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185Science Based on Artificial Intelligence Need not Pose a Social Epistemological ProblemSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 13 (1). 2024.It has been argued that our currently most satisfactory social epistemology of science can’t account for science that is based on artificial intelligence (AI) because this social epistemology requires trust between scientists that can take full responsibility for the research tools they use, and scientists can’t take full responsibility for the AI tools they use since these systems are epistemically opaque. I think this argument overlooks that much AI-based science can be done without opaque mod…Read more
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179Weighing the costs: the epistemic dilemma of no-platformingSynthese 199 (3-4): 7231-7253. 2021.‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to …Read more
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97Conscious Propositional Attitudes and Moral ResponsibilityJournal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5): 585-597. 2014.By drawing on empirical evidence, Matt King and Peter Carruthers have recently argued that there are no conscious propositional attitudes, such as decisions, and that this undermines moral responsibility. Neil Levy responds to King and Carruthers, and claims that their considerations needn’t worry theorists of moral responsibility. I argue that Levy’s response to King and Carruthers’ challenge to moral responsibility is unsatisfactory. After that, I propose what I take to be a preferable way of …Read more
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Utrecht UniversityAssistant Professor
Utrecht, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |