Benjamin Ferguson

We experimentally elicit views of what exploitation is from over 2,000 subjects. Our experimental design does not test existing theories of exploitation. Rather, it focuses on more fundamental properties that are the building blocks for these theories. We find, first, that exploitation is not a vacuous concept: Not all economic interactions are deemed exploitative. Second, contrary to several of the major approaches in the literature, both inequalities in the distribution of economic gains and asymmetric power relations contribute to exploitative relations. What matters most is the interaction of power and inequality: The effect of both elements together is significantly greater than the sum of each on their own. Finally, and perhaps remarkably, we found no major differences in exploitation ascriptions between experts and lay subjects. These findings have implications for the ethics of employment contracts, particularly in the context of sweatshop labor.

Introduction While there is a global consensus that Lay Community Health Workers (CHWs) should be formally remunerated for their time and effort, they remain unsalaried in most Sub-Saharan African countries, including Zambia. Does this constitute exploitation? To answer this question, we conducted a qualitative study in Lusaka province of Zambia where we interviewed Lay CHWs attached to government healthcare facilities. We juxtaposed the Sub-Saharan African Communitarian (Ubuntu) ethical system and Western ethics to discuss the findings. Study Methods We conducted qualitative interviews with thirty-five Lay Community Health Workers in three districts of Lusaka province in Zambia. We adapted the Braun and Clarke (2006) six-step framework of thematic analysis and NVivo computer software to analyse data. Study Findings Lay CHWs were motivated by both the intrinsic Ubuntu altruism and economic benefits as they provided community health services in their respective localities. Although they complained about low and inconsistent stipends, as well as a lack of equipment, that did not stop them from serving their communities because of their intrinsic Ubuntu motivation to care for others. Conclusion Our study found no evidence that paying Lay CHWs undermined their intrinsic Ubuntu motivation to aid other people, as they continued to serve their communities whether they received stipends or not. It is also our considered view that Lay CHWs are exploited due to their vulnerable positionality, and to avoid that, they should be formally remunerated in line with the WHO recommendation.

In this thesis I present a rights-based theory of exploitation. I argue that successful conceptions of exploitation should begin with the ordinary language claim that exploitation involves `taking unfair advantage'. Consequently, they must combine an account of what it means to take advantage of another with an account of when transactions are unfair. Existing conceptions of exploitation fail to provide adequate accounts of both aspects of exploitation. Hillel Steiner and John Roemer provide convincing accounts of the unfairness involved in exploitation, but because they fail to provide restrictive `advantage taking' conditions, their theories of exploitation include cases that we would not ordinarily describe as exploitations. Ruth Sample and Robert Goodin provide accounts that place a stronger emphasis on the attitudes involved in exploitation and the processes that bring it about. Unfortunately, these theories do not properly incorporate the unfairness aspect of exploitation. Consequently, they are either self-frustrating or incomplete. I provide a conception of exploitation that combines both aspects. I claim that...

We consider the apparent inability of theories of exploitation to capture common intuitions about structural exploitation. For example, it seems that consumers participate in the exploitation of sweatshop workers, but there is no direct transaction between the parties. This poses a problem for transactional accounts of exploitation. Many address this problem by appealing to structural exploitation. Existing structural accounts fall, primarily, into two families: weak structural exploitation and strong structural exploitation. We argue neither appropriately captures intuitions about sweatshops. Weak accounts can capture aggregate inequalities but fail to consider relationships or discrete connections. Strong accounts, on the other hand, are sensitive to relationships between exploiters and exploitees, but too demanding about what it takes to exploit to capture consumers' role in sweatshops. We propose a third option, ‘moderate structural exploitation’, that fits ‘between’ existing approaches. Moderate structural exploitation focuses on relationships between the exploited and their exploiter (unlike weak accounts), without appealing to overly strong conditions for who counts as an exploiter (like strong accounts do). We then show that our moderate structural account can not only accommodate intuitions about sweatshops, but also helps assess the exploitation of teachers in the US public education system.

