Daniel Schulthess

The article deals with the role of questions in the process of acquiring knowledge. Starting from the classical definition of knowledge as true and justified opinion, the author shows how the justification of our opinions is based on an epistemic practice in which questions play a fundamental role. Before knowledge we have the stages of ignorance and uncertainty. The latter shows a disjunctive structure that is similar to that of questions. In order for questions to be asked a dimension of libido sciendi or at least a wish to know is necessary. The author concludes, relying on Johannes Daubert, with considerations on questioned states of affairs (Fragverhalte) that can generate knowledge in the form of known states of affairs (Erkenntnisverhalte).

Although, according to the Austrian school, economic competition, since it pushes entrepreneurs to innovations that benefit not only themselves but consumers as well, is supposed to lead to the public good, it is essential to consider also the possibility of cartel formation. In this case a mechanism is set up whereby the prices of goods and services are kept artificially high. The article shows that it is the same entrepreneurial spirit celebrated by the Austrian school that makes that in certain situations, whose logic can be analyzed according to the model of the prisoner’s dilemma, companies agree to keep prices high. The conclusion is that the public good can only be realized through institutional interventions with both legal and ethical dimensions.

Leibniz presents himself, especially in his late correspondence with Remond, as a concordist: in other philosophical views, even distant and ancient ones, he sets out to discover «traces of truth» that are already present there. According to the concordist programme, Leibniz claims, philosophers are right in what they affi rm, and wrong in what they deny. This paradoxical asymmetry is given a logical explanation in the paper, in connection with the topic of «reduplication», i. e. the introduction of qualifi cations in otherwise simple categorical propositions. In order to be right in affi rming a complex disjunctive proposition, it is enough for one of the disjuncts to be true; but in order to be right in negating a complex disjunctive proposition, it is required for all of them to be false. Meanwhile, if one may «qualify» propositions by different reduplications of their terms, in principle one of those qualifi ed propositions is bound to be true. On such presuppositions concordism can be expected to be quite effective as a meta-philosophical perspective

The article considers the questions posed by environmental ethics in the light of the work of Hans Jonas, especially his work Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Jonas centers his ethic on the concept of responsibility, which finds its expression in the categorical imperative that enjoins us to take into account the future effects of our actions. The specification of this imperative generates a series of problems: 1) given that the specification rests on complex causal chains, it has an hypothetical character; 2) the effects that are the object of imperatives are external to our intentions (externality); 3) the complexity of the causal chains involved generates threshold effects; 4) the complexity of the causal chains prevents us from having a complete knowledge of it. The author then considers the possibilities and limits of Jonas' ethics to solve these problems.

The article explores the relationship between the (etymologically related) notions of haphazardness and happiness in the history of Western philosophy. Although a certain popular wisdom sees in happiness a product of the vagaries of life, philosophers have rather tried to decouple the pursuit of happiness from the haphazard. We can distinguish two ways: the way of the Ancients tries to redefine the parameters of a happy life so as to remove it from haphazardness as much as possible (Aristotle) or even totally (Plato, the Stoics); the way of the Moderns tries instead to subjugate the haphazard either by making us “masters and possessors of nature” by the technique (Descartes) or by setting up mechanisms of compensation based on the calculus of probability (insurances). The question of the sometimes conflicting relationship between the two paths is finally raised.

Our aim is to show how the well-known tale of Charles Perrault, Le Petit Poucet, contains the illustration of two principles of rational choice in a situation of uncertainty, the maximin ("to limit the breakage") and the maximax ("to target the best"). It builds in a targeted and economical way highly fluctuating situations which make inapplicable the first while showing the virtualities of the second principle. As such, this children's story has a new reading, which is not without connection to the problem of the decisions of migrants in our troubled world.

Although our moral intuitions lead us to distinguish, with regard to euthanasia, between the omission to treat a terminal patient and the act of actively kill him, consequentialists deny that there is such a distinction. The article considers a logico-mathemtical difficulty following from the consequentialist approach to moral problems, arguing thus for the necessity to take into consideration also other philosophical resources to deal with the issue of euthanasia. Indeed, as soon as one considers a population varying both in its composition and in its size as the whole in respect to which the consequences of an action have to be assessed, the problem arises that there are many possible optima, so that the assessment is difficult or even impossible.

The article deals with Kierkegaard's conception of the comic and the role it plays in his thought. The background against which the issue must be tackled is Kierkegaard's critique of modernity: according to Kierkegaard, modernity is characterized by its objectifying tendencies, to which we must oppose the rediscovery of interiority. These two registers correspond to two different linguistic regimes: objectivity to direct communication, interiority to indirect communication. The latter can express itself in the form of the incongruity that grounds the comic, for example when an interlocutor answers a rhetorical question. Such an answer cannot be apprehended literally (objectively) but only by an internal exercise. In the last part of the article the author highlights the different functions that have irony and humour in Kierkegaard’s conception of the stages of existence.

Dans son œuvre L’Amour et L’Occident, Denis de Rougemont a pris pour thème l’amour courtois tel qu’il s’exprime dans la poésie des troubadours du XIIe siècle et dans le roman courtois du XIIIe siècle. Cette définition de l’amour, nouvelle et d’influence majeure, découle selon lui d’une dissidence religieuse, le catharisme, dont elle transpose les contours au vécu de l’amoureux face à sa Dame. Rougemont fait remonter à cette création médiévale beaucoup de facettes de la « passion » telle que la connaissent les temps plus récents. L’article documente à ses débuts la polémique suscitée par le livre, en utilisant des documents restés longtemps inédits (Marrou, Gilson, Massignon). Il met en place les deux niveaux du débat, portant l’un sur la méthode historique, l’autre sur la perméabilité des strates religieuse et profane dans la réalité sociale.

