-
409Fischer's Fate With FatalismEuropean Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (4): 25-38. 2017.John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argu…Read more
-
50Why to believe weakly in weak knowledge: Goldman on knowledge as mere true beliefGrazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1): 19-40. 2009.In a series of influential papers and in his groundbreaking book Knowledge in a Social World Alvin Goldman argues that sometimes “know” just means “believe truly” (Goldman 1999; 2001; 2002b; Goldman & Olsson 2009). I argue that Goldman's (and Olsson's) case for “weak knowledge”, as well as a similar argument put forth by John Hawthorne, are unsuccessful. However, I also believe that Goldman does put his finger on an interesting and important phenomenon. He alerts us to the fact that sometimes we…Read more
-
62Reformierte ErkenntnistheorieZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (4). 2001.Wann ist es rational, etwas zu glauben? Wann ist ein Glaube gerechtfertigt, vernünftig, intellektuell akzeptabel? Was gilt es zu beachten, um ein Netz von Überzeugungen aus möglichst vielen wahren und möglichst wenig falschen Annahmen zu flechten? Um diese Fragen geht es in Theorien epistemischer Rechtfertigung. Ein Ansatz, der auf diesem Gebiet in jüngerer Zeit viel von sich Reden gemacht hat, ist die von Philosophen wie William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, allen voran jedoch von Alvin Planti…Read more
-
132Epistemic deontology, doxastic voluntarism, and the principle of alternate possibilitiesIn Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner (ed.), Knowledge and Belief, Öbv. pp. 217-227. 2004.
-
298Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertionAnalysis 72 (3): 491-498. 2012.Keith DeRose has argued that ‘the knowledge account of assertion – according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows – ... provides a ... powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism’ (2009: 80). The truth is that it yields a powerful argument against contextualism, at least against its most popular, anti-sceptical versions. The following argument shows that, if we conjoin (such versions of) epistemic contextualism with an appropriate meta-linguistic formulation of…Read more
-
Scientia media and Freedom to Do OtherwiseIn Josef Quitterer Winfried Löffler Christian Kanzian (ed.), The Ways Things Are - Studies in Ontology Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2011, Ontos. 2011.
-
43The value problem in epistemology is to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Or so it is commonly construed. Various solutions to the quandary have been proposed, but so far none has gained wide acceptance. Perhaps, then, we should abandon the idea that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This is what we shall argue, but with one important qualification: Knowledge is not generally more valuable than mere true belief. Certain epistemic contexts, however, are…Read more
-
153Process Reliabilism and the Value ProblemTheoria 77 (3): 201-213. 2011.Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the futu…Read more
-
1837Das KonsequenzargumentIn Rolf W. Puster (ed.), Klassische Argumentationen der Philosophie, . pp. 275-296. 2013.The paper reconstructs causal and theological versions of the consequence argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism and discusses the most influential objections to them.
-
161Reliabilism and the extra value of knowledgePhilosophical Studies 157 (1): 93-105. 2012.Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowled…Read more
-
997Kunst, Kontext und ErkenntnisIn Christoph Jäger & Georg Meggle (eds.), Kunst und Erkenntnis, Mentis. pp. 9-39. 2005.
-
419Religious experience and epistemic justification: Alston on the reliability of mystical perceptionIn Carlos Ulises Moulines and Karl-Georg Niebergall (ed.), Argument und Analyse, Mentis. pp. 403-423. 2002.I discuss Alston's theory of religious experience and maintain that his argument to the effect that it is rational to suppose that the 'mystical doxastic practice' is epistemically reliable does not stand up to scrutiny. While Alston's transitions from practical to epistemic rationality don't work here, his arguments may be taken to show that, under certain conditions, it is not epistemically irresponsible to trust one's religious experiences.
-
476Is Coherentism Coherent?Analysis 67 (4). 2007.In ‘A reductio of coherentism’ (Analysis 67, 2007) Tom Stoneham offers a novel argument against epistemological coherentism. ‘On the face of it’, he writes, ‘the argument gives a conclusive reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. But that cannot be right, can it?’ (p. 254). It could be right, but it isn’t. I argue that coherentists need not accept the central premises of Stoneham’s argument and that, even if these premises were acceptable and true, Stoneham’s reductio woul…Read more
-
Autorität der Ersten Person und emotionale VerdrängungE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 4. 2006.
-
35Privileged Access and RepressionIn Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 59-80. 2002.
-
665Wittgenstein über Gewissheit und religiösen GlaubenIn Florian Uhl and Artur R. Boelderl (ed.), Die Sprachen der Religion, . pp. 221-256. 2003.
-
506Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Theorie der Meta-EmotionenIn Barbara Merker (ed.), Leben mit Gefühlen, Mentis. pp. 113-137. 2009.
-
125Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 119-131. 2009.In his recent book Willensfreiheit Geert Keil defends a version of libertarianism. Yet he criticizes a flagship argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen's consequence argument, Keil thinks, relies on an irrelevant premise when it claims that agents have no choice about the remote past. I argue that Keil's charge rests on a misunderstanding. I then sketch why discussions of the consequence argument should focus on the question whether or not a certain version of rule Beta is valid