International bioethical principles place considerable weight on individual rights and autonomy. They require informed consent for both treatment and diagnostic testing. Although individual rights are widely valued, in some non-Western contexts, they receive relatively less weight than other moral values. In particular, the communitarian African philosophy of Ubuntu places a greater emphasis on the collective good of the community than it does on individual rights. In this paper, we explore differences between an Ubuntu-based bioethics and international bioethical principles through the lens of Zambia’s Universal Routine HIV Testing Services Policy. We find that both the written form of the testing policy and its practical implementation violate standard international bioethical principles of informed consent. However, we show that the policy and its implementation are compatible with an Ubuntu-based bioethics. We conclude with a suggestion that Ubuntu-based bioethics also better capture actual clinical practice in Western contexts than standard bioethical principles based on autonomy and individual rights.

Standard accounts of what makes exploitation wrong ground its wrong in distributive unfairness: when A exploits B he wrongs her by taking a greater share of the benefits from their interaction than he ought. I argue that this standard account does not succeed; distributive unfairness is neither the sole, nor the primary wrong of exploitation. I assume that distributive unfairness is pro tanto wrong. However, I argue that in situations where transactors’ consent to a transaction is morally valid, it is also morally transformative and overrides distributive unfairness’s pro tanto wrong. Thus, wrongful exploitation requires morally invalid consent.

A common understanding of what was wrong with colonialism was that it involved the theft of land and resources from indigenous peoples, accompanied in most cases by flagrant violations of rights to their bodily integrity. It is therefore natural to assume that libertarianism is theoretically well equipped to account for these wrongs. In this chapter I argue that although this assumption about libertarianism’s ability to condemn colonialism is correct, the path to this verdict is not as straightforward as it might seem. Indeed, as I show, historically, some libertarians—and many early modern liberal theorists—were colonial apologists who argued that Lockean theories of territorial rights supported, rather than condemned, colonial projects.

Exploitation: Perspectives from Philosophy, Politics, and Economics brings together recent work on the topic of exploitation from philosophy, political science, and economics in one volume, organized around three main questions: What is exploitation? Why is exploitation wrong? What should we do about it? These questions are increasingly relevant in public policy discussions. The past decade has witnessed the rise of populism and an increasing sense that politics is a game rigged to benefit certain classes of persons at the expense of others. Interestingly, this sense of unfairness has been shared across the political spectrum though, of course, the left and right differ in both their moral diagnosis and their political prescription. Current debates over minimum wage laws, immigration reform, and undue corporate influence on politics can all be understood as drawing on and developing these concerns over exploitative political treatment. At the same time, the literature on exploitation has blossomed. What was once a topic of relatively narrow interest to philosophers working in the tradition of analytical Marxism has been reinvigorated and diversified. The essays in this book both represent and extend that diversity. While the condition of labor remains an important and central topic, the current volume extends the analysis to such neglected topics as the relationship between children and parents, interactions between states, and interactions between generations.

Strict libertarianism, as one of us has defined it elsewhere, is “a radical political view which holds that individual liberty, understood as the absence of interference with a person’s body and rightfully acquired property, is a moral absolute or near-absolute, and that the only governmental activities consistent with that liberty are (if any) those necessary to protect individuals from aggression by others.” Strict libertarianism is a radicalized form of classical liberalism that is, characteristically, rationalistic, monistic, and (relatively) absolutist in its approach to political principles. One advantage of bringing so many well-informed proponents and critics of libertarianism together in the same volume is that it makes clear the tremendous diversity of libertarian thought. Libertarians are a methodologically, normatively, and even politically diverse group. The chapter also provides an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.

This book brings together recent work on the topic of exploitation from philosophy, political science, and economics in one volume, organised around three main questions: what is exploitation?, why is exploitation wrong?, and what should we do about it? These questions are increasingly relevant in public policy discussions. The past decade has witnessed the rise of populism and an increasing sense that politics is a game rigged to benefit certain classes of persons at the expense of others. Interestingly, this sense of unfairness has been shared across the political spectrum though, of course, the left and right differ in both their moral diagnosis and their political prescription. Current debates over minimum wage laws, immigration reform, and undue corporate influence on politics can all be understood as drawing on and developing these concerns over exploitative political treatment. This book also draws upon the natural opportunities for interdisciplinary engagement that the topic of exploitation presents. Questions about exploitation often involve not only philosophical issues, but economic and political ones as well. The contributors to this volume add to that breadth of knowledge. With the re-emergence of Politics, Philosophy, and Economics (PPE) as a burgeoning field of academic inquiry, now is the perfect time to explore issues of exploitation in an interdisciplinary, public-policy focused context. This books is essential reading for anyone interested in exploitation theory, and in PPE more generally.

