Hennie Lötter

The fate of the half a million or so free-ranging elephants in Africa depends on the choices people will make. What ‘moral standing’ do elephants deserve, and thus what constraints should we impose on our behaviour towards them? To assess the state of our knowledge about ethics and elephants is no easy affair. Different views on the moral standing of elephants and thus the obligations humans owe elephants, are not really a matter of scientific knowledge, although such knowledge might deeply influence our chosen ethics. At stake are human value choices that are developed through argument and discussion into ethical positions that suggest, prescribe, or legislate acceptable behaviour, and proscribe or discourage unacceptable treatment of elephants. The point of this assessment is thus to determine which ethical positions have been developed on various matters concerning the management of elephants and have been justified through reasoning. This chapter portrays the different ethical views relevant to the management of elephants that are present in some or other form in the public domain. The aim is to make readers aware of the multiplicity of ethical issues involved in elephant management, as seen from a variety of ethical viewpoints. The complexity of the benefits and harm that accompany different management options will be clarified. The chapter is divided into five sections: (1) our human responsibility towards elephants, (2) the accountability of elephant custodians, (3) the moral standing of elephants, (4) ethical theories, and (5) ethics and management options.

Abstract What is justice all about? What is the scope of the concept of justice? What issues can legitimately be evaluated in terms of justice? In her book Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young challenges the concept of justice as defined by John Rawls and used by many others in the philosophical debates that responded to Rawls’s, A Theory of Justice (1971). Is Young’s critique on the prevailing use of the concept of justice and contemporary theories of justice correct? Is her alternative understanding of the concept viable? In this paper I want to critically examine her views on the concept of justice and compare them with a close reading of John Rawls’s use of the concept of justice. The comparison of Young and Rawls will lead me to reconcile their views in terms of the central features of the concept of justice

In the introductory chapter of this book I firstly argue that the contemporary debate on justice focuses exclusively on matters of justice pertinent to nearly just societies; in the second place, I suggest that radically unjust societies generate problems of justice that cannot be solved by the naive application of current theories of justice. It follows that these problems of justice for unjust societies demand to be discussed in their own right. -/- In what follows, just such an attempt will be made to extend the scope of the contemporary debate on justice by developing a theory of justice for a radically unjust society. The chapters seek to remedy the several deficiencies of the contemporary debate on justice. -/- Thus, in Chapter Two suggestions will be made on how to identify injustice so that people can learn to see their experiences of suffering, degradation, humiliation, and oppression in terms of justice and injustice. In Chapter Three a standpoint will be developed on the relation between universal and particular elements in a theory of justice. Chapter Four serves two functions that are intertwined and cannot be easily separated. It functions first as a guide for making the second transition involved in the identification of injustice: to articulate theoretically the experiences of injustice. The second function is to provide a method for the design, construction, and justification of a theory of justice for a specific society. -/- In Chapter Five the relation between considerations of justice and forms of political action for the transformation of injustice into justice will be explored. Chapter Six then investigates the possible role that cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious pluralism has to play in theorizing about justice, and it asks how justice can be secured for every person in such a society. In the concluding section of Chapter Six the need for an ongoing dialogue between members of a political community is emphasized as the best way for settling disputes on matters of justice.

If humans may indeed legitimately intervene in conservation areas to let nature be and to protect the lives of all the diverse individual animals under their care, then the management of elephants must be legitimate as part of the conservation of natural world diversities. If this is so, to what extent are current management options ethically acceptable? In this article I address the ethics of the management options available once the judgement has been made that there are too many elephants in a conservation area. I evaluate the ethical acceptability of four options, i.e., the simulation of nature, translocation, contraception, and culling. I furthermore ask whether the harsh blow of culling under very specific conditions can be softened by the taming and training of African elephants. I then examine the ethics of decision making about these issues. Before I do so, two issues must be discussed that decisively influence the management of elephants. The one is whether it is ethically justifiable to fence in elephants. The second is the ethical requirements of the scientific practice that informs management decisions. In the article I come to the conclusion that all four options are ethically flawed. All four require some violation of the important injunction to let nature be and to treat individual animals with respect. However, to do nothing and allow a loss of other species violates the important goal of conserving natural world diversity.

The reluctance to eradicate poverty shown by citizens and governments of many modern constitutional democracies is puzzling. If poverty threatens societies in various ways, why would many countries with a strongly agreed upon system of democratic governance fail so painfully to find the commitment and appropriate action to eradicate poverty? In this essay I want to investigate the discordance between poverty and democracy. I will first briefly articulate the broad underlying values of modern constitutional democracies. Then I will analyze the ways in which poverty violates the underlying values of democracy. Next I will try to explain why poverty is still widespread in democracies, despite the multiple ways it violates democratic values. Finally I will look at the implications of my findings in terms of the functions of democratic values in contemporary democracies.