•  248
    Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency
    Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 132-157. 2013.
  •  901
    Against the Taking Condition
    Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 314-331. 2016.
    According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious …Read more
  •  185
    Fitting belief
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2): 167-187. 2014.
    Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.