What is wrong with colonialism? The standard—albeit often implicit—answer to this question has been that colonialism was wrong because it violated the territorial rights of indigenous peoples, where territorial rights were grounded on acquisition theories. Recently, the standard view has come under attack: according to critics, acquisition based accounts do not provide solid theoretical grounds to condemn colonial relations. Indeed, historically they were used to justify colonialism. Various alternative accounts of the wrong of colonialism have been developed. According to some, colonialism involved a violation of territorial rights grounded on legitimate state theory. Others reject all explanations of colonialism's wrongfulness based on territorial rights, and argue that colonial practices were wrong because they departed from ideals of economic, social, and political association. In this article, we articulate and defend the standard view against critics: colonialism involved a procedural wrong; this wrong is not the violation of standards of equality and reciprocity, but the violation of territorial rights; and the best foundation for such territorial rights is acquisition based, not legitimacy based. We argue that this issue is not just of historical interest, it has relevant implications for the normative evaluation of contemporary inequalities.

We argue that permissibility-based solutions to the paradox of supererogation encounter a nested dilemma. Such approaches solve the paradox by distinguishing moral and rational permissions. If they do not also include a bridge condition that relates these two permissions, then they violate a very plausible monotonicity condition. If they do include a bridge condition, then permissibility-based solutions either amount to rational satisficing or they collapse back into the classical account of supererogation and fail to resolve the paradox.

This paper argues that two single-factor accounts of exploitation are inadequate and instead defends a two-factor account. Purely distributive accounts of exploitation, which equate exploitation with unfair transaction, make exploitation pervasive and cannot deliver the intuition that exploiters are blameworthy. Recent, non-distributive alternatives, which make unfairness unnecessary for exploitation, largely avoid these problems, but their arguments for the non-necessity of unfairness are unconvincing. This paper defends a two factor account according to which A exploits B iff A gains unfairly from B and either A believes that the gains he receives in the transaction wrong B, or A is culpably unaware that the gains he receives in the transaction wrong B. This account avoids the problems of non-distributive approaches and also delivers the intuition that exploiters are blameworthy.

In this thesis I present a rights-based theory of exploitation. I argue that successful conceptions of exploitation should begin with the ordinary language claim that exploitation involves `taking unfair advantage'. Consequently, they must combine an account of what it means to take advantage of another with an account of when transactions are unfair. Existing conceptions of exploitation fail to provide adequate accounts of both aspects of exploitation. Hillel Steiner and John Roemer provide convincing accounts of the unfairness involved in exploitation, but because they fail to provide restrictive `advantage taking' conditions, their theories of exploitation include cases that we would not ordinarily describe as exploitations. Ruth Sample and Robert Goodin provide accounts that place a stronger emphasis on the attitudes involved in exploitation and the processes that bring it about. Unfortunately, these theories do not properly incorporate the unfairness aspect of exploitation. Consequently, they are either self-frustrating or incomplete. I provide a conception of exploitation that combines both aspects. I claim that a bilateral, strictly Pareto improving, and voluntary transaction t between A and B is exploitative just in case (1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of exchanges leading to t that (2) reduces B's bargaining power by altering her status quo point, and (3) the degree to which B's preferences are satisfied in t is less than it would be had B's bargaining power not been reduced (by the alteration of her status quo point). Further, (4a) A's egoistic preferences are better satisfied in t because B's bargaining power is limited, and (4b) if the previous conditions also hold for A, then the reduction in A's bargaining power is less than the reduction in B's bargaining power. Finally, (5) A truly believes the previous conditions hold.