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175Category mistakes in m&ePhilosophical Perspectives 17 (1). 2003.Theories of causation may imply that your birth causes your death, which seems odd in the way that it is not odd to say that your birth precedes your death. Theories of knowledge may imply that the object of knowledge is the same as the object of belief, although we know but do not believe facts and we can know a proposition without knowing whether it is true
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434The Nonexistence of Character TraitsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2): 223-226. 2000.
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1Pragmatism and reasons for beliefIn Christopher B. Kulp (ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.
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132Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and PsychologyPhilosophical Review 89 (1): 115. 1980.
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223Self-reflexive thoughtsPhilosophical Issues 16 (1): 334-345. 2006.Alice has insomnia. She has trouble falling asleep and part of the problem is that she worries about it and realizes that her worrying about it tends to keep from falling asleep. It occurs to her that thinking that she will not be able to fall asleep may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps she even has a thought that might be expressed like this: I am not going to fall asleep because of my having this very thought. This thought attributes to itself the property of keeping her awake
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1CharacterIn John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. pp. 355--401. 2010.
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62New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (review)Journal of Philosophy 98 (5): 265-269. 2001.
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127Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess1Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 163-182. 1980.
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20Response to Shaffer, Thagard, Strevens and HansonAbstracta 5 (S3): 47-56. 2009.Like Glenn Shafer, we are nostalgic for the time when “philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists interested in probability, induction, and scientific methodology talked with each other more than they do now”, [p.10]. 1 Shafer goes on to mention other relevant contemporary communities. He himself has been at the interface of many of these communities while at the same time making major contributions to them and this very symposium represents something of that desired discussion. We begin with …Read more
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241Guilt-free moralityOxford Studies in Metaethics 4 203-14. 2009.Here are some of the ways in which some philosophers and psychologists have taken the emotion of guilt to be essential to morality. One relatively central idea is that guilt feelings are warranted if an agent knows that he or she has acted morally wrongly. It might be said that in such a case the agent has a strong reason to feel guilt, that the agent ought to have guilt feelings, that the agent is justified in having guilt feelings and unjustified in not having guilt feelings. It might be said …Read more
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4422Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution ErrorProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 315-331. 1999.Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error '. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.
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3727. Reflections on Language, by Noam Chomsky; On Noam Chomsky: Critical EssaysIn Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Princeton University Press. pp. 133-140. 2014.
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228Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning1Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1): 173-179. 2007.Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate a version that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.
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Wide functionalismIn Stephen R. Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation, Westview Press. pp. 11--20. 1988.
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