The article sketches a possible argument for the objectivity of the evil. In a first stage the author deals with the emotivist thesis according to which evaluative judgments are nothing other than the expression of our positive or negative emotions toward an object. Although this thesis is rejected, the idea that emotions play a central role by the uttering of an evaluative judgement is retained. It is only by critically examining such judgments that one can eviscerate the objective core they contain. The author proposes a conception of the objectivity of the evil that relies on the notion of social agreement, on which every human society is based. According to this conception, which draws on the philosophical tradition, objective evil is a privation of social agreement, which can take the form of legal or moral faults.

The article deals with Plato’s analysis of the phenomenon of comedy in the Philebus (48a-50e). The laughter aroused by comic spectacles is an example of a purely psychic pleasure mixed with pain. The analysis is articulated in three stages: a) 48b-c: starting from envy (φθόνος) as a form of pain of the soul, it is shown that one can experience pleasure in the face of the ills of those whom we envy; b) 48c-49c: the ridicule (γελοῖον) of the comic characters stems from the fact that they don’t know themselves (against the Delphic precept); c) 49c-50a: even when it is the turn of our friends to be ridiculous, a pain close to envy is mixed to the pleasure of laughter. The article ends by showing the two registers of Plato’s argumentation: to the “hedonist” argument that condemns comedy as a source of pain is interweaved the condemnation of “anti-Delphic” self-ignorance.

The article deals with the problem of the so-called “axiological neutrality” which characterizes modern science. Starting from a psychological conception of intrinsic value as that which is perceived worth being pursued, the author first shows that science can study values only indirectly. There are two senses in which science must remain axiologically neutral: on the one hand, it must avoid all ontological evaluation of its objects (ontological neutrality); on the other hand, it must keep separate the evaluation of its results from the question of justifying them (epistemological neutrality). Nevertheless, values intervene in the scientific research, principally in the form of epistemic values (coherence, simplicity, rationality). At the end the author shows that the ethical and political context determines the framework in which values are assigned.

The article reconstructs Leibniz’s theory of the relation between perceptions and reality. Leibniz’s position is different both from that of Descartes, according to whom the perceptions of the senses, unlike those of the mind, are never perceptions of reality, and from that of Locke, according to whom only the perceptions of primary qualities have a resemblance to reality, whereas secondary qualities do not correspond to anything real. The author shows that, according to Leibniz, the expressive link between perception and reality can be pursued in both directions: the analysis of ordinary perception allows us, on the one hand, to arrive at distinct perceptions of reality; on the other hand, Leibniz shows against Locke that even secondary qualities express a certain reality, namely that of the constitution of our body and of our sensory apparatus.

The article deals with the problem of how works indexical reference to temporal moments (especially to the present) in the philosophy of Leibniz. Leibniz refutes Newton's and Clarke’s theory of absolute time: since there is no sufficient reason to consider the universe as having being created at one absolute moment rather than at another, temporal moments can be individuated only through their reciprocal relation. What then distinguishes reference to the present from reference to the past and to the future? There is a dilemma here: either the difference is real and the principle of sufficient reason seems to fail (given that the relational theory gives only the relational position of temporal moments), or the difference is only ideal. The author shows that the so-called “causal theory” of time does not solve the dilemma and concludes thus that the Leibnizian theory of time might have been better grounded.

The article takes into consideration the opposition between Lifeworld and world of science in the analytic tradition (going back to Descartes and Locke) on the one hand, and in continental authors such as Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger on the other. The two approaches aim at a surpassing of the opposition between Lifeworld and world of science, by different strategies that the author eviscerates. In the last part of the article the author develops a personal theory of the relationship between Lifeworld and world of science: in the wake of the analytic tradition, he denies to the lived world a transcendental autonomy that could ground science; it is rather science that, starting from the positional nature of our relation to the world, should account for our experiences. At the same time the author stresses the limits of à la Quine naturalism in accommodating intentionality and “self-transcendence” (T. Nagel).

In the concrete exercise of practical reason, certain pieces of knowledge are required: they relate to the obligations to which the agent is committed (according to the deontological orientation in practical philosophy), to the actions themselves, as well as to the situations in which the agent operates. It appears that these pieces of knowledge are themselves required by what may be called here “second-order obligations”. The purpose of the article is to identify the place of these obligations and to show the link that they establish between practical and theoretical reason.

A review of Pierre Lucier’s Empirisme logique et langage religieux (1976). The work compares the interpretations of religious language provided by R.B. Braithwaite (who advocates the emotivist interpretation characteristic of logical positivism), of R.M. Hare (who proposes a “transcendental” interpretation seeing in religious language the acknowledgment of an order making possible both moral action and scientific research), and of I.T. Ramsay (who, against logical positivists, defend the possibility for religious language to reveal a transcendent dimension).

L’éthique est opérante dans la politique même si son rôle reste parfois difficile à percevoir. L’article relève la volonté des rédacteurs des constitutions de contraindre les détenteurs d’offices politiques à se montrer à la hauteur des exigences éthiques, par la mise en place des dispositifs institutionnels les plus divers poursuivant cette fin (comme les élections et les mandats de durée limitée). L’article met en évidence aussi le rôle d’une vision normative, « aristotélicienne » de la politique, dans laquelle éthique et politique convergent entièrement. Cette vision normative constitue une stimulation bienvenue pour toute société et pour tout gouvernement. Mais elle constitue aussi un facteur d’opacité dans la conduite des affaires de la collectivité, dans la mesure où elle rend inavouable tout ce qui ne se situe pas à son niveau. Les exigences éthiques, en rendant les hommes rétifs à cette opacité, constituent un facteur de crise pour la politique.