Philip J. Nickel

As a moral philosopher, the perspective I will take in this chapter is one of argumentation and informed judgment about two main questions: whether individuals should ever choose to conduct human embryonic stem cell research, and whether the law should permit this type of research. I will also touch upon a secondary question, that of whether the government ought to pay for this type of research. I will discuss some of the main arguments at stake, and explain how the ethical conflict over these questions differs from the political conflict over them. I will be guided throughout by the assumption that the unique scientific and clinical promise of human embryonic stem cell research is significant. Those who have doubts about this assumption should consult other chapters in this volume in which the issue is addressed directly. I begin with one of the basic facts relevant to the ethical issue of stem cell research: you and I, along with everybody else we know, developed out of clumps of primordial cells, which happen to be the very same clumps that serve as the source for human embryonic stem cells in the laboratory. Let us call these “source cells” for short, since they can be used in this way. Each individual has developed into whatever she is now out of a one-celled animal, which then became a blastocyst, a multi-celled human embryo. These blastocysts are partly made up of an inner mass of cells, and the body of every adult person has developed out of this inner mass. It is this very same clump from the inner part of the blastocyst that consists of source cells for human embryonic stem 1 cell research. These cells can be extracted and grown into a laboratory specimen of extraordinary interest to scientists. Before discussing the significance of the fact that all humans originate from these source cells, it is useful to begin by asking some perhaps rather simple-minded questions about how any one of us knows this fact to be true in the first place. How do I know that I developed from a single cell, and then a blastocyst? In my own case, the main way I know this is that other people have told me so..

In the 60+ years that the modern concept of informed consent has been around, researchers in various fields of practice, especially medical ethics, have developed new models to overcome theoretical and practical problems. While (systematic) literature reviews of such models exist within given fields (e.g., genetic screening), this article breaks ground by analyzing academic literature on consent models across fields. Three electronic research databases (Scopus, Google Scholar, and Web of Science) were searched for publications mentioning informed consent models. The titles, abstracts, and if applicable, full publications were screened and coded. The resulting data on fields, models, and themes were then analyzed. We scanned 300 sources from three databases to find 207 uniquely named consent models, and created a network visualization displaying which models occur primarily in one field, and which models overlap between fields. This analysis identifies trends in the consent debate in different fields, as well as common goals of consent models. The most frequently occurring consent models are identified and defined. The analysis contributes toward a cross-disciplinary “consent design toolkit” and highlights that there are more interrelationships between models and fields than are acknowledged in the literature. Where some models are designed to solve distinctively field-specific issues and are specific to biomedical ethics, some may be adaptable and applicable for other fields including engineering and design.

Moral dependence is taking another person's assertion or "testimony" that C as a reason to believe C , such that whatever justificatory force is associated with the person's testimony endures or remains as one's reason for believing C. People are justified in relying on one another's testimony in non-moral matters. The dissertation takes up the question whether the same is true for moral beliefs. ;My method is to divide the topic into three somewhat separate questions. First, there is the epistemological question, what if anything gives me reason to believe that another person's moral claim is likely to be true. Second, there is the psychological question, whether moral dependence is, in fact, part of the rational explanation of why people hold the moral beliefs they do. Third, there is the moral question, whether a person can be a good moral agent while being morally dependent. ;I answer these questions as follows. First, in response to the epistemological question, I argue that there is a justification for moral dependence based on identifying people who are good moral deliberators. I also argue that there is an unreliable justification for moral dependence based on cooperation and trust. This latter, trust-based justification is unreliable because it is possible to trust and cooperate with those who are morally bad. ;Second, in response to the psychological question, I argue that moral dependence is part of the rational explanation of moral belief. This is true even though there is some reason to hold that a testimonial justification cannot rationally explain moral belief when there is also a non-testimonial justification available for that same belief. I also argue that moral dependence rationally explains moral development, both because it explains how children come to believe the particular things they do, and also because it can explain how children come to employ new forms of moral justification. ;Third, in response to the moral question, I argue that autonomy limits moral dependence, but that relying on moral testimony can also bring one to be more aware of what is morally important