Daniel Schulthess

The article proposes an interpretation of the role of practical reason in Hume. The starting point is the distinction between strong practical reason and weak practical reason. The distinction concerns the assignment of values to states of affairs: strong practical reason is itself involved in this assignment of values, whereas weak practical reason only deliberates on the basis of given assignments. According to the author of the article Hume, showing how our choices are produced from a mechanics of passions, refutes not only strong but also weak practical reason. In the last part of the article the author, relying on the distinction that Hume makes between calm and violent passions, attempts to defend a rationalist conception of the deliberative dynamic, which reserves for reason an arbiter role on the passions.

The authors begins with the observation that jokes can have a different moral import: some may even be edifying. Is humor therefore to be integrated into an overall moral perspective? One of the leading philosophers of the 19th century, S. Kierkegaard, pleaded for such an integration. The best way to understand why he took such a stand is to articulate the edifying jokes - or rather the humor that underlies them - in terms of Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication. However, this pushes the problem one step further: the main challange being to understand why indirect communication should be expected to have a positive moral import.

The letters published here belong to the ‘Fonds Pierre Prevost’ held by the Library of Geneva. Our presentation of the letters is modelled on that of the published correspondences of Adam Smith and Thomas Reid. Our aim in transcribing the letters that follow has been to establish a clean and reliable text with minimal editorial intervention. We have made no attempt to normalise the spellings, capitalisation, and apparently aberrant usage found in the letters or to modernise the punctuation, and we have not expanded the contractions that occur in the original texts. However, Prevost’s contractions in Letters 13 and 15 are likely to provide major problems for most readers, and we have therefore added an appendix in which these contractions have been written out.

Thomas Reid’s influence on continental and especially on French philosophy at the beginning of the 19th century has to be considered against the background of the crisis of the philosophical project of the moderns. This project, which is intimately related to the rise of the modern scientific world image, has one of its major tenets in the so called “theory of ideas” introduced by Descartes and developed further by Locke. By emphasizing the role of our active faculties in the formulation of judgements, Reid rejects this theory. One of the consequences of this rejection is the distinction Reid makes between sensations, which are passive, and perceptions, which are active. Maine de Biran picks up Reid’s emphasis on our active powers but reinterprets it on the light of his theory of the “primitive fact” that external objects resist our efforts to move them, thus providing a unifying principle for Reid’s “principles of common sense”.

The text shortly introduces Rousseau’s De l’imitation théatrale (1764). Rousseau’s writing is basically a translation of the first pages of Book X of Plato’s Republic. On the one hand, Rousseau shares with Plato the ethical rigor that, in view of a certain political project, leads to the moral condemnation of theatrical practices. On the other hand, the metaphysical assumptions on which Plato’s critique relies are much heavier than those of Rousseau, whose sensualistic nominalism is incompatible with the metaphysical realism about universals that underlies the arguments of Book X of the Republic. In this respect, it is surprising that Rousseau refers to Book X rather than Book III, in which the same critique of theatrical spectacles is developed from a psychological and moral point of view.

The author, referring in particular to Jonas Cohn’s Theorie der Dialektik, interprets Hegel’s dialectic in the light of the Aristotelian principle of the priority of actuality over potentiality. The principle finds application especially in the field of the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, which is thought from the point of view of Absolute Knowledge as actuality of the Spirit. In this regard the main issue is to understand the nature of the limitations that Spirit encounters on the way of the actualization of its potentialities. The most extreme form of limitation is contradiction, which historically is given in the form of conflict between philosophical doctrines. Some philosophers, like Kant, sees limitation as intrinsic to cognitive activity. According to Hegel, the thought of limitation is contradictory, since it presupposes the thought of what lies beyond the limit.

Alphonse Guillebert (1792-1861), pastor, teacher and politician, was one of the leading figures of the Academy of Neuchâtel, founded in 1838 and opened to students in the autumn of 1840. In this article, we will first offer a brief biography, then indications on the various facets of the written work of our author. We have used only a part of the available sources and we are therefore aware that further study would be worthwhile. In the following, we describe the philosophy course of Guillebert, and finally we look at an essay – the Dissertation sur l’unité en philosophie – in which he was more personal than in his teaching. Marked by the French intellectual climate of the first half of the nineteenth century, our author was able, by opening himself to Germany, to introduce his listeners to the main philosophical doctrines of his time.

The text shortly introduces Rousseau’s Lettres Morales, which result from the conversations he had with Mme Houdetot in the years 1757-1758. It is interesting to notice that in contrast to other important philosophical works based on a love relationship (one can think of Plato’s Symposium and the role of Diotima, but also of Boethius’s Philosophia in the Consolatio or Dante’s Beatrice in the Divine Comedy), in Rousseau’s letters it is the man who has the leading role, whereas the woman figure, Sophie, is characterized by youthful spontaneity and even a certain naivety.

