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14Blose B. L.. Synonymy. The philosophical quarterly , vol. 15 , pp. 302–316Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3): 457-458. 1970.
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11Review of Michael E. Levin: Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem (review)Ethics 92 (1): 174-176. 1981.
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21Review of W. V. Quine. Philosophy of logic. Englewood cliffs (review)Metaphilosophy 2 (2). 1971.
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221Using intuitions about knowledge to study reasoning: A reply to WilliamsJournal of Philosophy 75 (8): 433-438. 1978.
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42On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays.Noam Chomsky, Linguistics and PhilosophyPhilosophical Quarterly 26 (103): 187-189. 1976.
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117Is modal logic logic?Philosophia 2 (1-2): 75-84. 1972.(1) modal logic is not needed, Since there are alternative accounts of modality. (2) modal logic does not function as logic even in the thinking of its advocates, As is revealed, E.G., When the semantics of modal logic is presented in an extensional metalanguage. Furthermore, (3) when a wider view is taken, One sees that modal logic treats as logical constants expressions that belong to a large and open syntactic class, Unlike other logical constants. Finally, (4) modal logic treats as sententia…Read more
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50An introduction to 'translation and meaning' chapter two ofword and objectSynthese 19 (1-2): 14-26. 1968.
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19Reflections on Knowledge and its LimitsPhilosophical Review 111 (3): 417-428. 2002.Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits is the most important philosophical discussion of knowledge in many years. It sets the agenda for epistemology for the next decade and beyond.
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30Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge (review)Philosophical Review 97 (1): 122-123. 1988.
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12Reply to CriticsMoral Relativism and Moral ObjectivityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 215. 1998.
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12Precis of Part TwoMoral Relativism and Moral ObjectivityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 171. 1998.
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41Thomson against Moral ExplanationsMoral Relativism and Moral ObjectivityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 199. 1998.
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Davidson's contribution to the philosophy of languageIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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33Quine on Meaning and Existence, I. The Death of MeaningReview of Metaphysics 21 (1): 124-151. 1967.QUINE'S PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS are for the most part contained in two collections of essays, From a Logical Point of View and recently The Ways of Paradox, and in an important book, Word and Object. The present survey will be restricted to views expressed in these three volumes, although Quine's work in logic is continuous with his work in philosophy. The present Part One describes and defends Quine's views about meaning. The following Part Two does the same for his views on other subjects, espe…Read more
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Indeterminacy, Relativity, and BehaviorismIn Gilbert Harman & Ernest LePore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
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104A Companion to W. V. O. Quine (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2013.This Companion brings together a team of leading figures in contemporary philosophy to provide an in-depth exposition and analysis of Quine’s extensive influence across philosophy’s many subfields, highlighting the breadth of his work, and revealing his continued significance today. Provides an in-depth account and analysis of W.V.O. Quine’s contribution to American Philosophy, and his position as one of the late twentieth-century’s most influential analytic philosophers Brings together newly-co…Read more
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The intrinsic quality of experienceIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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The intrinsic quality of experienceIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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The Intrinsic Quality of ExperienceIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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205Moral Relativism and Moral ObjectivityBlackwell. 1996.Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the …Read more
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2612. knowledge, inference, and explanationIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 106. 2003.
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