Hennie Lötter

Most of us can easily identify human beings suffering from poverty, but find it slightly more difficult to understand poverty properly. In this essay I want to deepen our understanding of poverty by interpreting the conventional definitions of poverty in a new light. I start with a defence of a claim that poverty is a concept uniquely applicable to humans. I then present a critical discussion of the distinction between absolute and relative poverty. I argue that a revision of this distinction can provide us general standards applicable to humans everywhere.

How can citizens be made just? I focus on how modern constitutional democracies can entice, convince, and guide their citizens to become just. I rely chiefly on Rawls's theory of justice, as well as the work of sociologist Derek L. Phil lips. I argue that internal control by citizens themselves is the best option. This view is attractive because every citizen can play a part in establishing and maintaining the public conception of justice by being role models, engaging in dialogue with fellow citizens, or by simply doing their part in maintaining just institutions.

Poverty violates fundamental human values through its impact on individuals and on human environments, and it goes against the core values of democratic societies. Drawing on numerous scientific studies as well as his own experience witnessing the systematic poverty in his home country of South Africa, H. P. P. [Hennie] Lötter presents a holistic profile of poverty and its effects on human lives all the while accounting for the complexity of each individual case. He argues that shared ethical values must guide the planning and distribution of aid and that our society must reevaluate our notions of justice and reimagine the role of the state in order to enable collective human responsibility for poverty’s successful eradication

The contemporary debate on justice is understandably dominated by theories and arguments addressing the problems of justice pertinent to nearly just societies, as virtually all the theorists participating in this debate live in such societies. They are obviously, and rightly so, first and foremost concerned with the philosophical problems of their own societies. Although almost all the contemporary theories of justice were formulated in the context of nearly just societies, why can we not apply them to the issues and problems of radically unjust societies? The view that such a move is permissible and wise is at present no more than an unexamined assumption, an unargued view. Such an unargued view leads to the suspicion that a strong case may be made that radically unjust societies generate problems of social and political justice that should be considered in their own right. This does not imply that theories of justice developed in the context of, and aimed at, those issues current in nearly just societies should be disregarded or discarded. What is required are arguments to indicate to what extent the theoretical insights and wisdom contained in these theories can be utilized in a discussion of the social and political problems of radically unjust societies. I argue for the view that the contemporary debate on justice contains a major deficiency. In this article, I attempt to specify this major deficiency, namely that exclusive attention is given to the problems of nearly just societies while the problems of radically unjust societies are mostly ignored. The strategy will be to raise issues pertinent to radically unjust societies and note the extent to which clear and unambiguous solutions could be provided by participants in the contemporary debate on justice.