Attila Tanyi

My aim in this paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-based Reasons Model or the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then consider attempts to argue against the Model through its naturalism. I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is the indirect version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s more recent Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case the reduction they propose is tolerable. This, however, means that in order to see if the objections work, we must analyze the particular reductions proposed. Hence, though not knock down arguments as they were intended to be, the indirect OQA and TO may pose threat to the Model.

According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist requirements and, on average, find more extreme demands less reasonable, the level of disagreement with consequentialism falls short of qualifying as a widely shared intuition, even when demands are the highest. The article then ends with a general discussion of possible objections to its methods and its findings.

This book provides a survey of the ethical aspects of health care resources distribution. It first distinguishes health from health care in an effort to clear up the ethical landscape. After this, still with the same purpose, it makes a distinction between problems of macro-allocation and micro-allocation. In the rest of the book two questions of macro-allocation are treated in some detail. First, several approaches – in particular: utilitarian, egalitarian, communitarian, and libertarian – to the question whether we have a right to health care are assessed. Second, it is discussed how best, if we have such a right, health care resources are allocated given obvious budget constraints. Here again the major theories discussed are utilitarian, communitarian, and egalitarian. Although it is not the aim of the book to propose a new theory of the ethics of health care resource distribution, the critical approach throughout is broadly egalitarian in spirit.