-
33Skepticism and foundationsIn Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press. pp. 1--11. 2003.
-
Wide functionalismIn Stephen R. Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation, Westview Press. pp. 11--20. 1988.
-
44"What Is Cognitive Access?" PDF. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007 [published 2008]): 505. Brief comments on a paper of Ned Block's. "Mechanical Mind," a review of Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science by Margaret Boden. Online Published Version . From American Scientist (2008): 76-81.
-
Immanent and transcendent approaches to the theory of meaningIn Roger Gibson & Robert B. Barrett (eds.), Perspectives on Quine, Blackwell. 1990.
-
874Moral relativism defendedPhilosophical Review 84 (1): 3-22. 1975.My thesis is that morality arises when a group of people reach an implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with one another. Part of what I mean by this is that moral judgments - or, rather, an important class of them - make sense only in relation to and with reference to one or another such agreement or understanding. This is vague, and I shall try to make it more precise in what follows. But it should be clear that I intend to argue for a version of what has be…Read more
-
2027. Reflections on Language, by Noam Chomsky; On Noam Chomsky: Critical EssaysIn Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Princeton University Press. pp. 133-140. 2014.
-
68General foundations versus rational insight (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.BonJour offers two main reasons for supposing that there is such a thing as rational insight into necessity. First, he says there are many examples in which it clearly seems that one has such insight. Second, he argues that any epistemology denying the existence of rational insight into necessity is committed to a narrow skepticism. After commenting about possible frameworks for epistemological justification, I argue against these two claims in reverse order.
-
30How do people reason about the what follows from certain assumptions? How do they think about implications between statements. According to one theory, people try to use a small number of mental rules of inference to construct an argument for or proof of a relevant conclusion from the assumptions (e.g., Rips 1994). According to a competing theory, people construct one or more mental models of the situation described in the assumptions and try to determine what conclusion fits with the model or mo…Read more
-
26Book Review:Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A Theory of Judgment. Howard Margolis (review)Ethics 100 (1): 200-. 1989.
-
38Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2): 251-251. 1983.
-
367Practical reasoningIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63. 1997.
-
89Can science understand the mind?In George Armitage Miller & Gilbert Harman (eds.), Conceptions of the human mind: essays in honor of George A. Miller, L. Erlbaum Associates. pp. 111--121. 1993.
-
70Some philosophical issues in cognitive scienceIn Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science, Mit Press. 1989.
-
8182What is moral relativism?In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals, D. Reidel. pp. 143--161. 1978.
-
1Pragmatism and reasons for beliefIn Christopher B. Kulp (ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield. 1997.
-
21New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (review)Journal of Philosophy 98 (5): 265-269. 2001.
-
85Review of Piotr stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Volume 1: The Formal Turn; Volume 2: The Philosophical Turn (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2). 2011.
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America