Valeriano Iranzo

Ciencia, valores y relativismo discute el papel desempeñado por los valores en la práctica científica. El subtítulo del libro-una defensa de la filosofía de la ciencia-es asimismo indicativo de la posición que defiende Rodríguez Alcázar. La crisis del fundamentismo en la teoría del conocimiento, y el derrumbe de la Concepción Heredada en la filosofía de la ciencia, han llevado a cuestionar la legitimidad del propio discurso filosófico sobre la ciencia y el conocimiento. Enfoques como el pragmatismo rortyano, el anarquismo epistemológico de Feyerabend, o las escuelas sociologistas, manifiestan este rechazo. Contra estas corrientes, las tesis nucleares de Ciencia, valores y relativismo son, primero, que la filosofía de la ciencia se distingue del resto de ciencias de la ciencia por su perspectiva normativa; y, segundo, que una filosofía de la ciencia así entendida permite evitar tanto el fundamentismo como el relativismo.

Una estrategia recientemente utilizada por los defensores deI realismo científico ha sido derivar implicaciones ontológicas deI contexto manipulativo-experimental. EI artículo pretende comparar y valorar dos enfoques diferentes deI argumento de la manipulabilidad -I. Hacking y R. Harré-, cuya idea basíca es que, de cara a establecer la existencia de una entidad, manipularla puede ser tan importante corno observarla. Por último, a fin de evitar los aspectos más cuestionables de ambos enfoques, propongo entender la eficacia manipulativa corno obtención de informacion fiable. The ‘manipulability argument’ has been reeently employed in favour of scientific realism. The underlying idea is that, in order to establish the existence of an entity, manipulating it is so important as observing it. Two different approaches to the ’manipulability argument’ are compared: Ian Hacking’s ‘experimental realism’ and Rom Harré’s ‘depth realism’. In order to avoid the most controversial aspects of both approaches, I suggest that manipulative efficacy be understood as the attainment of reliable information

The paper analyzes which is the proper role of history of science in philosophy of science. I argue that, traditionally, philosophy of science has focused on the normative dimension of science. Several positions within philosophy of science stem from different perspectives on such dimension. I classify them according to two variables . Then I discuss the role of history of science within all these four alternatives. I conclude that: philosophers and historians pursue not only different, but opposite aims; historical evidence is useful for assessing the relation between methods and results; besides this, only very simple or radical philosophical views can be “refuted” by historical evidence; the disagreement between those who think that history of science is necessary for philosophy of science and those who think it is not is, in fact, a disagreement about the prospects for a generaltheory of science; such disagreement cannot be resolved appealing to historical evidence; if it can be resolved, philosophical arguments should somehow be invoked

Van Fraassen's argument from the "bad lot" challenges realist interpretations of inference to the best explanation (IBE). In this paper I begin by discussing the replies suggested by S. Psillos and P. Lipton. I do not find them convincing. However, I think that van Fraassen's argument is flawed. First of all, it is a non sequitur. Secondly, I think that the real target for the scientific realist is the underlying assumption that epistemic justification results from a comparative assessment among rival explanations. I argue that justification for believing an explanation does not depend on comparison, but on the extent that criteria of explanatory goodness are fulfilled. Therefore, in addition to offering more or less intuitive IBE-tailored arguments, realists fond of IBE should have to analyze the implicit standards of explanatory goodness. In the last section I distinguish between contextual and transcontextual criteria concerning explanatory goodness. Concerning the latter, I focus on consilience, simplicity, analogy and conservatism.