The article discusses in detail Nicholas Rescher’s book Scientific Progess: A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science (1978). Rescher discusses the possibilities of further progress for science. According to Rescher there are no limits by principles to scientific progress. Among the positions which postulate an end of scientific progress there are some which see the reason in the finiteness of nature, others in the finitude of our intellectual resources. According to Rescher science arises from the interaction between nature and our intellectual instruments, and the combinatory of these interactions in infinite. On the other hand, there is an economic limit to scientific progress, due to the growth of the marginal costs of the scientific enterprise: the costs grow exponentially, that is to say that the yields grow only logarithmically compared to the investments.

The article compares Descartes’ and Leibniz’ use of the concept of a machine. For Descartes, the activity of the engineers rises to become the model for the scientific enterprise: one proceeds from the simple and the familiar to explain the complex. In this way one can escape the sheer astonishment about the complexity of the machines and their effects. This mechanical model is extended also to the explanation of the living beings. Also Leibniz regards living beings as machines. The difference between living and inanimate machines is that in the case of the former their parts are machine-like all the way down, to the infinite. Another peculiarity of the living machines is their infinite convolution that allows them to maintain their individual identity over time. The author also points to the self-similar character of the folds.

The author focuses on the role that the epistemic practice of questioning, as it is presented in the Platonic dialogues, plays by Socrates. A comparison with Hintikka’s theory of questioning in proposed: in Hintikka’s account it is the questioner who endeavours to obtain new knowledge by asking someone who presumptively possesses that knowledge, whereas Socrates questions his interlocutors to wake in them the awareness of a knowledge they don’t know to possess. The origin of this knowledge is to be searched in the ideal “vision” that pertains to the immortal soul. But the dialogic practice aims also to the propositional articulation of the knowledge we become aware of: we must become able to “give reasons” (λόγον διδόναι) for our beliefs. This is the source of the Aristotelian theory of argumentation developed in the Topics.

L’éthique est opérante dans la politique même si son rôle reste parfois difficile à percevoir. L’article relève la volonté des rédacteurs des constitutions de contraindre les détenteurs d’offices politiques à se montrer à la hauteur des exigences éthiques, par la mise en place des dispositifs institutionnels les plus divers poursuivant cette fin (comme les élections et les mandats de durée limitée). L’article met en évidence aussi le rôle d’une vision normative, « aristotélicienne » de la politique, dans laquelle éthique et politique convergent entièrement. Cette vision normative constitue une stimulation bienvenue pour toute société et pour tout gouvernement. Mais elle constitue aussi un facteur d’opacité dans la conduite des affaires de la collectivité, dans la mesure où elle rend inavouable tout ce qui ne se situe pas à son niveau. Les exigences éthiques, en rendant les hommes rétifs à cette opacité, constituent un facteur de crise pour la politique.

Is the classical model of action, damage, and responsibility, which is based on the idea that it is always possible to individuate the direct or indirect damages resulting from a certain individual or collective action, still valid in the case of the environmental consequences of industrial production and mass consumption? We argue that the absence of a classical plaintiff in these cases implies that we have to conceive of the consequences of our individual actions (as consumers of industrial goods for example) in a new manner: the moral and juridical evaluation of our actions and the assessment of individual responsibility is no more bound to a clearly identifiable damage.

Starting from an anecdote reported by Ernst Mach in the Analysis of Sensations, the author shows how the distinction between intentionality de re and intentionality de se can contribute to solving the individuation problem, at least for those individuals who are capable of self-referentiality. Intentionality is expressed linguistically in the form of the oratio obliqua, in the context of which the subordinate can be false even when the whole is true. The analysis of the conditions of falsity of the subordinate tells us that this can be false either because the predicate does not fit to the subject or by a failure of reference, conceived according to the descriptive theory of reference. The intentionality de se is peculiar precisely by the fact that in this case the reference cannot fail and uniquely individuates the haecceitas of the intentional subject.

When we deal with the concept of identity in political sociology (e.g. national identity, regional identity, etc.) we have first to ask some general question about the concept of identity and distinguish between numerical identity (which encompasses identity through time) and specific or type identity. Some theses can be advanced about identity in political sociology: 1) The identity in question is type identity; 2) This type identity is an artefact; 3) This artefactual identity concerns only those traits that are accidental, i.e. not essential for their bearer; 4) The concerned traits should be either non-relational or relational but implying non-relational traits; 5) in order to define the identity of a group, the traits should be choose not only so that all the group members possess them (weak identity) but also so that only the group members possess them (strong identity).

In his Theory of moral Sentiments , Adam Smith does not deal only with interpersonal moral issues. He also addresses some economic and political consequences that tie with his analysis of ‘sympathy’. Interestingly, these socially relevant outcomes do not feature as products of sympathy proper, but rather as byproducts of certain ‘irregularities’ or biases which affect the way sympathy actually works. The stability of a political society through a system of ‘ranks’ which are spontaneously granted a share of authority thus gets projected beyond the reach of a rational approach, e.g. of a contractarian character. Although the idea of a spontaneous order certainly attracts Adam Smith here as elsewhere, his approach of the economic and political sphere in TMS is nevertheless tinged with a tone of moral criticism which must be taken seriously

The article provides a critical overview of the main theses contained in the book The First Person by Roderick Chisholm. Chisholm's main thesis is that of the priority of the reference de se over reference de re. Chisholm develops firstly a theory of properties according to which these must be able to remain unexemplified. This excludes from the outset that we can reinterpret the indexical term “I” (the first person) in the sense of a property, since an indexical term always refers to an existing particular object, so that the property in question would necessarily be exemplified. The sentences relating to the first person (de se) are not propositions but attributions, from which one can derive both the sentences de re as well as sentences de dicto (intentional attitudes). These sentences can have as subjects persons other than the “I”.

