannot be restricted by certain natural principles of intensifi cation and remission of qualities. In the last part, the author shows that if it is not contradictory that two mere numerically diff erent accidents can co-exist in the same subject, it is a fortiori valid about the Thesis of successive existence of the two mere numerically diff erent accidents in the same subject.

The paper deals with the problem of conceptual interpretation of Aristotle’s prima facie divergent opinions on human happiness in his Nicomachean Ethics, especially in Book 1 and Book 10. As its starting point it takes the well-known expository scheme connected with the polarity “Dominantism versus Inclusivism”. It attempts to show that the relationship of two main candidates on human happines, namely the activities of moral virtues and of contemplation, should be understood on the basis of the predicative scheme called the intrinsic analogy of attribution. While both contemplation and the activities of moral virtues are intrinsically valuable, it is argued that they exhibit certain order of priority and posteriority: the theoretical activities of our intellect realise happiness primarly, whereas the moral activities merely secondarily. The desirable character of intrinsic goodness of our moral actions consists in the fact that they are beautiful and that they, in a certain way, approximate theoria. Interpreting the teleological relation between moral action and contemplation as one of approximation thus seems to represent a plausible alternative, which, unlike the standard means–end relation, keeps in balance both of the desiderata, i.e. the intrinsic goodness of our moral actions as well as their intrinsic orientation toward contemplation.