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Marius Usher

Tel Aviv University
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  •  Publications
    37
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  • Tel Aviv University
    Regular Faculty
  • All publications (37)
  •  108
    'Tis all in pieces (separate RFs and CFs), all coherence gone
    with Ernst Neibur
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 693-694. 1997.
    We argue that the separation between CF (contextual field) and RF (receptive field) in relation to the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) system is empirically questionable and that it is functionally unnecessary. In addition, the proposed suppression of unexpected information will in many cases be counterproductive.
    Aspects of ConsciousnessRepresentation in Neuroscience
  •  172
    Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?
    Mind and Language 19 (2): 241-248. 2004.
    The merit of the SINBAD model is to provide an explicit mechanism showing how the cortex may come to develop detectors responding to correlated properties and therefore corresponding to the sources of these correlations. Here I argue that, contrary to the article, SINBAD neurosemantics does not need to rely on teleofunctions to solve the problem of misrepresentation. A number of difficulties for the teleofunction theories of content are reviewed and an alternative theory based on categorization …Read more
    The merit of the SINBAD model is to provide an explicit mechanism showing how the cortex may come to develop detectors responding to correlated properties and therefore corresponding to the sources of these correlations. Here I argue that, contrary to the article, SINBAD neurosemantics does not need to rely on teleofunctions to solve the problem of misrepresentation. A number of difficulties for the teleofunction theories of content are reviewed and an alternative theory based on categorization performance and statistical relations is argued to provide a better account and to come closer to the practice in neuroscience and to powerful intuitions on swampkinds and on broad/narrow content.
    Naturalizing Mental Content, MiscTeleological Accounts of Mental ContentRepresentation in Neuroscien…Read more
    Naturalizing Mental Content, MiscTeleological Accounts of Mental ContentRepresentation in Neuroscience
  •  77
    Postscript: Through TCM, STM shines bright
    with Eddy J. Davelaar, Henk J. Haarmann, and Yonatan Goshen-Gottstein
    Psychological Review 115 (4): 1116-1118. 2008.
    Søren Kierkegaard
  •  51
    The neurodynamics of choice, value-based decisions and preference reversal
    with Anat Elhalal and James L. McClelland
    In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science, Oxford University Press. pp. 277--300. 2008.
    Preferences in Decision Theory
  •  72
    Disentangling decision models: From independence to competition
    with Andrei R. Teodorescu
    Psychological Review 120 (1): 1-38. 2013.
    Theory in Economics
  •  158
    Dynamics of decision-making: from evidence accumulation to preference and belief
    with Konstantinos Tsetsos, Erica C. Yu, and David A. Lagnado
    Frontiers in Psychology 4. 2013.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  69
    The Demise of Short-Term Memory Revisited: Empirical and Computational Investigations of Recency Effects
    with Eddy J. Davelaar, Yonatan Goshen-Gottstein, Amir Ashkenazi, and Henk J. Haarmann
    Psychological Review 112 (1): 3-42. 2005.
    Memory and Cognitive Science
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