Among the salient aspects of laughter; I retain its aptitude to administer a kind of punishment – albeit of a relatively mild character. Henri Bergson did not hesitate to adopt for himself the traditional formula that "laughter chastises the ways of life" (Laughter, I.2). I maintain that laughter, seen under this angle, simultaneously conveys an evaluation (commonly a depreciative one) and an immediately implemented punishment. This twofold nature makes of laughter a very specific kind of behavior. The starting point of our approach is the following: as human behavior generally, laughter is itself susceptible of an evaluation. It is of the kind that can be applied to acts of evaluation, and also of the kind that may be applied to punishments. Under the light of this second-order evaluation, laughter may be considered as appropriate or not, as acceptable or not, as deserved or not. This depends principally on the object of laughter. I try to describe some of the norms that are relevant at this second-order level. I also expect such norms to extend their relevance to humor, insofar as it sets out to bring about laughter. The norms that appear at this second-order level (mostly restrictive norms) have a strong social and contextual character. We may describe them without recognizing them as binding. Nevertheless, they do not lack an authority of their own. This is not to say that they are above criticism. There is much to say about humor in ethical and juridical terms. I describe summarily some conflicts of norms that may appear at this second-order level, and claim that there is a dialectical arrangement that best permits to understand how these norms work together.

The article develops the conception that Leibniz has of organisms as machines of a particular type, differing from artificial machines because 1. all the parts of an organic machine are in turn composed by smaller machines and thus to infinity; and 2. the maintenance of the individual identity in living machines is provided by the fact that they have folds going to infinity which can unfold and fold back, thus allowing infinite transformations of the body. The author then discusses these two theses. With respect to thesis 1 the question is how the idea that the artificial machines have parts which are not in their turn machines is compatible with the mechanistic worldview hold by Leibniz. With respect to thesis 2 the author emphasizes the fact that Leibniz's conception of the infinite convolution of the organic machines seems to anticipate several points in the mathematics of fractal curves.

The article criticizes the interpretation of Thomas Reid’s philosophy as a form of coherentism put forward by Lehrer and Smith. In the author’s view Reid’s “first principles”, which govern the activities of our faculties, rely on a correspondence theory of truth. At the same time the rightness of our first principles in conjunction with the fact that the world is structured in such a way that true judgements about it do not lead to contradiction entails that our “doxastic system” (i.e. the system of our common sense believes) is itself coherent or at least consistent. Although consistence seems to play an important role in respect to some of the first principles recognized by Reid (such as the principle of credulity), on the overall coherence has a rather derivative function in Reid’s philosophy.

Starting from the recognition of the difficulty of establishing peace and the observation that several attempts to terminate conflicts end in failure, the author puts forward the argument that peace is a state that is essentially a by-product, according to the definition given by Jon Elster in his homonymous paper of 1981. Such states are characterized by the fact that they can only be brought about by actions aimed at other ends, i.e. non-intentionally. According to the author it is in the light of this notion that we must consider the strategies implemented by the pacifying power in a so-called pacification war. In fact, what follows from such a war is rarely peace. The question arises to know how much the pacifying power is conscious of this fact and what follows from it both politically and morally.

Table des Matières: Introduction; Chapitre Premier: La conception de la philosophie chez Thomas Reid; Chapitre 2: Le Rôle épistémologique du sens commun; Chapitre 3: La justification des principes du sens commun; Chapitre 4: La perception sensible; Chapitre 5: La perception sensible (suite); Chapitre 6: Les facultés intellectuelles autres que la perception sensible; Chapitre 7: Les facultés actives; Chapitre 8: Le "common sense" chez Reid et quelques conceptions antérieures de la raison naturelle; Conclusion

The causal texture of environmental problems is very different from the causal aspects which are relevant in other cases of moral or legal significance. The author suggest to take account of this in environmental matters. He takes the various instruments of environmental policy Under scrutiny: regulations, taxes and labels. He argues that labels have strong advantages over the two others instruments: they somehow map the texture of environmental problems and have interesting motivational properties.

The articles critically discusses K. Lehrer’s book Thomas Reid (1989). In particular, the author criticizes some central aspects of Reid’s epistemology of common sense. Two points are particularly problematic: 1) the identification of common sense beliefs: how are the contents of common sense beliefs specified or individuated? The author shows that there are two possibilities for the identification of common sense beliefs – on one understandings these beliefs are explicit, on the other they are implicit and have to be made explicit by philosophers – and that both are problematic. 2) The authority of common sense beliefs: according to Reid the source of their authority is their innate character, but this is problematic. The author concludes that the actuality of Reid lies less in his epistemology than in his psychology, which will be continued by Brentano and Husserl.