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Gilbert Harman

Princeton University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    256
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    3
  •  News and Updates
    20

 More details
  • Princeton University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
  • All publications (256)
  •  26
    Reason, Meaning and Mind
    Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201): 537-540. 2000.
    Perception
  •  29
    Epistemology and the Diet Revolution
    In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 203--214. 1994.
  •  59
    Words and pictures in reports of fmri research
    This is indeed a fallacy, if the relevant sort of consistency is logical consistency. However, the expression “is consistent with” is often used by scientists to mean something much stronger, something like confirms or even strongly confirms.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  95
    Quine's semantic relativity
    Philosophers sometimes approach meaning metaphorically, for example, by speaking of “grasping” meanings, as if understanding consists in getting mental hands around something.1 Philosophers say that a theory of meaning should be a theory about the meanings that people assign to expressions in their language, that to understand other people requires identifying the meanings they associate with what they are saying, and that to translate an expression of another language into your own is to find a…Read more
    Philosophers sometimes approach meaning metaphorically, for example, by speaking of “grasping” meanings, as if understanding consists in getting mental hands around something.1 Philosophers say that a theory of meaning should be a theory about the meanings that people assign to expressions in their language, that to understand other people requires identifying the meanings they associate with what they are saying, and that to translate an expression of another language into your own is to find an expression in your language with the same meaning as the expression in the other language.
  •  769
    Conceptual role semantics
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (2): 242-56. 1982.
    CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one
    Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and ContentSemanticsLogicsSemantic Theories
  •  1
    Thought, Selections
    In Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 194. 2000.
    German Idealism
  • Lx8i^^ g? Jn view~
    In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 167. 2003.
  •  17
    Part I: Foundations of reasoning
    In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations, Cambridge University Press. pp. 35. 2008.
  •  1
    Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass
    Behaviorism 16 (1): 93-96. 1986.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  127
    The essential grammar of action (and other) sentences
    Philosophia 10 (3-4): 209-215. 1981.
    Meaning, MiscPhilosophy of Action, MiscAction Sentences
  • Is there mental representation?
    Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. 1978.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsNaturalizing Mental ContentPhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  360
    Knowledge and assumptions
    with Brett Sherman
    Philosophical Studies 156 (1): 131-140. 2011.
    When epistemologists talk about knowledge, the discussions traditionally include only a small class of other epistemic notions: belief, justification, probability, truth. In this paper, we propose that epistemologists should include an additional epistemic notion into the mix, namely the notion of assuming or taking for granted.
    Knowledge, MiscCausal Theory of KnowledgeClosure of KnowledgeDefeasibility Theory of Knowledge
  •  44
    Online versions of recently published work
    "What Is Cognitive Access?" PDF. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007 [published 2008]): 505. Brief comments on a paper of Ned Block's. "Mechanical Mind," a review of Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science by Margaret Boden. Online Published Version . From American Scientist (2008): 76-81.
  • Acknowledgments
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2): 351. 1986.
  •  55
    Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge
    Routledge. 1990.
    Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference. Starting from ‘Is skepticism a problem for epistemology’, the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering me…Read more
    Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference. Starting from ‘Is skepticism a problem for epistemology’, the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.
    Varieties of Skepticism, MiscBritish PhilosophyReplies to Skepticism, Misc
  •  97
    If and modus ponens
    Theory and Decision 11 (1): 41-53. 1979.
    Logical Expressions
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