-
128Two Visual Systems and the Feeling of PresenceIn Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems, Oxford University Press. pp. 107. 2010.Argues for a category of “cognitive feelings”, which are representationally significant, but are not part of the content of the states they accompany. The feeling of pastness in episodic memory, of familiarity (missing in Capgras syndrome), and of motivation (that accompanies desire) are examples. The feeling of presence that accompanies normal visual states is due to such a cognitive feeling; the “two visual systems” are partially responsible for this feeling.
-
127Biological universals and the nature of fearJournal of Philosophy 95 (3): 105-132. 1998.Cognitive definitions cannot accommodate fear as it occurs in species incapable of sophisticated cognition. Some think that fear must, therefore, be noncognitive. This paper explores another option, arguably more in line with evolutionary theory: that like other "biological universals" fear admits of variation across and within species. A paradigm case of such universals is species: it is argued that they can be defined by ostension in the manner of Putnam and Kripke without implying that they m…Read more
-
80Teleology, error, and the human immune systemJournal of Philosophy 81 (7): 351-372. 1984.The authors attempt to show that certain forms of behavior of the human immune system are illuminatingly regarded as errors in that system's operation. Since error-ascription can occur only within the context of an intentional/teleological characterization of the system, it follows that such a characterization is illuminating. It is argued that error-ascription is objective, non-anthropomorphic, irreducible to any purely causal form of explanation of the same behavior, and further that it is wro…Read more
-
7Aristotle Today: Essays on Aristotle's Ideal of Science (edited book)Academic Printing & Pub.. 1987.
-
17Intentionality and the linguistic analogyStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (1): 77-94. 2000.
-
159Seeing, doing, and knowing: A précis (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2). 2008.An outline of Seeing, Doing, and Knowing (Oxford, 2005).
-
797Assembling the emotionsIn Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions, University of Calgary Press. pp. 185-212. 2008.In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
-
776The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle's CosmologyOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20 171-199. 2001.Argues that Aristotle regarded the universe, or Totality, as a single substance with form and matter, and that he regarded this substance together with the Prime Mover as a self-mover
-
20R. M. Dancy, "Sense and Contradiction" (review)Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (3): 345. 1978.
-
2233Aristotle's Theory of PotentialityIn John P. Lizza (ed.), Potentiality: Metaphysical and Bioethical Dimensions, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 29-48. 2014.In this paper, I examine Aristotle's notion of potentiality as it applies to the beginning of life. Aristotle’s notion of natural kinēsis implies that we should not treat the entity at the beginning of embryonic development as human, or indeed as the same as the one that is born. This leads us to ask: When does the embryo turn into a human? Aristotle’s own answer to this question is very harsh. Bracketing the views that lead to this harsh answer, his theory of kinēsis still gives us reason for s…Read more
-
157Review: Action in Perception (review)Mind 115 (460): 1160-1166. 2006.This a review of Alva Noë's Action in Perception. It argues that a distinction should be made between the proposition that sensorimotor feedback is used in sensory perception and that perception is of sensorimotor features of the world. Noë fails to make this distinction.
-
894Millikan's Historical KindsIn Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics, Wiley. pp. 135-154. 2012.This chapter contains section titles: Introduction: Russell's Natural Kinds Is Biological Homeostasis Historical? Intrinsic Properties Redux Population Structure Conclusion: Are Species Duplicable?
-
476Visual ConceptsPhilosophical Topics 33 (1): 207-233. 2005.Perceptual content is conceptual. In this paper, some arguments against this thesis are examined and rebutted. The Richness argument, that we could not have concepts for all the colours, is queried: Doesn't the Munsell system give us such concepts? The argument that we can perceive colours and shapes without possessing the relevant concepts is rebutted: we cannot do this, but the kind of concept-possession that is relevant here is not intellectual but perceptual
-
564Comments on Gauker's Word and ImageAnalysis 75 (1): 83-99. 2015.Christopher Gauker argues that no concept can be extracted from perceptual experience and that imagistic thought cannot draw boundaries between one kind and another. Here, it is argued, on the contrary, that images have extension and are consequently Fregean concepts. Hume’s theory of abstraction as indifference is offered as an account of extra-sensory concepts. Finally, it is argued that modern theories of sensory data processing run parallel to Kant’s idea of synthesis as a pre-condition for …Read more
-
1510The Individuation of the SensesIn Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press. pp. 567-586. 2015.How many senses do humans possess? Five external senses, as most cultures have it—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste? Should proprioception, kinaesthesia, thirst, and pain be included, under the rubric bodily sense? What about the perception of time and the sense of number? Such questions reduce to two. 1. How do we distinguish a sense from other sorts of information-receiving faculties? 2. By what principle do we distinguish the senses? Aristotle discussed these questions in the De Ani…Read more
-
Tad Brennan, Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus (review)Philosophy in Review 21 237-239. 2001.
-
181On the Diversity of Auditory ObjectsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1): 63-89. 2010.This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (wh…Read more
-
1762How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way)In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. pp. 226. 2010.What colour does a white wall look in the pinkish light of the late afternoon? Philosophers disagree: they hold variously that it looks pink, white, both, and no colour at all. A new approach is offered. After reviewing the dispute, a reinterpretation of perceptual constancy is offered. In accordance with this reinterpretation, it is argued that perceptual features such as color must always be predicated of perceptual objects. Thus, it might be that in pinkish light, the wall looks white and the…Read more
-
45Review of Thomas Natsoulas, Consciousness and Perceptual Experience (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014. 2014.A review of Thomas Natsoulas's "Consciousness and Perceptual Experience."
-
590Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of TruthPhronesis 28 (2). 1983.The author investigates greek ontologies that apparently rely on a conflation of "binary" (x is f) and "monadic" (x is) uses of 'is'. He uses Aristotelian and other texts to support his proposal that these ontologies are explained by the Greeks using two alternative semantic analyses for 'x is F'. The first views it as asserting a relation between x and F, the second as asserting that a "predicative complex" exists, where a predicative complex is a complex consisting of x and F. The article conc…Read more
-
12On the Difference Between Non-Connoting Terms and Rigid Designators: A Reply to BradleyDialogue 23 (1): 79-83. 1984.A main point of my article, as I see it, is that we can solve Putnam's problem, as articulated in the first paragraph of section three, without recourse to the definition of “natural-kind term” as “rigid designator of a natural kind”. I had three main objections to this definition: It makes the classification of a term as a natural-kind term dependent on one's metaphysics, i.e., on the status given to natural kinds. However, Putnam's argument seems to be independent of such metaphysical consider…Read more
-
1381What is a Hand? What is a Mind?Revue Internationale de Philosophie (214): 653-672. 2000.Argues that biological organs, including mental capacities, should be identified by homology (not function).
-
41Discussion. Evolution, Wisconsin style: selection and the explanation of individual traitsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 143-150. 1999.natural selection may show why all (most, some) humans have an opposable thumb, but cannot show why any particular human has one, Karen Neander ([1995a], [1995b]) argues that this is false because natural selection is 'cumulative'. It is argued here, on grounds independent of its cumulativity, that selection can explain the characteristics of individual organisms subsequent to the event. The difference of opinion between Sober and his critics turns on an ontological dispute about how organisms a…Read more
Areas of Specialization
2 more
Perception |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Biology |
Aesthetic Pleasure |
Aesthetic Subjectivism |
The Value of Art |