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30Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Ronald N. Giere (review)Philosophy of Science 57 (4): 729-731. 1990.
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144The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory. Arthur Fine (review)Philosophy of Science 55 (1): 155-156. 1988.
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136Referential and Perspectival RealismSpontaneous Generations 9 (1): 151-164. 2018.Ronald Giere has argued that at its best science gives us knowledge only from different “perspectives,” but that this knowledge still counts as scientific realism. Others have noted that his “perspectival realism” is in tension with scientific realism as traditionally understood: How can different, even conflicting, perspectives give us what there is really? This essay outlines a program that makes good on Giere’s idea with a fresh understanding of “realism” that eases this tension.
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An Interpretative Introduction to Quantum Field TheoryBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1): 152-153. 1996.
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90Robots, Action, and the “Essential Indexical”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 763-771. 2011.
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348Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics1British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1): 71-81. 1986.One can give a strong sense to the idea that a relation does not 'reduce' to non-relational properties by saying that a relation does not supervene upon the non-relational properties of its relata. That there are such inherent relations I call the doctrine of relational holism, a doctrine which seems to conflict with traditional ideas about physicalism. At least parts of classical physics seem to be free of relational holism, but quantum mechanics, on at least some interpretations, incorporates …Read more
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12Some Discussion and Extension of Manfred Bierwisch's Work on German AdjectivalsFoundations of Language 5 (2): 185-217. 1969.
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7Review: Karel Lambert, Gordon G. Brittan, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (2): 476-477. 1982.
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5Comments on Niiniluoto and UchiiPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976. 1976.
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321Goodman's theory of projectionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (3): 219-238. 1969.
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1Subjectivity and knowing what it's likeIn Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter. 1992.
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1A contemporary look at emergenceIn Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter. 1992.
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98Infinite renormalizationPhilosophy of Science 56 (2): 238-257. 1989.In quantum field theory divergent expressions are "discarded", leaving finite expressions which provide the best predictions anywhere in science. In fact, this "renormalization procedure" involves no mystery or illegitimate operations. This paper explains, in terms accessible to non-experts, how the procedure really works and explores some different ways in which physicists have suggested that one understand it
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23Truth Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical LogicPhilosophical Review 84 (2): 276. 1975.
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76Critical Study: Nancy Cartwright's The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of ScienceNoûs 36 (4): 699-725. 2002.
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2Representation in scienceIn Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Routledge. 2008.
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34A metaphysics for contemporary field theoriesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (4): 507-522. 1997.
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3Quantum mechanics and haecceitiesIn Elena Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies, Princeton University Press. pp. 114--141. 1998.
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87Vacuum Concepts, Potentia, and the Quantum Field Theoretic Vacuum Explained for AllMidwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1): 332-342. 1993.
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132Modeling, Truth, and PhilosophyMetaphilosophy 43 (3): 257-274. 2012.Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby sh…Read more
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24The Projection Postulate and Bohr's Interpretation of Quantum MechanicsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980 201-223. 1980.This article explains why Bohr does not need to discuss the projection postulate or the "problem of measurement". Beginning with a thumbnail sketch of Bohr 's general views, it is argued that Bohr interprets the state function as giving a statistical summary of experimental outcomes. Against the objection that Bohr was too much a microrealist to endorse such an instrumentalist statistical interpretation it is suggested that he rejected the issue of microrealism as not well formed. It is shown th…Read more
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126How we dapple the worldPhilosophy of Science 71 (4): 425-447. 2004.This essay endorses the conclusion of Sklar’s “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World” that he announces in his abstract, that notwithstanding recent attacks foundational theories are universal in their scope. But Sklar’s rejection of a “pluralist ontology” is questioned. It is concluded that so called “foundational” and “phenomenological” theories are on a much more equal footing as sources of knowledge than Sklar would allow, that “giving an ontology” generally involves dealing in idealizations, …Read more
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163The gauge argumentPhilosophy of Science 67 (3): 481. 2000.This paper examines the so-called "gauge argument" sometimes used by physicists to motivate the introduction of gauge fields, here facilitated by an informal exposition of the fiber bundle formalism. The discussion suggests some preliminary ways of understanding the connection between gauge fields and interactions
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ReductionIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 679--80. 1995.